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Taboo, Overview

Robbie Duschinsky
School of Health, Community and Education
Sciences, Northumbria University,
Newcastle, UK

Introduction

"Few people today think of taboo as an exotic word," Steiner ([1952] 1999, pp. 113–114) notes in his classic book on the topic. However, it has an important history in the missionary and anthropological discourse, which continues to shape how the concept is used today.

Definition

"Taboo" is a Polynesian term, which has come to refer in Western academic and public discourses to topics, spaces, or practices that are consecrated as prohibited or to the process itself of marking them off.

Keywords

Ritual; anthropology; forbidden; belief; values

Traditional Debates

In the early anthropological writings of the missionary William Ellis and the Reverend William Robertson Smith, which first popularized the term, "taboo" was the defining characteristic of a "deviant" and "primitive" form of religion. Ellis and Robertson Smith took the fact that the term "taboo" could be used to refer to either ritually pure or impure objects in Polynesian discourse as a measure of heathenism and irrationality. For both authors, the concept of "taboo" stood in contrast to the capacity of Christianity to distinguish between the purity of Christ and the impurity of the devil. It also stood in contrast to the capacity of Western Reason to distinguish between magical and real causality. This anthropological narrative had an anti-Semitic thread, too: as well as characterizing Polynesian belief as dominated by irrational fear of taboo, they also used the term "taboo" comparatively to characterize Jewish ritual as primitive and superstitious dross, superseded by both Christianity and Western Reason.

Expressing pleasure that his missionary work was succeeding in combating beliefs in the meaningfulness of taboos, Ellis (1859, p. 390) stated that "there is every reason to hope that pure Christianity, which imposes none but moral restrictions" will "eventually pervade every portion of the community." Using the Polynesian

term "taboo" as proof of Western moral superiority, for example, Robertson Smith argued that to "distinguish between the holy and the unclean, marks a real advance above savagery. All taboos are inspired by awe of the supernatural, but there is a great moral difference" since "superstition," "being founded on fear, acts merely as a bar to progress" ([1894] 2002, p. 154). It was therefore as a term for deviant and primitive forms of religious prohibition, a set of irrational and fearful behaviors in contrast to the inspired truth of Christianity and Western Reason, that the word "taboo" was first popularized in academic discourses such as the "folk psychology" of Wundt ([1906] 1916, pp. 193–203) and the "anthropology" of Frazer ([1922] 2009, pp. 166–222). Our use of the term "taboo" in both psychological and everyday discourses descends from this bit of imperialist moralism, an agenda which reified even as it popularized the concept, and in doing so has largely undermined its use as an effective psychological construct.

Attending to the usage of the term "taboo" in everyday language ([1952] 1999, pp. 113–114), Steiner noted that "Younger people. . . said they had come across it just as one comes across any other word for the first time: hearing it in common talk." By contrast, "many middle-aged people, both of English and continental extraction, however, first heard of taboo as part of the Freudian vocabulary." Freud's contribution to discussions of "taboo" is complex. In the first instance, he appears not to question the received anthropological tradition in its account of taboo. He states that "the meaning of 'taboo', as we see it, diverges in two contrary directions. To us it means, on the one hand, 'sacred', 'consecrated', and on the other, 'uncanny', 'dangerous', 'forbidden', 'unclean'" ([1913] 2001, p. 18). He interprets the duality identified by Robertson Smith as inherent in taboo as the result of a strong and unacceptable emotional ambivalence, produced in every human being by a repressed and displaced sexual desire for the mother and rivalry with the father. For both primitive societies and for people in modern society suffering from obsessional symptoms, Freud presents the same causal analysis. The tabooed topic, object, or

practice serves as a substitute, receiving the disavowed affect which has been displaced from the subject's parents.

Whereas Ellis and Roberson Smith had placed taboo on the side of the primitive and the irrational, in contrast to Christianity and Western Reason, Freud brings the concept of taboo unnervingly close, as a displaced form of desires that are present, too, in us. Thus, he interprets our contemporary tendency to depict femininity as either pure or impure (the Madonna/whore dichotomy) as an effect of a contemporary taboo, which allows the male subject to maintain their mother as an idealized and pure object of affection ([1912] 2001, p. 183). And rather than opposing Christianity to taboo, he uses the latter to analyze Christianity and its asceticism itself as the sublimation of guilt for having wished to murder the father and to fulfil erotic drives for the mother ([1913] 2001, p. 154). Following Freud's analysis of obsessional symptoms and religious rituals in terms of unconscious desire, the term "taboo" has subsequently been mobilized in psychological discourses predominantly to refer to the relative universality and causal mechanisms behind the interdiction on sex with family member: the "incest taboo" (e.g., Fraley & Marks, 2010).

Critical Debates

The term "taboo" has also been used by psychologists researching cultural prohibitions that appear outside of formally "religious" contexts. It is here that psychology has depicted itself as both "taboo-breaking" in bravely analyzing forbidden topics such as the monetary value of one's offspring and as "taboo-researching" in shedding light on the processes through which prohibitions emerge outside of established religious institutions. For instance, Fiske and Tetlock (1997, p. 256) define a "taboo trade-off" as "any explicit mental comparison or social transaction that violates deeply-held normative intuitions about the integrity, even sanctity, of certain forms of relationship." Yet researchers have found themselves facing real issues of construct validity, as it is unclear what "taboo" means precisely: "we believe that this paper does address the nature

of taboo values, in part because the scenarios we used are similar to those used in previous taboo research" (Lichtenstein, Robin, & Julie, 2007, p. 169). And they repeat the construction of taboos as by definition irrational and primitive, bequeathed, as we have seen, by the Victorian anthropologists who brought the term into general usage: "A controversial issue concerns exactly what taboo blocked exchanges and "taboo trade-offs" actually are. Are they taboo in the *primal* Polynesian meaning of the term, absolute, categorical, and *unreasoned* aversions' to anything that 'transgresses boundaries that demarcate the sacred from the secular'?" (Tetlock, McGraw, & Kristal, 2004, p. 249, my italics).

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Tabula Rasa

Robbie Duschinsky
School of Health, Community and Education Sciences, Northumbria University, Newcastle, UK

Introduction

The image of the human mind as a tabula rasa (an emptied writing tablet) is widely believed to have originated with Locke in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and to be a characterization of the mind as formless and without predispositions at birth. Both beliefs are false. On the one hand, the image of the *tabula* rasa has a long, winding history back to Greek thought. On the other hand, Locke did not use the term "tabula rasa" in the *Essay*, but rather spoke of the child's mind as "white paper"; he does not use the image to argue that the child begins formless and pure but that the mind is initially dependent upon experience for its operation. These false but widespread beliefs suggest that the *tabula rasa* has been used to signify a zero point of utter formlessness, against which discourses on the true nature of the human mind can differentiate their position.

Definition

In his influential *Basic Principles of Psychoanalysis*, which introduced Freud to American readers, A.A. Brill (1921: 16) stated (falsely, incidentally) that for Freud "the child's mind, when born, is, in the words of Locke, a *tabula rasa*, a blank slate." Brill's text popularized the translation of *tabula rasa* as "blank slate"; it is now commonplace to assert that "Locke proposed the *tabula rasa*, the blank sheet on which experience writes human characters" (*The Guardian*, 23 June 2011, p. 36). However, this is not a precise definition. *Tabula rasa*, in Latin, referred to the state of the layer of wax on ancient writing tablets, after the inscriptions had been removed. The *tabula rasa* is

generally taken today to mean a state prior to text, in line with Brill's "blank slate." However, if we attend more closely to the metaphor, it can be observed that a more precise translation would be "a slate that has been blanked," the effect of the erasure of text.

Keywords

Mind; human nature; embodiment; purity

Traditional Debates

In *De Anima* (430a), Aristotle argues that "What [the mind] thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing tablet (*grammateion*) on which as yet nothing actually stands written." Agamben argues that it was the mind's potential for different uses, rather than the substantive state of blankness, that Aristotle intended by the image of the writing tablet. Yet "the image was ambiguous, and this ambiguity certainly contributed to its success" (Agamben, 1993: 244–245). *Grammateion* was translated as *tabula rasa* by Albertus Magnus in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, a translation that was followed by his student Aquinas: Locke did not invent the term. In his *Summa Theologica* (1274: 271–274), Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that the human mind is "at first like a *tabula rasa* on which nothing is written" but qualifies that we must also "assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible." Aquinas is here using the image of the *tabula rasa* to emphasize that a person's moral principles will depend upon the experiences they undergo.

In the immediate context in which Locke was writing, the term *tabula rasa* was not uncommon, though it was not necessarily used in a manner loyal to its Scholastic origins. For instance, the *tabula rasa* is deployed as a substantial quality of originary purity in Andrew Marvell's (1951) *Upon Appleton House*. Marvell writes that the flooded fields of the country house remind him of Eden: "The world when first created sure/Was such a table rase and pure" (lines 445–446). The

tabula rasa is here deployed by Marvell as a characterization of an ideal of originary purity. This was not Locke's usage of the term, however, despite what subsequent history has believed. Two decades after Marvell's poem, in the unpublished Drafts A and B of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke (1671: 8, 128) deployed the term *tabula rasa* to argue, along the lines of Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica*, that the development of all ideas is dependent, in the first instance, on our sense experiences. In the final draft of the *Essay*, however, Locke does not use the term *tabula rasa*. Instead, at the beginning of the second book, he argues "let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished? . . . To this I answer, in one word, From Experience" (1690: II, i, 2). This statement has been read by many to suggest that Locke believes that the mind is formless at birth. However, if one reads further on in the *Essay*, Locke's argument diverges from such a caricature. Locke suggests that the formation of ideas is initially dependent upon sensory experiences, in exactly the same manner as seeing is dependent upon light. However, Locke suggests innate capacities for judgement must be engaged for there to be any understanding of the meaning of such sensory experiences. He insists that there is "no knowledge without discernment": the ability to distinguish between experiences, compare them, and abstract from them (1690: II, xi, 1).

If we do hunt down the term "tabula rasa" in Locke's published writings, it appears in the *Essays on the Law of Nature* and further supports the idea that Locke did not intend to suggest that the mind begins without form or structure by the metaphor. Locke (1664: 96) states that his aim is "to inquire whether the souls of the newly-born are just *rasas tabulas*, afterwards to be filled in by observation and reasoning, or whether they have the laws of nature as signs of their duty inscribed on them at birth. But by our inquiry whether the law of nature is written in the souls of men we mean this: namely, whether there are any moral propositions inborn in the mind." Locke distinguishes here between observation and reasoning,

the two elements that together comprise understanding. For Locke, the *tabula rasa* is not an image of cognitive formlessness but of a state that requires correct instruction in order to form representations of true moral principles.

So whereas Locke is commonly said to have originated the idea of the "tabula rasa" and to have intended by it the argument that the human mind begins without form or structure, we have seen that neither is true. The continued popularity of both false beliefs suggests that there is a demand for them, that they have some utility for certain projects. Specifically, I would suggest the utility of the image of the tabula rasa is that it has operated as a rhetorical extreme position. Jonathan Swift (1707: 556), for example, in his *A Tritical Essay upon the Faculties of the Mind*, parodies the caricature of a philosopher to whom he attributes the view that "the Mind of Man is at first (if you will pardon the Expression) like a *tabula rasa*." Within the philosophical tradition, the *tabula rasa* has served as an enduring philosophical tool for describing an originary state of utter human malleability, against which accounts of particular aspects of human cognitive or moral nature can be positioned. In his *New Essays on Human Understanding*, Leibniz (1765: P54) offers a sustained critique of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and particular criticisms of the image of the "tabula rasa" as an accurate characterization of the human mind. He suggests that "Aristotle and the author of the *Essay* maintain" that "the soul in itself is completely blank like a writing tablet on which nothing has as yet been written–a tabula rasa," which implies that "everything which is inscribed there comes solely from the senses." By contrast, Leibniz argues that the human mind "inherently contains the sources of various notions and doctrines which external objects merely rouse up on suitable occasions."

Leibniz's characterization of Locke is in one way highly familiar. Like the account commonly believed today, he believes that Locke used the term *tabula rasa* in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and that by it he intended the argument that everything which is inscribed in the mind is a product solely of the senses. In another sense, however, the characterization by Leibniz is unfamiliar, in that this image and argument is placed in a historical context that stretches back to the Latin translation of Aristotle. Leibniz is not alone in this awareness of the *tabula rasa* as a concept that radically predates Locke: William Molyneux in a letter to Locke himself regarding the translation into French of the *Essay* states that "I do not go by Aristotle's *tabula rasa*" and asserts that there is something "solid" in the argument that there are certain innate faculties to the human mind (Molyneux, 1697: 779).

Both Leibniz's caricature of Locke's argument and his placement of this metaphor in its historical context can be explained through a single hypothesis: that reference to the *tabula rasa* should be regarded as a rhetorical zero point of utter malleability, against which philosophers and social commentators have debated the extent to which human nature is innate or dependent upon experiences and enculturation. As Wahrman (2004: 186) has noted, "this image – of the *tabula rasa* – was endlessly recycled in the mushrooming pedagogical literature of subsequent decades, enthralled as it was by the shaping power thus conferred upon education." From Leibniz onwards, the *tabula rasa* was never as much a live concept as the first part of a genre of narratives which ran "While Locke's image of the mind as a '*tabula rasa*' can be accepted to some extent and indicates the importance of education, in fact the mind is better regarded as. . . ." The tabula rasa operates as a polemical concept, which establishes the far limits of formlessness and provides scaffolding for discourses on the true form of human nature.

Critical Debates

Philosophical usage of the *tabula rasa* as a zero point for theories of the nature of the human mind has been inherited by psychological discourses. This is the case even with authors appearing to agree with the idea of *tabula rasa*: a telling case is Le Bon's (1899: 62) *The Psychology of Socialism*. Here Le Bon warns against "crosses between

members of different races. The individual then becomes a sort of *tabula rasa*. He has lost his ancestral concepts' he is nothing but a hybrid without morals or character, at the mercy of every impulse." Deploying the classic philosophical narrative to engage in psychological discourse, Husserl (1954: 85) writes that Locke has misdirected psychology away from the fundamental importance of intentionality through his image of the mind as passively "like a writing tablet," which "dominates psychology and the theory of knowledge for centuries, even up to the present day." Similarly, in Allport's (1955) foundational work on the psychology of personality, he opposes his argument to that of Locke, who "assumed the mind of the individual to be a *tabula rasa* at birth. And the intellect itself was a passive thing" (1955: 7). Allport, by contrast, identifies with Leibniz, for whom "the intellect was perpetually active in its own right. . . bent on manipulating sensory data" (1955: 8).

This image of the *tabula rasa* as the constitutive outside of the psychologist's view of the human mind has been maintained since Allport. In *The Blank Slate* (2002: 6), Pinker has accused Locke's "doctrine of the Blank Slate" of having "set the agenda for much of the social sciences" and of having misdirected psychology into an attempt "to explain all thought, feeling, and behaviour with a few simple mechanisms." In Schaffer and Kipp's textbook *Developmental Psychology* (2007: 8), they note that an "influential view on children and childrearing was suggested by John Locke, who believed that the mind of a child is a *tabula rasa*, a blank slate, and that children have no inborn tendencies." The authors regret, however, that Locke "collected no objective data to back up" his argument, in contrast to later psychologists who have more accurate views. My favorite instance from contemporary psychological discourse of the standard *tabula rasa* narrative is Kenrick et al. (2003: 21), who argue against Locke that "sufficient numbers of discordant findings have proliferated to make the blank slate look like the graffiti-filled wall of a New York subway station."

Future Directions

Yet in one intriguing area, the image of the *tabula rasa* has become and remains a live area of debate in discourses on the nature of the human mind: the reception of Foucault's (1971: 375) statement that "the body is the inscribed surface of events" by post-structuralist feminist researchers. McLaren (2002: 206) has noted that "Foucault uses a variety of verbs to describe the effect of power on the body" and implies that there must therefore be some utility gained by those who only tell "part of the story." I would agree and suggest that a comparison with Locke indicates that the attribution of belief in tabula rasa as a state of prior purity is serving a similar rhetorical purpose. Whereas Locke was deployed in narratives on the *tabula rasa* to signify an origin of utter human mental malleability, these debates about Foucault play out the same argument on different terrain: not the mind, but embodiment.

Foucault's work is used to discuss the social determination of the embodied subject, as a way of thinking about the meaning of agency. "For Foucault," Butler (1989: 603) argues "the cultural construction of the body is effected through the figuration of 'history' as a writing instrument that produces cultural significations–language–through the disfiguration and distortion of the body, where the body is figured as a ready surface or blank page available for inscription." Turner (1996: 37) agrees that Foucault's subject is "a featureless *tabula rasa* awaiting the animating disciplines of discourse." The accusation from Butler and Turner is that Foucault's human being is inherently passive, receiving their embodied identity like the inscriptions upon a blank page. Such criticisms of Foucault have been responded to in various ways by later feminists. One common approach distinguishes two forms of power in Foucault's work. On the first model, "power is the maker of persons. Power is productive and its products are the specific forms of historical subjectivity. Since Foucault rejects the claim that there is anything like a human nature that is transhistorical in character, power on this model has in effect a *tabula rasa* – the individual, not yet

a subject – on which to inscribe its various constructions." By contrast, "the second model of the functioning of power is not that of power as person-maker but of power as one player in a social field – really a battlefield" (Bartky, 1995: 188–189). Another interesting development has been the ongoing deployment of the accusation of Foucault as a theorist of human embodiment as *tabula rasa* to justify new forms of realist epistemology. For instance, Kirby (1997: 114–115) has offered a criticism of both Foucault and Butler, arguing that the body is in both cases thought of as unintelligible in itself, waiting discourses to give it meaning. Kirby proposes instead a realist position in which matter itself is by degrees generative of meaning; she suggests that our embodied subjectivities do not resemble a *tabula* awaiting inscription, whether blank or otherwise.

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Teacher

Luca Tateo[1] and Giuseppina Marsico[2]
[1]Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark
[2]Department of Human, Philosophic, and Education Sciences, University of Salerno, Salerno, Italy

Introduction

The figure of the teacher is extremely relevant in psychology, as far as it is committed with the processes of acculturation, education, and socialization. The teacher accompanies the person during a long part of his life contributing to his/her

process of becoming member of the cultural community. It is not trivial to say that the teacher is a person everybody spent a lot of time with during one's own life. At the same time, the teacher plays a key role in the process of transmission and maintenance of the cultural continuity taking place in educational institutions. He/she mediates the relationship between students and knowledge, values, norms, and representations of the cultural community, guiding and supporting students in the elaboration of more or less critical or acquiescent conceptual tools. It is worth to discriminate between "teaching" as an activity that can be carried out in a number of different contexts (e.g., formal and informal, school, workplace, leisure) by different people (e.g., parents, kinship) and "teacher" as a specific profession framed in a institutionalized educational system.

Definition

A teacher is a person with a specific professional qualification responsible to provide education for learners of different age within an educational institution, namely, school. Though cultural communities assign different roles to the teacher, with respect to the activities, the objectives, and the people to be educated, it is possible to identify some constant dimensions related to the figure of the teacher. First, the teacher must manage at least two basic expertise dimensions: he/she must be a pedagogical expert and a subject matter expert. The teacher is supposed to be able to plan and deliver a learning unit in one or more subjects. Besides, a teacher must be able to take care of the intellectual development and well-being of learners, to recognize learners' needs and problems. The role of the teacher in contemporary societies has been defined after the introduction of mass education systems. The social status of the teacher is correlated to the relevance of education in the different cultural communities that nevertheless constantly establish a formal procedure to access the profession. In general, to become a teacher is required to follow a specific course of studies, often university or

college, and to spend an amount of time in supervised school apprenticeship. Teacher education includes pedagogy, teaching methods, and the study of the disciplines to be taught in school curricula. Finally, the different cultural communities share the idea of teaching as an asymmetry relationship between teacher and learner, implying in a variable degree the issue of power and control in education.

Keywords

Critical pedagogy; zone of proximal development; educational reform; scaffolding; knowledge society; teacher professional identity; caring profession; transformative intellectual; cultural community; change; vulnerability; continuity

Traditional Debates

A traditional idea of teaching used to conceive the teacher as an agent transferring knowledge to students based on his/her expertise in subject matter, while effective teaching involves much more than a simple transmission of knowledge (Rogoff, Matusov, & White, 1996). Teaching cannot be reduced to a set of instrumental actions to help students achieve learning objectives. Teaching profession implies pedagogical and ethical dimensions, like the development of learners' social skills and emotional management. Teacher's educational expertise is not only conceived as the capability to plan, execute, and assess lessons, it includes helping students to develop their own learning and collaboration methods, with a greater emphasis on learning and less on teaching. Since Vygotsky, the teacher is understood as the main person responsible for the actualization of learner's potentialities of intellectual development (Daniels, Cole, & Wertsch, 2007). The teacher is required to be a mediator, a facilitator, and a scaffold for learners (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976). The teacher's scaffolding function is related to

a radical revision of the triadic psychological and power relationship between teacher, learner, and the object of knowledge.

Teacher is often considered a "caring profession," though this aspect is mainly involved in primary and junior secondary education. Caring consists of those emotions, actions, and reflections that result from teacher's desire to motivate, help, or inspire pupils and young students. Caring is primarily connected to teachers' pedagogical and classroom management strategies. However, it also exists within the different social contexts of teacher–student interactions, inside and outside the classroom situation. As a care professional, the teacher is subject to burnout risk. The concept of teacher's burnout has been more recently replaced by the idea of teachers' professional vulnerability (Kelchtermans, 2005) which is related to experiences of feeling threatened and questioned by principal, parents, and politicians and being unable to face the growing demand for change and innovation. In the knowledge society, vulnerability seems to become a structural condition of teachers and educators in general (Kelchtermans).

A second perspective considers teachers as "intellectual workers," whose job is to create, elaborate, and disseminate knowledge. This approach, developed by critical pedagogy, implies an active political and social role of the teacher also underlying the role of school in producing change rather than simply reproducing the social order. Teachers should be "transformative intellectuals" (Giroux, 1988), able to be agents of change and to educate learners in being future citizens. This approach denounces a social pressure to consider the teacher as an organic intellectual, a passive recipient of social and political imperatives, whose objectives and activities are decided by technocratic experts far from the everyday realities of classroom life.

Critical Debates

Critical psychology raised the issue whether the teacher is an agent of a school system that perpetuates social inequalities by systematic, inequitable different distribution of resources based on class, race, and ethnicity. These workers have to deal every day with professional and societal changes and growing social pressure that define teachers as technicians with testable content knowledge and shortening higher education curricula. The advent of the so-called knowledge society and the wider societal changes (migrations, new educational practices, new technologies, laws, etc.) triggers change in educational conditions, through several educational reforms related, some say, to devolution and neoliberalism. Teacher's role has been thus affected by two decades of policy reforms at a national level, especially in Western countries. These initiatives and changing conditions have placed increased social, performance, and workload pressure upon teachers. Changes in society are leading to new expectations about the role of education, which, in return, is leading to new demands on teachers' quality and competences. The received economizing view of education shifts the emphasis to the academic productivity. Education is at stake as instrumental good to achieve individual goals on the job market, and teacher are understood as delivers of such a good. Education becomes the mean to acquire specific skills, namely, work-based literacy, useful for individual achievements on job market. To measure the effectiveness of this process, a system of standardized accountability is set up turning to competence-centered and test-based curricula (Kaščák & Pupala, 2012), with teachers being deprofessionalized as civil servants charged to deliver and assess market-oriented knowledge (Wong, 2006). In the framework of knowledge economy ideology, also the evaluation of teacher quality shifts to predominantly quantitative indicators, leading to a very one-sided perspective on the quality of teachers and teacher education. Beyond meritocratic ideology, several studies problematize the correlation between class differences and teaching quality, showing for instance, that working-class children are more likely to be taught by less credentialed educators (Fine, Burns, Torre, & Payne, 2008).

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Online Resources

Journal Teaching and teacher education
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Technologies of Self/Subjectivity

Moises Esteban-Guitart
Department of Psychology, University of Girona, Girona, Spain

Introduction

"Technologies of the self" can be considered as a central concept in Foucault's approach, which allows to connect a wide range of concerns in critical psychology. At the end of his life, Michel Foucault was interested in writing a new book on "technologies of self." He described it as "composed of different papers about the self (for instance, a commentary on Plato's *Alcibiades* in which you find the first elaboration of the notion of *epimeleia beautou*, ´care of oneself´), about the role of reading and writing in constituting the self and so on" (Rabinow & Dreyfus, 1983, p. 62). In the autumn of 1982, Foucault did a seminar on this topic at the University of Vermont (Foucault, 1988).

This later work by Foucault on the technologies of the self represents a new synthesis of his previous studies, centered on inquiries into insanity, deviancy, criminality, and sexuality. Specifically, Foucault was interested in showing how macro technologies of power and domination constituted the self and how the self constituted itself as an individual through certain scientific, religious, and other discourses. Indeed, Foucault (1976/1984a, b) explicitly addressed the issue of the self in his three-volume series of books on *The History of Sexuality*, the last one entitled *The History of Sexuality III*: *The Care of the Self*. He recognized that his interest was in techniques of the self. "I must confess that I am much more interested in problems about techniques of the self and things like that rather than sex … sex is boring." (in Rabinow & Dreyfus, 1983, p. 62). Central to these works was a historical reflection on ourselves. Indeed, we could summarize part of Foucault's project as a genealogy of how the self constituted itself as an individual and how power structures manage rationality through the self understanding itself. In other words, through different psychological, medical, penitential, educational, or religious practices, certain models of self and subjectivity are developed. Such models of self and subjectivity become normative and self-evident and are thought to be universal.

Definition

According to Foucault there are four major types of techniques or "technologies" that human beings use to understand and produce themselves. First are "technologies of production" that are

used to produce, transform, and manipulate objects. Second, there are "technologies of sign systems" such as meanings and symbols. The third type consists of "technologies of power," which manage the conduct of individuals, submitting them to certain domination. Finally, there are the "technologies of the self," "which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality" (Foucault, 1988, p. 18). In other words, technologies of the self are what Michel Foucault calls the methods and techniques through which human beings constitute themselves. According to him, individuals are perpetually engaged in processes whereby they define and produce specific ethical self-understandings. In this sense, these processes are political because in order to understand subjectivity or self, one must examine the interplay between the micro-relations of the people and the macrostructures or forces of power (e.g., the political/economic system, the judicial apparatus, education, health services, religious precepts). Governmental and social administrative structures of power manage knowledge, that is, the rules, ideas, and beliefs ("truths") that people consume and use to represent, understand, and regulate their own thoughts and practices. In this sense, economics, biology, psychiatry, medicine, penology, psychology, and the arts are the cultural means in our societies through which humans develop knowledge about themselves. They are specific techniques of knowledge used by people to produce and understand themselves. It is important to note here that any technologies of the self and, indeed, technologies in general, are associated with a certain type of domination. Technologies of the self involve acquiring certain skills and attitudes in order to integrate the individual into the normative society. For example, the discourse on madness deals with individuals inside and outside of asylums. "This contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self, I call *governmentality*" (Foucault, p. 19).

By "governmentality" Foucault means specific guiding rationalities whereby individuals and social structures, through norms of thought and behavior, regulate people's understandings and experiences (Foucault, 1991). In this sense, technologies of the self must be understood as inextricably linked to governmentality and governmentality is the link between governing and modes of thought. That is to say, it is not possible to study the technologies of the self without an analysis of how they are underpinned by the political rationality – the "art of government" or the "conduct of conduct" (Foucault). Although there are different meanings or analytic dimensions of governmentality in Foucault's work, it is emphasized here the use of the term in relation to those forms of political rule and economic exploitation that influence an individual's capacity for self-control. In his lecture entitled *Governmentality*, Foucault gives us a definition of governmentality: "The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculation of tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target the population, as its principal form of knowledge the political economy, and as its essential technical means the apparatuses of security" (Foucault, 1991, p. 102).

Keywords

Capitalism; digital technologies of the self; genealogy of subjectivity; governmentality; self; subjectivity; technologies of the self; conduct of life

Critical Debates

The concept of "technologies of the self" has inspired many studies in social sciences and historical investigations. Indeed, it can be argued that it is also a source of inspiration for critical approaches in psychology. Some scholars have sought to refine and extend Foucault's work as a tool for the critical analysis of political,

economic, and cultural technologies and governmental rationalities in contemporary societies. Esteban-Guitart (2011), for instance, views capitalism as a governmental rationality, or form of *governmentality*, which produces individuals capable of performing their subjectivity through the practice of "freedom" ("autonomy") and narcissism as specific technologies of the individualistic self, embedded and rooted in particular artifacts, social institutions, and cultural concepts (Esteban-Guitart & Ratner, 2011).

Also inspired by Foucault's concept of "technologies of the self," Abbas and Dervin (2009) edited a book focussing on how contemporary individuals fashion their identities using digital technologies such as ambient intelligent devices, social networking platforms and online communities (e.g., Facebook), and online gaming, which they call "digital technologies of the self." The book stresses how technologies contribute to the expression and enactment of certain identities and ways of being.

Closer to Foucault's analysis of Greco-Roman philosophy and Christian spirituality is the genealogy of the Catholic practice of confession and psychotherapy conducted by Loredo and Blanco (2011). In their view, the practice of confession is a technology of the self that aims to eradicate culpability caused by a particular moral conflict. As in psychotherapy, the individuals have to transform themselves with the help of a spiritual father or a psychoanalyst. In both cases, the people objectify their inner life ("which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality").

Capitalism, digital media and electronic devices, religion, and psychotherapy are contemporary examples of technologies of the self. It could be said, then, from Foucault's work, that different types of practice involve different forms of knowledge and power ("the conduct of conduct"), which also involve differential ways of being. In the very general sense, technologies of the self can be regarded as self-training that aims to create

particular dispositions and capacities to act correctly according to certain "truths," government, or rationality. To sum up, technology of the self is the practical rationality embedded in productive activities in which people are educated and trained. The challenge, then, is to analyze the practical business of the actual training of individuals in particular social activities, such as consumerism, digital media, or psychotherapy. These are forms of technology based on historical means of transforming and creating subjectivity, such as the practice of confession in the Catholic tradition.

To conclude this entry, it is important to emphasize the significance of the term "technologies of the self" in critical psychological approaches. Rather than seeing the self as an essential reality, critical psychologists have approached them as a product of historically situated practices, intimately tied up with the circumstances of their cultural production. In this regard, the concept of "technologies of the self" can be very useful and analytically stimulating.

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Technology

Ernst Schraube
Department of Psychology and Educational Studies, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark

Introduction

We may well share, together with most generations over the past 200 years, the impression that technology is fundamentally changing our everyday life. Nevertheless, the new quality of the technologization of the world since World War II seems to actuate a radical and new redefinition of the human being. This transformation was reflected in a variety of critical social and cultural theories during the twentieth century (e.g., Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Lewis Mumford, Günther Anders, Frankfurt School, ecological movements), but it is only over the last decades that the social and human sciences have come to recognize the *central* significance of technology in almost every sphere of human life. This development found expression in the emergence of subdisciplines (e.g., philosophy of technology, sociology of technology, history of technology) and such multidisciplinary programs as *Science and Technology Studies*. Within psychology – although now several approaches explore the subjective dimension of technological change – a systematic psychological study of technology is only in its infancy. For critical psychologies, which are concerned with human experience and the formation of subjectivity, agency and the conduct of everyday life, and which conceive themselves as a means for social self-understanding, the exploration of the relationship between humans and technology constitutes an integral part of their theory and practice. Here, technology is not conceived as something external or abstract, but as a social creation produced by humans and by which, through its appropriation, humans transform themselves. Critical psychologies of technology are trying to develop a psychological language and methodology through which the relationship between technological creation and human self-transformation in its conflicts and contradictions becomes tangible and which elucidate for humans both individually and collectively their possibilities for influence and choice in today's technological world.

Definition

The term technology refers to human-made objects and artifacts, for example, computers, telephones, or atomic power plants, and can be understood as all the machines, systems, and techniques underlying human civilization and society. The term originates from the ancient Greek word "techne," which not only refers to material objects and the results of human activity but also to the processes of human activity and the art of bringing something into existence (e.g., the art of not only making pottery or building a house but also in relation to the affording "art" of psychological activities as in "psychoanalytic techniques" or "technologies of the self"). From the very beginning of human history, technologies have been part of human life. "Technologies are not foreign to 'human nature' but inseparable from it," notes the historian of technology David Nye (2007, p. 2), they "have been part of human society from as far back as archaeology can take us into the past" (p. 7). Technological objects are often defined as means to an end. A mobile phone, for example, is understood as a means to call somebody. This definition conceives technologies as neutral tools and instruments, given to humans for their free disposal where seemingly the only aspects of key importance are the cultural and societal context, and what humans individually or collectively are doing with the technological things. Such an instrumental notion of technology is challenged

by approaches arguing that this definition might be right, but does not go far enough. Technologies are more than just useful tools expanding human experience and action; they are also powerful sociopolitical "forms of life" (Winner, 1989) and "materialized action" (Schraube, 2009) constituting human activities and relations and fundamentally transforming the fabric of everyday life. From this perspective not only are people doing something with technologies, technologies are also doing something with people. Mobile phones, to continue with the example, are not just tools to call somebody; they are complex devices forming human relationships in new ways and interfering in the practices of how people live their everyday lives. Since technologies form a fundamental precondition of human experience and (inter-) action, they represent an essential topic of critical thought.

Keywords

Subjectivity; agency; experience; action; conduct of everyday life; meaning; materiality; technological artifacts; human-world relationship; dialectics; epistemology

History

When we consider the phylogenetic development of the psyche on the path to becoming human, we can observe how the capacity to manipulate and utilize things develops into the ability to create and use tools – the beginnings of technology. Furthermore we can discover a parallel process whereby the initial capacity to communicate phonetically within social groups develops to produce language and consciousness, which are not only prerequisites of science and knowledge, but underlie the very possibility of communal understanding. This is what makes humans uniquely human: They are not simply living with others of their species in a direct relationship to a preexisting "natural" world; instead, they actively and consciously create their own

societal and technological world: collectively and in accordance with their needs, plans, and ideas. It is this living of life through social and material structures that humans (in contrast to other life forms) have themselves constructed which allows us to speak of sociomaterially mediated individual life: a life process of human subjects mediated by societal and technological structures of their own creation and a process that humans can (potentially) grasp, use, and change.

Thus, it makes no sense to try to understand the world of technology in abstraction from human subjects and their inner relations to it. Humans participate in the creation of the world of technology as subjects within specific linguistic and cultural contexts, communities, institutions, and work structures – that is, in a sociomaterially mediated form. However, we are also directly confronted with the technologies: we live our lives in and through them and, in this process, we change ourselves. Therefore, human subjects are not involved in a one-sided relationship to the technological artifacts and structures, simply being affected by or identical to them; the situation is rather that of a dialectical *two-sided relationship*, where we are both affected and affecting. On the one hand, this relationship involves appropriating artifacts – using them and realizing their meaning. But on the other hand, we also participate in producing or coproducing things. It is precisely this two-sided nature of human agency that constitutes the specificity of human subjectivity. The epistemology of the psychological study of technology must therefore reflect this twofold nature of human subjectivity and agency.

Traditional Debates

The psychological study of technology began more than 100 years ago with the concept of *psychotechnique* (Psychotechnik) introduced by the German psychologist William Stern in 1903. Münsterberg, Moede, Giese et al. then developed this into an approach focusing on the adaptation of humans to the technological and industrial process as well as on the adaptation of the devices

and machines to humans. In the early 1930s, as technological development accelerated and increasingly complex machines and systems were produced, interdisciplinary research programs were launched to systemically analyze human-machine systems, and this then became the foundation of the emerging *engineering psychology*. Engineering psychology builds on psychotechnique and is especially concerned with the question of how – on the basis of psychological knowledge about the abilities and limits of the mind – machines have to be constructed and plants, workplaces, and tasks designed.

Traditional psychologies of technology, such as psychotechnique, engineering psychology, as well as *effect and acceptance research*, usually draw on a scientific vocabulary taken from the natural sciences including a statistically based experimental methodology. By doing so, these approaches imply a reduction of the interaction between humans and technology to pure cause-and-effect relationships. Thus, the various dimensions of human life are represented in the abstract form of numbers and variables, resulting in a one-sided and deterministic perspective. On the one hand, the experiences and actions of human subjects are reduced to measurable and quantifiable "responses" and "outputs"; on the other hand, the diversity and complexity of technological structures and their meaning for subjects and collectives are reduced to a measurable "stimulus" and "input" form. Such a mechanistic methodological framework underlies the scientific self-understanding and research practice of most approaches in mainstream psychology, and it illustrates to what extent academic psychology has *reduced itself to a technology* and to a *technological form of thought* (Rose, 1998). Within this process, psychology has rendered itself structurally incapable of articulating the two-sidedness of human subjectivity and of developing a deeper understanding of either the process of creation or the human self-transformation in the technological world. Thus, a more comprehensive psychology of technology both critically explores the role of technology in the production of psychological knowledge

(Stam, 1999; Ward, 2002) and seeks to radically redefine the scientific self-understanding of traditional psychology in an attempt to develop an epistemology allowing the complexity of human experience as well as the meaning of the created technological reality for human subjects and collectives to be included in psychological theory and research practice.

Critical Debates

In psychology, the critical reflection on the subjective dimension of technological change started with *psychoanalysis* at the beginning of the twentieth century. "Man has . . . become a kind of prosthetic God," Sigmund Freud wrote, "when he puts on all his auxiliary organs, he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at times" (1975, p. 91). Freud recognized that science and technology not only offer a general ease of life and increasing freedom from natural constraints, but they can also express the darker sides and destructive passions of the human being. Psychoanalytical approaches address the discontent with the technological progress and interpret the development of culture and technology in the light of people's internal psychic structures and the psychodynamics of human drives. Furthermore, they reflect on the role of everyday material things – for example, as "transitional objects" (Winnicott) – in human development.

With *discursive psychology* and *social constructionism*, a new alternative scientific self-understanding emerged refining the traditional mechanistic perspective through an understanding of the social relatedness of psychological phenomena and the significance of language and discourse. Informed by constructionist theory, discourse analysis, qualitative methods, and ethnography, interpretative research methodologies are developed which can explore the dilemmas and ambivalences people are confronted with in the complex technological nets of relations. So far studies within this framework focus especially on the influence of

technologies on human interrelations as well as on the construction of self and identity (Gergen, 2000; Turkle, 2011). Studies drawing on *actor-network theory* (ANT) and its central research principle "to follow the actors themselves" (Latour, 2005) constitute a further movement of thought contributing to current critical debates. The focus here is on tracing the course of human action and the making of the social by including systematically the multiplicity of actors – both human and non-human – involved in a field into the research perspective and explore, for example, how children in a school class are enacted as a collective through the specific sociomaterial configuration of the situation (Sørensen, 2009).

In *cultural-historical* activity theory as well as *critical psychology* (especially in the German and Scandinavian tradition), we can find historical analyses of the mind which develop a conceptual basis for the psychological study of technology and detailed understandings of the sociomaterial mediation of human subjectivity (Holzkamp, 2013; Leontyev, 1981). *Activity theory* is based on the assumption that higher psychological processes emerged in phylogenesis simultaneously with the capacity to produce and modify material objects as a means of regulating human interactions with the world and one another and that this development was a phylogenetic prerequisite for the formation of human subjectivity. "Man differs from animal in that he [sic!] can make and use tools," explained Luria in 1928, these tools "not only radically change his conditions of existence, they even react on him in that they effect a change in him and his psychic condition" (p. 493). Here technological artifacts are understood both as ideal and material and the questions center on how the tools and signs are incorporated into goal-directed human action. Detailed models of how artifacts mediate human action have been developed and refined in this school of thought and are still used today especially in research on human development, learning, and work (Cole, 1998; Engeström et al., 1991; Kontopodis, Wulf, & Fichtner, 2011).

Recent approaches in *critical psychology* are more aware of the conflicting nature of science and technology and realize that they represent not just human accomplishments expanding human subjectivity and the possibilities of action, but contradictory structures and forms embodying specific interests, ideologies, power, and politics. Therefore studies in this movement of thought are trying to develop two-sided, dialectical approaches, exploring systematically the experiences and activities of human subjects and collectives in their engagement with things, but also examining the discursive-material relationalities (Walkerdine, 2007) as well as the materiality of everyday practice (Costall & Dreier, 2006) and the experiences and actions materialized in the things themselves (Schraube, 2013).

Future Directions

In the early decades of the twenty-first century, the gap between the technological progress and a social understanding of how it is transforming our communities and ourselves seems wider than ever. Critical psychologies of technology could help to redress this imbalance and open the ways to a new type of scientific culture. Such a culture would not only reflect critically on how technological artifacts can expand human experience and action but also how the artifacts embody coercions, constraints, and negations of human subjectivity and agency. Critical psychologies of technology could provide an important voice in the public debate on how humans transform themselves and their social relations in an age of high technology.

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Teenage Pregnancy

Catriona Macleod
Crital Studies in Sexualities and Reproduction Research Programme, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

Introduction

In a book on preventing early pregnancy and poor reproductive outcomes in developing countries, the World Health Organization (2011) declares that "adolescent pregnancy" contributes to maternal, perinatal, and infant mortality and to a vicious cycle of poverty and ill-health. This statement reflects the common public assumption that "teenage pregnancy" represents an individual, social, health, educational, and financial risk that requires remediation. This kind of public perception is spurred by media coverage in which young girls with large protruding stomachs are etched in profile and stories of calamity are told (e.g., *Time* (21 June 2005) magazine).

And yet the very notion of "teenage pregnancy" is a relatively recent one. Depending on the country one talks about, it has been around since between the1960s and 1980s. In the United States, for example, the rise of "teenage pregnancy" as a social problem was associated with a shift in gendered power relations. Prior to the late 1960s the morally loaded concepts of "unwed mother" and "illegitimate child" were used to describe young women who conceived. For the most part, young pregnant women were excluded from society, with the accompanying shame around the lack of proper conjugal arrangements. The use of the term "teenage pregnancy" removed the implied moral judgment and replaced it with seeming scientific neutrality. Young pregnant women now became publicly visible and thus the object of scientific scrutiny (Arney & Bergen, 1984).

Definition

By straightforward definition "teenage pregnancy" refers to a woman between the ages of ten and 19 who conceives. Differentiation in reportage on the rates of pregnancy (calculated per 1,000 of a specific population) is often made within public health on the basis of pregnancy in women aged 15–19 and those aged 10–14. A distinction is also made between "teenage fertility" and "teenage pregnancy." In the former the pregnancy results in birth, while the latter includes pregnancy resulting in a birth, abortion, and miscarriage.

Keywords

Teenage pregnancy; adolescent pregnancy; revisionist approaches; social constructionist approaches

Traditional Debates

The research questions asked within traditional debates about "teenage pregnancy" can be categorized into three broad questions: (1) What are the consequences of teenage pregnancy? (2) What are the causes of teenage pregnancy? (3) What interventions are effective in preventing "teenage pregnancy" or ameliorating its negative effects once it takes place? The first of these questions forms the foundation of the other questions: it only makes sense to explore the causes of teenage pregnancy or effective interventions if the answer to the first question is that there are negative consequences. In relation to abortion among teenagers, a key debate is the capacity of the young woman to make an independent decision regarding terminating a pregnancy.

The consequences of "teenage pregnancy," as listed in the traditional approaches, are the following: the disruption of schooling; the perpetuation of a cycle of disadvantage or poor socioeconomic circumstances; poor child outcomes in terms of health, emotional development, and learning; health risks associated with the pregnancy; welfare dependency; contribution to higher fertility rates in certain countries; and the association of teenage pregnancy and HIV. The causes of "teenage pregnancy" are seen as follows: reproductive ignorance, the earlier occurrence of menarche, risk-taking behavior, psychological problems, cognitive deficiencies, poor academic performance, peer influence, coercive sexual relations, dysfunctional family patterns, poor health services, poor socioeconomic status, and cultural factors. Proposed primary preventive interventions include better or different sexuality and reproductive health information and education (with debates around the merits of abstinence only or comprehensive education abounding, particularly in the USA), creating better educational and other opportunities for young women, and accessible and acceptable contraceptive services. Secondary and tertiary measures (once pregnancy has occurred) include promoting early detection of pregnancy and use of antenatal care, accessible and acceptable antenatal and postnatal care, measures to encourage and support return to school, and accessible and acceptable termination of pregnancy services. Intervention guidelines, such as those provided by the WHO, are frequently generalized and fail to take the nuance of local context into consideration.

Critical Debates

Critical approaches to teenage pregnancy can roughly be divided into two broad camps: revisionists and social constructionists, although these are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Revisionists argue research on the consequences of "teenage pregnancy" fails to adequately account for confounding variables such as socioeconomic status, ethnicity, marital status, lifestyle factors, family structure, parity, prenatal, and other health care. When research takes these kinds of factors, in particular socioeconomic status, into account, the effect of early reproduction, *in and of itself*, on health, educational, or economic outcomes is found to be far less negative than commonly assumed.

Geronimus (2003), in summarizing well-designed comparative studies, concludes that these outcomes are "slightly negative, negligible, or positive" (p. 881).

In addition, revisionists postulate that early childbearing represents an adaptive choice for teenaged women in particular circumstances. For these women, there is little advantage in delaying childbearing. For example, they argue that having children early in situations of poverty is functional in a number of ways: these young mothers have better access to the familial caregiving nexus than older women, and they will enjoy a longer healthy parenting time owing to health inequities that ensure that women in these circumstances have foreshortened healthy life expectancy (Geronimus, 2004).

Social constructionist writers argue, on the other hand, that we should be vigilant about the power relations that the very notion of "teenage pregnancy," and the associated research and interventions, allows. This involves an analytics of the gendered/raced/classed power relations that cohere around young women and reproduction and refusal of abstractions that predefine the pregnant teenager.

Broadly speaking researchers in this paradigm do not ask "What is the true nature of the pregnant teenager or teenage pregnancy?", but rather "How have scientific and professional discourses constructed or positioned the pregnant teenager as a subject and what power relations are contingent on this positioning?". For example, Wilson and Huntington (2005) argue that in the USA, the UK, and New Zealand, young mothers are vilified not because of poor outcomes, but because they do not conform to a life trajectory that dovetails with governmental objectives of economic growth through higher education and increased female workforce participation. Breheny and Stephens (2007) show how health professionals in New Zealand draw on "Developmental" and "Motherhood" discourses to position adolescent mothers as problematic. The simultaneous deployment of these discourses allows for young mothers to be positioned as unable to mother properly as the characteristics of an "adolescent" cannot be reconciled with the attributes of a "good" mother. Macleod (2003, 2011) analyzes how the dominant construction of adolescence as a transitional stage (1) acts as an attempt to decide the undecidable (viz., the adolescent who is neither child nor adult, but simultaneously both), (2) relies on the ideal (masculinized, white, heterosexual, middle class) adult as the endpoint of development, and (3) is saturated with colonialist assumptions concerning human development.

The examples presented above indicate how critical scholars analyze power relations cohering around the technologies of representation and of interventions surrounding "teenage pregnancy." The power relations implicit in these technologies are not uniform or stable and will change historically and across circumstances. What is important about these kinds of analyses, however, is the activity of unpicking taken-for-granted assumptions and drawing out the gender, class, and raced relations that underpin many scientific statements and professional interventions with regard to pregnant and parenting teenagers.

A difficulty with much critical work in the area of "teenage pregnancy" is that it engages in the politics of critique, with little active involvement in the messy business of care or interventions. More work needs to be done in terms of advocating for pre-, ante-, and postnatal care and interventions that are attuned to gendered dynamics and that are aimed at empowering young women. Essential in such work is a reproductive justice approach that highlights the contextual nature of women's lives and the overarching socioeconomic inequalities, racism, and sexism that shape women's lives but also identifies, within this, the commonality of conditions that are necessary for comprehensive reproductive and sexual freedom (Chrisler, 2012).

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Theistic Approaches to Psychology

Brent D. Slife and Michael Zhang
Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA

Introduction

Many critical psychologists might be surprised at the entry of a theistic approach to psychology in a critical psychology encyclopedia. They may fear that the use of theism or other religious ideas in psychology would promote a type of ideology that could be oppressive. Some psychologists may even believe that theism is the *most* oppressive of ideologies (Hart, 2009). After all, theism is one of the most dominant belief systems in the world. If anything, theists – comprising a majority of the world's consumers of psychology (Richards & Bergin, 2005) – would appear to be the ones with a power advantage over nontheistic minorities.

Oppression and dominance, however, are contextually situated (Fox, Prilleltensky, & Austin, 2009). Although theism is undoubtedly a dominant and perhaps oppressive ideological system in some contexts, it is also the oppressed and relatively powerless minority in other contexts. Our primary focus in the latter case is Western academia. This particular context has suffered from what Gadamer (1960/2004) has called the "prejudice against prejudice" (p. 273). This prejudice against prejudice frequently supposes that frank prejudices are inherently dogmatic, hegemonic, and oppressive, whereas hidden prejudices are somehow more open, egalitarian, and less likely to be oppressive. The social sciences, especially, have participated in this supposition by framing method ideas as objective and thus relatively free from prejudices, biases, and assumptions. Most religions, on the other hand, are quite explicit about their values and assumptions, so they have been excluded from consideration as guides for advancing knowledge. Indeed, they are often cast as the *other side* of the modernist dualism, because they are viewed as subjective rather than objective.

As we will describe, a theistic approach to psychology challenges both the objectification of method ideas and the subjectification of religious ideas, partly because all such idea systems are underlain with "subjective" values and unproven assumptions (Slife & Melling, 2012). A theistic approach may serve to highlight the more hidden assumptions and prejudices of method, which can be the more problematic for hegemony, dogmatism, and oppression in the academic context. As Fox, Prilleltensky, and Austin (2009) put it, these prejudices "are institutionalized in subtle ways, making it harder both to understand their operation and to combat their presence" (p. 9). A theistic approach also means, as we will outline, demonstrating how theistic ideas can be productively used in the theory, research, and practice of psychologists. Rather than seeking to replace more conventional conceptions, this approach moves toward a pluralism in which it supplements or complements conventional practices and modes of inquiry.

Definition

Part of the inappropriate subjectification of theism is the misconception that it varies greatly from person to person. There is certainly a sense in which this is true, because any such subsuming conception varies to some degree from individual to individual. However, any of the subsuming philosophies that might undergird the social sciences, such as epistemology and ontology, would likely also vary in much the same way (Slife & Williams, 1995). Actually, the notion of theism is quite straightforward, shorn of its subjectification. Consider Plantinga's conception in this regard: "God is already and always intimately acting in nature which depends moment to moment ... upon divine activity" (Plantinga, 2001, p. 350). In this sense, theism merely assumes that God is currently active in the world, including the psychological world. A *complete* understanding of the psychological world, from this premise, includes both divine factors and factors not typically understood as divine.

Keywords

Theism; philosophy of science; naturalism; pluralism; religion; transcendence

History

Theism has a long past, with a long line of scholarship in a variety of disciplines, but a short history in psychology. We can provide only the briefest of sketches of both, especially as they might pertain to psychology. First, relevant theistic thought can be traced to the Middle Ages, such as the Patristics, and even farther back to Plato (Nelson & Thomason, 2012). Since the Enlightenment, however, theism has been separated from traditional science, with psychology distancing itself from theism in the pursuit of modernist and naturalist scientific ideals. Consider a recent resolution of the APA Council of Representatives (2007) in this regard. Psychology and religion are conceived of as "distinct" enterprises, having roles "outside" of one other (pp. 3–4): "It is important for psychology as a behavioral science, and various faith traditions as theological systems, to acknowledge and respect their profoundly different methodological, epistemological, historical, theoretical and philosophical bases" (p. 2). The gist of this passage and others from the resolution is clear: theism should not be involved in psychological science.

Theistic approaches to psychology challenge this need for separation by clarifying theism's relationship to science, expanding the purview of science, and embracing a true pluralism for psychology. Theistic psychologists recognize not only that science and religion were historically united in many periods of history (Hart, 2009) but also that modernism has become the popular reading of recent history in this regard, casting religion and science as antithetical. Indeed, many now assume that theistic religion oppressed science, when the contrary was almost always the case (Hart). For example, the modernist interpretation of Galileo's travails with the church is almost completely turned on its ear when a thicker account of that situation is known (Hart).

Theistic approaches to psychology generally oppose this modernist framing of science by recognizing that "The hallmark of science is the investigation of ideas, with investigation and method allowable in a variety of forms, including qualitative and perhaps even theistic forms" (Slife, Reber, & Lefevor, 2012, p. 221). Gerald Holton (1973) echoes this pluralism in his analysis of scientific themata, along with the noted physicist Percy Bridgman: "The scientific method is doing one's damnedest, no holds barred" (Holton, 1984, p. 1232). A theist's approach to science is thus more pluralistic because it espouses openness to other method worldviews in addition to naturalism.

Slife, Reber, and Lefevor (2012) also provide numerous justifications for psychology's specific consideration of a theistic worldview,

including its popularity among renowned scholars, its use among psychology's consumers (Richards & Bergin, 2005), and its dialectical contrast to many secular scientific assumptions. This last justification allows psychologists to become more aware of their current method assumptions as well as attend to aspects of psychological phenomena that conventional methods may overlook.

Traditional Debates

Obviously, a theistic worldview stands in stark contrast to many of the more traditional worldviews of science, notably naturalism. As Leahey (1991) explains, naturalism is the "central dogma" of many psychological methods and practices (p. 379). Its contrast with theism stems from its specific focus on *natural* events and topics as if they can be distinguished from *supernatural* events and topics. A theist does not make this distinction and thus does not engage in this sort of dualism; God is just as involved in the "natural" as the "supernatural." Moreover, naturalism typically entails an emphasis on the natural lawfulness of natural events. Although the theist is equally interested in the patterns and regularities of the world, naturalism often assumes that natural laws govern world events, whereas the theist views such events in relation to a supreme being (Taylor, 2007).

The potential unobservability of a supreme being poses an immediate challenge to many social scientists. Yet, the philosophy of naturalism also assumes unobservable entities, such as its natural laws (Bridgman, 1927/1993). Although the postulated manifestations of the law of gravity, say, are typically observable (e.g., footprint in the sand), the law itself has never fallen on anyone's retinas. The law of gravity is, rather, inferred from what has fallen on our retinas, its observable manifestations (Slife et al., 2012). This understanding of lawful activity is not different in kind from many theists' understanding of God's activity. Similar to natural laws, "God is an unseen entity that supposedly governs or influences world manifestations" (Slife et al., p. 224). There is no reason, then, that inferences cannot also be made about God's activity in the world in much the same way.

Critical Debates

Given the Enlightenment separation between theism and science, many social science researchers have considered theistic approaches to psychology to be impossible, or at least implausible. Perhaps the most important critical debate then is: Is this perceived implausibility due to the modernist stereotyping of theism and science, or is it, indeed, impossible to do respectable, scientific investigation from a theistic perspective? This general question is broken into two smaller questions (below): Can a theistic approach be investigated, and can it generate new knowledge and methods? Limited space prevents a comprehensive review of this research, so an illustrative example is provided for each aspect. Lastly, theism's association with certain political ideologies is also examined.

Can a theistic approach be investigated? Recent research studies suggest that theistic investigation is no more difficult to conduct than any scientific investigation of nonobservable psychological phenomena, such as memory, motivation, emotions, and attitudes (e.g., O'Grady & Richards, 2010; Reber, Slife, & Downs, 2012; Richards, Smith, Berrett, O'Grady, & Bartz, 2009; Smith, Bartz, & Richards, 2007). To illustrate, consider the conventional, *non*theistic program of psychological research devoted to understanding how it is that people form their "image of God." Apparently, a person's image of God significantly affects, and is affected by, human development, parenting, and even interpersonal relationships (Dickie, Ajega, Kobylak, & Nixon, 2006; Dickie et al., 1997; Hertel & Donahue, 1995). Why is it that some people see God as exclusively loving and charitable, while others consider their supreme being as the Great Punisher? Most psychological researchers investigate how important authority figures – e.g., parents, teachers, and coaches – influence the formation of these images.

This type of subject matter may appear to readily lend itself to a theistic mode of inquiry, but actually few of its researchers even consider that experiences with God could be a factor in the development of a person's image of God (O'Grady & Richards, 2007; Slife & Reber, 2009). The absence of this consideration is never defended, rationally or empirically; it is merely assumed without justification because the naturalism of psychology automatically discounts not only the existence and thus experience of God but also the possibility of validly gauging such experiences.

Nevertheless, Reber, Slife, and Downs (2012) modified and extended the work of these researchers to account for a theistic perspective. Using similar survey questions, they asked religious participants about their experiences with God, which are no more or less difficult to measure than experiences with one's parents or other human authority figures (the conventional predictors of people's image-of-God development). Neither set of experiences is any more or less "observable" in the empirical sense. Reber et al. (2012) found that a large proportion of the variance in their participants' images of God came from the participants' reported experiences of God, even when controlling for parental attachment. These findings, along with many others on other topics (e.g., O'Grady & Richards, 2010; Richards et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007), illustrate how theistic hypotheses can be empirically investigated and tested, even using conventional quantitative research methods.

Can a theistic approach generate new knowledge and methods? Skeptics also question whether a theistic approach to psychological research is capable of generating new or different findings from naturalism. They may agree that theism is conceptually different from naturalism but presume that the naturalistic scientific method maps the "objective" world for both the naturalist and the theist. This presumption has recently been labeled the *myth of neutrality* (Armstrong, 2011; Flashing 2010; Slife et al., 2012) and is another manifestation of psychology's "prejudice against prejudice," i.e., the desire for naturalistic methods to be neutral or

free of biases and subjectivities. To help dispel this myth as well as illustrate the heuristic value of theism for generating new psychological findings and methods, consider some recent work on the detection of naturalistic prejudices, both in research (Slife & Reber, 2009) and in teaching students psychological topics (Reber et al., 2012).

Regarding didactic instruction, for example, Reber, Slife, and Downs (2012) predicted that teaching naturalistic psychology moves theistically oriented students away from their theistic beliefs. Their reasoning for this hypothesis was that naturalism is a disguised or hidden ideology (Slife et al., 2012) and thus not a neutral set of assumptions, especially with regard to theists. In this sense, naturalistic psychology teaches students who were originally biased in favor of theism and theistic explanations to explain themselves and others in naturalistic terms (i.e., without reference to God's practical activity). For instance, theistic students, who would have originally explained their own and others' happiness with God as an active influence, would, after an undergraduate education in psychology, tend to explain their own and others' happiness without God as an active influence. This change in understanding would not have to be explicit. In fact, Reber et al. (2012) predicted that students' conscious and explicit attitudes toward theism would remain intact across their undergraduate education, especially in a religious environment. However, they also predicted that these students' *implicit* biases, such as their explanations of happiness, would shift increasingly toward scientific naturalism across their years of undergraduate work.

To measure this implicit shift, two relatively new methods for measuring biases were created to gauge the explicit and implicit prejudices of these students, both using standard psychological techniques for measuring such biases. In the case of implicit biases, for example, the Implicit Association Test was adapted to gauge implicit *faithism*, the potential prejudice against people of theistic faith. This new instrument is an example of how a theistic approach can foster the development of new measures. The results are

preliminary and only cross-sectional data are currently available, but they are clearly in line with these theistically informed predictions. Perhaps more importantly, they suggest the possibility not only that theistic students do shift their biases but also that supposedly neutral psychological findings and practices can move students to a different implicit understanding of the world.

The development of new methods would not preclude the development of an entirely new philosophy of science. Because current philosophies of science are generally founded on naturalism, we would not rule out the possibility of a theistic philosophy of science. Indeed, preliminary conceptualizations in this regard are currently being discussed (Johnson, 2007; Plantinga, 2011; Slife & Whoolery, 2006).

Political Ideology. One final "critical debate" concerns theism's association with certain political ideologies. In the United States, for example, many citizens would almost equate various forms of theism with conservatism. Yet, there is nothing about theism that weds it to a particular political ideology. Liberation theology, for instance, is a political movement within the Catholic Church, beginning in Latin America in the 1950s. The term "liberation" stems from the conviction that theists should work for liberation from unjust social, economic, and political conditions. This movement is one of several within social Christianity, with a history and range that extends to the work of Francis of Assisi, Leo Tolstoy, Martin Luther King, and Desmond Tutu. In fact, many theists of all stripes, such as Islam and Judaism, have movements and histories of social and liberationist theism.

International Relevance

International work from a theistic perspective has only just begun. Kari O'Grady (2012), for example, provides an instructive illustration of theistic implementation in the recent disaster in Haiti. Her work includes general clinical interventions as well as a more specialized account of individual and community trauma. In all her conceptualizations, she avoids the temptation to syncretize the naturalistic and the theistic, and yet she provides what appear to be viable theistic approaches to these important therapeutic issues.

As another example, Eric Johnson and P.J. Watson (2012) casts a vision for a theistic approach to psychology that entails international meetings and dialogue not only across various forms of theism, including animism, polytheism, monotheism, Trinitarian theism, pantheism, panentheism, and atheism, but also across various forms of transcendence, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and New Age representatives. Conversations across these traditions would not preclude working within them. Christians could work on specifically Christian approaches to psychology, and Muslims could work on Islamic approaches to the discipline, and so on. However, that work would be examined in relation to the work of other traditions as part of a larger whole, much like the interdisciplinary work of many universities. Perhaps even more intriguingly, subsections of these meetings could explore commonalities across associated traditions, such as the Abrahamic religions of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. This vision of a theistic approach to psychology is obviously anything but monolithic.

Practical Relevance

If a theistic approach to psychology can not only investigate theistic hypotheses but also generate new findings and methods, as we have illustrated (see section "Critical Debates"), can these investigations and findings lead to new and functional psychological theories and applications, such as those that might inform psychotherapy? Only the briefest of affirmative answers is possible here, given our space limitations.

Theory. The usual "personality" theories have long been viewed as sufficiently comprehensive and diverse, if not too diverse, to accommodate human thought and behavior (Slife, 2012). However, few if any of the mainstream theories make the assumption of a currently active and practically relevant God. This assumption is typically avoided because God is not considered to be real

or knowable. Even when psychological theorists have imported philosophies steeped in theism, they too, like conventional image-of-God researchers, have often ruled out or overlooked theistic considerations and features (Slife et al., 2012). One of the more striking instances of this naturalistic theoretical bias involves the importation of Martin Buber's work, most famously by Carl Rogers (Slife & Reber, 2009). However, we could discuss the theistic theorizing of any number of other scholars whose ideas have been imported into psychology, including John Macmurray, Soren Kierkegaard, and Emmanuel Levinas.

By contrast, consider Jim Nelson's work (Nelson & Thomason, 2012) as a notable exception. He not only includes and keeps intact the theistic core of major theistic thinkers; he also shows how these thinkers can be credible and effective resources for psychologists in their theorizing. A theist can, of course, operate from any number of traditions, including Islamic and Jewish traditions, among many others, but much of Nelson's work is set in the Christian tradition, especially the early Church Fathers of the Patristic era. Nelson describes how these early scholars solved many theoretical puzzles that befuddle psychological theorists today (Nelson & Thomason).

Practice. Similar to methods and theories, psychological practices are themselves underlain with systems of assumptions or worldviews (Rychlak, 1981). These worldviews often reflect the same secularism and naturalism as most sets of ideas in mainstream psychology (Richards & Bergin, 2005; Richardson, 2005; Slife, 2012). Consequently, psychotherapists are generally teaching their clients, even theistic clients, to explain themselves as if God does not matter (Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010). This teaching could, of course, be correct; the problem is that it is often merely assumed and taught *implicitly* in therapy rather than explicated and examined with sensitivity and awareness (Slife et al., 2012).

As a supplement to the implicit naturalism pervading mainstream therapeutic practices, several psychotherapists have recently initiated a movement toward the inclusion and use of theistic therapeutic practices (e.g., O'Grady, 2012; Richards & Bergin, 2004, 2005; Slife et al., 2010; York, 2009). Some psychotherapists may even desire an eclectic combination of naturalistic and theistic ideas and practices for various reasons. After all, not every client will agree with the assumptions and biases of a theistic approach. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that this type of disagreement applies equally to naturalistic approaches, since naturalism is itself a system of assumptions and biases – a worldview or an ideology – about which many clients, both theistic and nontheistic, might not agree (Richards & Bergin, 2004). For this reason, we believe it is ethically imperative to identify the conceptual assumptions of *all* psychotherapies in order to provide clients with the information needed for truly informed consent.

Future Directions

A theistic approach to psychology is in its nascent stages, to be sure. Still, it has proven its preliminary worth and viability in the theory, research, and practice of psychologists. To say, even at this preliminary stage, that it "cannot be done" is simply wrong because it *is* being done, as our illustrations evidence. What is needed now is a chance for this approach to compete fairly in the marketplace of psychological and scientific ideas. Fair competition, however, is easier said than done (Slife & Reber, 2009). Because so many psychologists have trained in taken-for-granted philosophies and theories that automatically exclude even the consideration of theistic approaches, these psychologists presume that this exclusion is due to theism's unsuitability for scientific exploration. Our clear contention is that this presumption is not true (Plantinga, 2011). Most training and research philosophies merely reflect the modernity and dualism of psychology, including its "prejudice against prejudice," not the intellectual or methodological fertility of a worldview such as theism.

In the end, the future of theistic approaches is probably tied to the advance of *real* methodological pluralism in psychology. We emphasize

"real" here because the worldview of naturalism still undergirds the practice of a variety of methods (Slife & Melling, 2012). To effect a genuinely pluralistic methodology is to consider not only a diversity of procedures but also a diversity of the worldviews that guide the procedures. The advent of qualitative methods heartens us, because these methods, when understood correctly (Packer, 2011), are typically guided by a different worldview than quantitative methods (Slife & Melling, 2012). Still, both quantitative and qualitative researchers have typically adopted different forms of naturalism and thus have agreed on the *a priori* dismissal of theistic theorizing. This type of dismissal is, for us, distinctly *un*scientific and *un*critical, because decisions about what matters are made *before* investigation and examination. The theistic psychologist, in this sense, merely wants to push the pluralism and diversity envelope a little further. If a theistic approach can be done, as we have demonstrated here, why not allow it a place among the other schools of psychological thought, to rise or fall on its own merits to the discipline?

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Online Resources

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-west/

Theistic Psychology. http://e-swedenborg.com/tp/

Thematic Analysis

Victoria Clarke[1] and Virginia Braun[2]
[1]Department of Health and Social Sciences, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
[2]School of Psychology, The University of Auckland, Auckland, Aotearoa/New Zealand

Introduction

Empirical research within critical psychology is strongly associated with the use of qualitative methods. In the field of qualitative psychology a distinction can be made between experiential and critical approaches (Braun & Clarke, 2013; Reicher, 2000), both of which involve some kind of critique of mainstream psychology. Experiential approaches aim to capture participants' experiences and perspectives and ground research in participants' accounts, rather than researcher's categories. However, these approaches view language as a reflection of "internal categories of understanding" (Reicher, p. 3), and so assume it is possible to "read off" participants' thoughts, feelings, and practices from their use of language. By contrast, critical approaches challenge what experiential approaches have in common with mainstream psychology – the assumption that language is only of interest as a description of inner states. Critical approaches (usually some version of discourse analysis) understand and analyze language as something that is constitutive, rather than reflective, of our social and psychological worlds as a form of social action. One of the most common qualitative methods is (some form of) thematic analysis (TA); however, there is a debate about whether TA is an experiential or a critical approach, and thus an appropriate analytic method for critical psychology.

Definitions

TA is a method for identifying and analyzing patterns of meaning (themes) in qualitative data. Braun and Clarke (2006) present TA as just an analytic method, not a methodology. TA does not prescribe theoretical assumptions, appropriate research questions, and ideal methods of data collection. Braun and Clarke argue that TA can be used within a wide range of theoretical frameworks: from essentialist, experiential TA to constructionist, critical TA; even thematic *discourse* analysis is possible (see Taylor & Ussher, 2001). Fitting with its poststructuralist framework, thematic discourse analysis involves attention to the constructive role of language and multiple and shifting meanings (Taylor & Ussher), but retains a specific interest in *patterned* meaning (discourses) within the data set.

TA can be used to address most types of research questions, from questions about people's practices and views and opinions to questions about the representation and construction of particular social and psychological objects and subjects in particular contexts. The exception is questions about language practice, which require a discursive psychological or conversation analytic orientation. TA can be used to analyze most types of qualitative data, from secondary sources (such as men's magazines or television talk shows) to textual data (qualitative surveys or story-completion tasks), and from interactive data (transcripts of interviews and focus groups) to naturalistic data (transcripts of audio recordings of counselling sessions). TA can also be used to analyze large or small data sets (from two to twenty focus groups) and to produce both data-driven (bottom-up) and theory-driven (top-down) analyses.

TA involves the generation of codes and then themes from qualitative data (in thematic discourse analysis, codes, themes, *and* discourses – "underlying systems of meaning"– are identified; Taylor & Ussher, 2001, p. 297). Codes capture interesting features of the data of potential relevance to the research question. Coding is not simply a method of data reduction; it is an analytic process that captures both semantic (surface) meaning within the data and latent (underlying) meaning. Themes are analytically constructed from coding, and the data set, and capture broader patterns of meaning within the data. They are used to structure the presentation of results. Theoretically flexible TA emphasizes the active (and reflexive) role of the researcher in constructing codes and themes. Themes do not simply "emerge" from the data; the researcher does not simply search the data for the themes residing within them. Rather, the researcher makes active, interpretative choices in *generating* codes and in *constructing* themes.

Keywords

Code; thematic analysis; thematic discourse analysis; theme; qualitative methods

History

The term "thematic analysis" was first introduced by the physicist, philosopher, and historian of science Gerald Holton in the 1970s (Merton, 1975). Since then a number of different versions of TA, as a method for analyzing qualitative data, have been proposed within psychology and the social sciences (e.g., Aronson, 1994; Boyatzis, 1998; Joffe & Yardley, 2004), but none of these approaches have achieved the "brand recognition" of grounded theory, discourse analysis, and, most recently, interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). TA arguably developed out of content analysis and could be regarded as a form of qualitative content analysis (Joffe, 2011). TA is often associated with an experiential approach to qualitative psychology, and many versions of TA are located within a phenomenological framework (e.g., Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012; Joffe, 2011). However, in 2006, critical psychologists Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke proposed a theoretically flexible approach to TA (see also Braun & Clarke, 2012, 2013), which is ideally suited to critical psychology and provides an alternative to discourse analysis which is often regarded as *the* (only) method of critical

psychology. Since their 2006 publication, TA has increased in popularity; it is often included in the latest editions of qualitative teaching texts and edited collections. TA is now well on the way to achieving the "brand recognition" of approaches such as grounded theory, IPA, and discourse analysis.

Traditional Debates

Is Thematic Analysis a Realist Method? Just as IPA (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009) could be regarded as a form of phenomenological TA, many proponents of TA demarcate it as a phenomenological (contextualist) or a realist method (Guest et al., 2012; Joffe, 2011). For example, although Joffe (p. 211) acknowledges that TA "is not tied to a particular theoretical outlook," she describes it as fitting well with the assumptions of social phenomenology. Furthermore, Joffe's version of TA involves the development of a "coding frame," which two or more independent coders then apply to the data set. The researcher seeks to determine the reliability of the coding frame by calculating inter-rater reliability scores. Likewise, Guest et al.'s (p. 18) "applied" TA is "more comfortably applied within a positivist framework" and involves the use of a "code book" (similar to Joffe's coding frame) and the calculation of "intercoder agreement" (another term for inter-rater reliability). Boyatzis' (1998) TA aims to bridge the divide between positivist and interpretative social science and again advocates the use of a codebook, multiple independent coders, and the calculation of inter-rater reliability scores. All are realist in assuming there is an accurate reality in the data that can be captured through coding. By contrast, Braun and Clarke's (2006) theoretically flexible TA can be applied equally within an essentialist or a constructionist framework. Coding is a more organic process, not guided by the development of a coding frame. Reflecting a critical approach to coding, it is understood as an active and reflexive process that inevitably and inescapably bears the mark of the researcher(s). With no one "accurate"

way to code data, the logic behind inter-rater reliability disappears (it can be argued that it shows that two researchers have been trained to code data in the same way, but not that coding is accurate).

A comparison of two studies (Lavie & Willig, 2005; Nicolson & Burr, 2003) on a similar topic (women's experiences of [lack of] orgasm) illustrates the differences between theoretically flexible TA and phenomenological approaches. Nicolson and Burr's (unclaimed) TA is explicitly located within a critical feminist framework (with the aim of challenging the medicalization of women's sexual problems) and draws on the conceptual lens of symbolic interactionism and that of psychodynamism in analyzing 33 (mainly heterosexual) women's interview accounts. The data are clearly located within (a feminist interpretation of) the wider sociocultural context. The authors identified three (latent) themes that underpinned the women's accounts: male sexuality as active and demanding of sexual satisfaction; female sexuality as active but different from male sexuality; and the notion that there is a "normal sexuality," which exists as a standard for women to judge themselves against. The analysis examined the ways in which the women's accounts constitute the social "reality" of orgasm in particular ways. By contrast Lavie and Willig's (2005) IPA, or phenomenological TA, analyzed the *psychological* experience of inorgasmia for 6 heterosexual women and focused (at the semantic level) on the ways in which inorgasmia impacted on the women's self-image, their partner relationships, and their enjoyment of sex. Although Lavie and Willig note the symbolic interactionist underpinnings of IPA and recognize that "meanings are negotiated within a social context" (p. 118), references to wider discourses of sexuality and gendered norms and expectations are limited (e.g., there is "a stigma attached to inorgasmic women in our society," p. 120). Although Lavie and Willig's analysis could be regarded as a departure from mainstream psychology in the sense that it prioritizes the voices of inorgasmic women, rather than researcher's categories, it is not sufficiently located within wider discourses of (hetero)

sexuality nor a productive view of language to be regarded as an example of a critical psychology of orgasm.

Critical Debates

What are the distinctive features of critical TA compared to discourse analysis and why would a critical psychologist choose critical TA over discourse analysis? For the novice critical researcher, TA is a far more accessible method; it has a clearly defined set of procedures (see above) rather than relying on more ill-defined analytic practices such as "craft skills." Furthermore, although critical TA recognizes the constitutive nature of language and discourse, it does not generally involve a microanalysis of language use; therefore, it does not require a technical knowledge of language practice (unlike discursive psychology and conversation analysis). Critical TA can be applied flexibly within a wide range of critical frameworks (from symbolic interactionism and psychodynamism [Nicolson & Burr, 2003] to feminist poststructuralism [Farvid & Braun, 2006]) and, as noted above, can be used to analyze almost all forms of qualitative data, both small and large data sets, and to address most of the different types of research question posed by critical psychologists.

Six-Phase Process

Braun and Clarke's theoretically flexible TA involves a six-phase process preceded by critical reflection on the "many questions" of TA. The "many questions" include whether TA will be used in a (broadly) experiential framework or a critical one and whether analysis will be "inductive" (working bottom-up from the data but recognizing that pure induction is never possible; the researcher always brings their prior knowledge and epistemological assumptions to the data) or guided by existing theoretical concepts (top-down). Coding and theme development in TA are always guided by a research question, but

this question can be developed and refined throughout the analytic process. Phase one of the analytic process involves familiarization with the data. The researcher must become intimately familiar with their data, reading and rereading the data (and listening to any audio data at least once). This process should be accompanied by note-taking, recording initial analytic observations about the data and potential avenues for further exploration. Phase two requires a thorough and systematic coding of the data. Codes can evolve across the coding process and should capture features of the data that are potentially relevant to the research question. As noted above, codes can be developed at both the semantic and latent levels, encapsulating both the surface meaning of the data (interpreted through the lens of the researcher's epistemological and theoretical assumptions) and the "underlying systems of meaning" (Taylor & Ussher, 2001, p. 297). The code itself should be a pithy phrase that evokes the relevant features of the data and (potentially) the researcher's interpretative lens. Because themes are initially developed from the codes and coded data, codes should "work" independently of the data and the researcher should end this phase by collating all their codes and all the data relevant to each code.

The process of theme development commences in phase three with the generation of a set of potential or "candidate" themes. The codes and coded data are examined to identify similarity and overlap – patterns of semantic meaning and/or underlying concepts. Codes are clustered together to form themes, or larger, more complex codes can be "promoted" to themes. The researcher should also reflect on the relationships between potential themes. Themes must work together to tell a rich and complex story about the data *in relation to the research question*. The researcher ends this phase with a set of candidate themes, all the relevant coded data collated for each theme, and, ideally, with a figurative representation of the relationship between themes (and codes) – a "thematic map" of the analysis.

Phase four is particularly important for the novice researcher, or the researcher who is

working with a larger data set, and involves two levels of review of the candidate themes. First the themes are reviewed against the coded data to check if there is a good "fit" between the themes and the coded data and if the themes tell a convincing and coherent story about the coded data. If the researcher judges the themes to "work" at the level of the coded data, then they progress to a review of the themes against the full data set. As the researcher gains confidence, theme development becomes a more recursive process (particularly when working with smaller data sets), flip-flopping between theme development and review until the researcher is satisfied that the individual themes are coherent and the themes together address the research question in a meaningful way and capture the most relevant features of the data. This review process may entail some level of revision to the candidate themes or the candidate themes may be completely discarded and the process of theme development begun again. Once the researcher has decided upon a (relatively) definitive set of themes, the analysis progresses to the final analytic phases of defining and naming themes and writing up (the process of revision, or rejection, of themes can continue into these final phases).

The process of writing theme definitions is particularly useful for novice researchers and facilitates the development of a rich and complex analytic narrative. Theme definitions should *tell the story* of each theme, its central concept, scope and boundaries, and how it relates to the other themes and to the research question. The theme name should encapsulate the "essence" of the theme and be concise and vivid (short data extracts can form excellent theme titles if they capture the central concept of the theme). "Writing up" is the final phase in the analytic process; however, there is no clear separation between analysis and writing. In practice, writing up involves assembling, editing, and (new) writing *and* further analysis, organization, and reorganization of the themes and relevant selected data extracts. Presented data extracts, whether treated as illustratively or analytically (Braun & Clarke, 2012), should provide clear and compelling evidence to support analytic claims.

International Relevance

Although some countries have stronger and more diverse traditions of qualitative and critical psychology than others (e.g., Northern Europe and Australasia have a much stronger tradition than North America), TA is clearly an international method, with proponents in the UK (e.g., Braun & Clarke, 2006; Joffe, 2011) and in the USA (e.g., Aronson, 1994; Boyatzis, 1998; Guest et al., 2012), and practitioners in these and many other countries.

Future Directions

Although theoretically flexible TA is used by some critical psychologists (see, e.g., Farvid & Braun, 2006; Nicolson & Burr, 2003), discourse analysis remains the dominant method of critical psychology, and many continue to perceive TA as a realist method. Furthermore, TA is most often used within a realist framework and as a descriptive rather than an interpretative or conceptual method. Moving beyond these limitations, theoretically flexible TA has much to offer critical psychology.

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Online Resources

Braun and Clarke thematic analysis website www.psych.auckland.ac.nz/thematicanalysis. Successful qualitative research companion website http://www.uk.sagepub.com/braunandclarke/main.htm

Theoretical Psychology

Henderikus J. Stam[1] and Dane Burns[2]
[1]Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
[2]University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

Introduction

Theoretical psychology is sometimes viewed as a distinct subdiscipline of psychology, sometimes only a topic, and sometimes an indivisible part of the research enterprise. Regardless, theoretical psychology has been since the 1960s a constant presence in psychology, albeit a minority one. It has also spawned specialty research groups in departments of psychology, specialty graduate programs, journals, conferences, and professional organizations devoted to the advancement of theory. However, it should be noted that while the journals continue to thrive and conferences devoted to theoretical psychology are held on an annual basis, programs devoted to theoretical psychology are less numerous now than they were in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Whether this is due to the changing nature of the discipline of psychology (with its contemporary emphasis on the neurosciences) or the changing nature of the university (as it gradually adopts neoliberal management strategies), or both, is not yet clear. It is likely to be the case however that some form of theoretical psychology will continue to exist well into the future. In addition, the contemporary renewal of interest in qualitative research is likely to support and enhance interest in theoretical questions.

Definition

Theoretical psychology is the explicit concern with foundational, metapsychological, and philosophical questions in psychology. It is frequently engaged in historical studies that support work of a foundational nature.

Keywords

Theory; behaviorism; cognitivism; humanism; critical theory

Traditional Debates

Sigmund Koch is responsible in large measure for the creation of a "theoretical psychology" in North America. In 1951 Koch quite rightly noted that the appeal of grand theories of learning had stagnated and that the push for applied psychologies was going to change the discipline. At about the same time, Skinner (1950) had pronounced that theories of learning were not necessary, leading Donald Hebb to publish his

important article on the "conceptual nervous system" a few years later (Hebb, 1955). Koch had argued that since any "high-order theory" was going to be "pathetically incomplete," a set of modest objectives for a theoretical psychology should be agreed upon. These included such basics as "education in the methodology and logic of science," "internal systematization of suggestive, but formally defective, theoretical formulations," and "intertranslation and differential analysis of conflicting theoretical formulations" (Koch, 1951, p. 298). With a few pronouncements, Koch had indicated that there was a place for theory that stood outside the discipline and looked in, providing critique as well as suggesting how one ought to proceed in principle. However, Koch continued to be reserved in his enthusiasm for theory construction and argued that a unitary, comprehensive theory was unlikely ever to be had. Indeed, he is also remembered for pronouncing a few years later that the discipline of psychology was so fractionated that it should be referred to simply as "psychological studies."

Running in parallel with these developments was the creation of a genuine, psychologically based clinical psychology in North America. It led psychologists to search for a basic model of therapy that they could claim as their own. Although behavior therapy would emerge as a strong contender for status as a scientific therapy, an alternative, "third force" or humanistic psychology vied with this scientific therapy almost from the start (e.g., Benjamin, 2005). Humanistic psychology was ostensibly based on European phenomenological and existential philosophy despite its modification in its transition across the Atlantic. It remained a source of inspiration for several decades as psychologists struggled to turn an abstract system of thought into a set of practices. Hence, versions of what constituted "theory" in psychology in the 1960s and 1970s included reflection on, and expansion of, phenomenology and existentialism (e.g., Giorgi, 1970; Van Kaam, 1969). The introduction of cognitive psychology further opened up the possibilities of theory, creating an entirely new set of concerns around such concepts as information,

mental representations, and intentionality. Psychologist Zenon Pylyshyn and philosopher Jerry Fodor, among others, were productive theorists in cognitive science, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, in the years from 1960 to 1990, an eclectic set of theoretical and philosophical concerns became the focus of discussions and debate among theoretical psychologists.

Critical Debates

Theoretical psychology does not have a central set of questions with which it is concerned. Although originally interested in foundational and phenomenological issues, some theoretical concerns were diverted by cognitive science to take on the issues of representation and intentionality, among others. Other psychologists were moved by the development of social constructionism (due in large measure to Rom Harré, e.g., 1979; Gergen, 1985) to reconsider the entire project of a scientific psychology. Feminist psychologists challenged taken-for-granted phallocentric conceptions of the discipline and rewrote psychology's male-oriented focus (e.g., Morawski, 1994). Postmodernism for a brief period in the 1990s proposed a deconstruction of the scientific enterprise, and a number of theoretical psychologists were deeply involved in this debate. Alternatively, a number of psychologists located in the USA have developed hermeneutic alternatives to psychology both for basic and applied psychology (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999; Slife & Williams, 1995).

In Europe, however, theoretical psychologists (particularly in the Netherlands, Germany, and Scandinavia) had other concerns. A group of psychologists largely located at Utrecht University in the 1950s was propounding a version of phenomenological psychology that was also rigorous and empirical. They loosely defined themselves in relation to the traditions of philosophical phenomenology in Germany such as those of Edmund Husserl (the famous founder of phenomenology as a philosophical approach), Karl Jaspers (the phenomologically oriented psychiatrist), Max Scheler (the Catholic

philosopher who emphasized personalism in phenomenology), and the existentialists in France such as Jean Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel, and Simone de Beauvoir. While this particular strand of phenomenological psychology did not last into the latter decades of the twentieth century, it did lead to the creation of several programs of theoretical psychology in the Netherlands. In the UK and elsewhere in Europe, important critiques of psychology emerged out of dialogues with Marxism (e.g., Parker, 2007). In Scandinavia activity theory, a development that has its origins in the work of Lev Vygotsky and was most recently advanced by Yrjö Engeström has been an important theoretical and research tradition for at least 25 years. In Germany, beginning in the 1970s, the work of Klaus Holzkamp led to the creation of a distinct neo-Marxist form of critical psychology that focused on the "standpoint of the subject (Tolman, 1994)." Although many of these movements and positions are no longer as prevalent as they once were, their emergence and spread indicate that theoretical psychology continues to be a place where critical work can be carried out to evaluate and consider alternatives to the mainstream of the discipline.

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Online Resources

A search for online resources will turn up many journals and books as well as various web resources. I limit myself here to two societies that are representative of contemporary work in theoretical psychology (although there are others), the International Society for Theoretical Psychology: http://psych.ucalgary.ca/istp/index.htmlhttp://psych.ucalgary.ca/istp/index.html

And the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology (Division 24 of the American Psychological Association): http://www.theoreticalpsychology.org

Theory

Henderikus J. Stam
Department of Psychology, University
of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

Introduction

Theory has a long history in psychology and its meaning has so varied over the past 150 years that there is no single tradition of doing "theory" in psychology (as in the social sciences more generally). However, both behaviorism and varieties of positivism in psychology privileged theory in the twentieth century so that it came to take on a restricted but important role in the discipline. Indeed, the 1940s and 1950s were often called the "age of theories" referring to the dominance of "theories of learning (Stam, 2012a)." This carried over into modern psychology where, until today, theory has continued to be an important component of what a researcher or practitioner in the discipline does. Critical theory more generally has had a limited impact on psychology however despite the rich traditions that it has

spawned outside of psychology. Contemporary theoretical approaches in psychology are eclectic but this belies the fact that there is a preferred and hegemonic approach to theory in the mainstream of the discipline (Stam, 2012b).

Definition

Theory is the abstract formulation of a phenomenon of interest, which may include a detailed account of how the components/hypothesized entities (sometimes variables) of a theoretical framework cohere and interact. In psychology "theory" is frequently (but not always) taken in its modern, scientific sense as a system of logically coherent formulations that "explains" the phenomenon under consideration and, preferably, also allows for further predictions. More generally however any psychological phenomenon may be "theorized" when it is taken to be a problem to be solved or an experience to be explained, with or without the use of data. Critical approaches to theory may include ideological, social, feminist or political critiques. The use of data (qualitative or quantitative) does not mean that theorizing has ceased.

Keywords

Theory; theoretical; philosophy; science; explanation; data; underdetermination; critique

History

The term "theory" is derived from the Greek word for viewing and contemplation. It had a specific meaning, the *theors* were ambassadors sent by a state to perform or observe a religious rite but this particular definition also gave way to a notion of *theoria* as contemplation. This was the notion of *theoria* adopted by philosophers beginning with Plato, the contemplation of truth. Aristotle makes the distinction between theory and practice by distinguishing the life of "politics" from the life of "contemplation."

The life of "politics" is a life of practice, whereas the contemplative life (*bios theoritikos*) is a life of reflection (see Constantinou, 1996, for a discussion). But this distinction is actually less modern-sounding than it seems at first blush. The notion of theory as a scholarly endeavor apart from other forms of thinking (or research) is essentially a modern one. It emerges with the advancements of science and the gradual development of "natural philosophy" into other disciplines in the nineteenth century.

The notion that one would conduct theory apart from one's empirical investigations is rather late and is in part due to the wide-spread adoption of positivism as a philosophy of science. Since positivism eschewed all manner of religious and metaphysical influences, it held that non-empirical statements were theoretical (or worse, merely metaphysical). However, even those theoretical entities that survived had to be tied to observation, at least as far as scientists such as Ernst Mach were concerned. Advances in the natural sciences, especially physics, in the early twentieth century made it clear that theoretical propositions had a role to play in science well beyond their role as descriptors of observables. In the philosophy of science this was codified by logical positivism in so far as the place of theory was not limited to observable descriptions but was allowed a place in the framework of explanations so long as theoretical propositions were logically tied to observation sentences. Psychologists appeared to adopt some of these strategies particularly in the founding moments of behaviorism since B. F. Skinner and Clark Hull were aware of the positivist debates and their resolution. Kenneth Spence argued that theories were merely devices to help in the formulation of laws and their role was restricted to the postulation of "hypothetical constructs." Operationism, derived from Percy Bridgman's work in physics likewise strengthened an inherent positivism in American psychology (Koch, 1992). However, the advent of cognitivism and humanistic psychology overturned, in part, the reliance on narrow positivist conceptions of theory and opened up the question of what theory could be in psychology at

a time when philosophers of science themselves abandoned the logical positivist or empiricist framework (Hempel, 1958). In the wake of the work of Norwood Hanson (1958, who famously introduced the notion of "theory-ladeness" of observations) and Thomas Kuhn (known for his notion of the historical "paradigm shift"), traditional question of theory were no longer tied to moribund considerations of just how a theory statement was tied to observations.

Traditional Debates

In the writings of the founding figures of psychology, such as Wilhelm Wundt or William James, their research contributions, philosophical endeavors and speculative considerations were all of a piece (Danziger, 1990). Theory was not conceived of as a separate activity in research until positivism became firmly entrenched in psychology in the early twentieth century. Behaviorists took seriously the dictum that observations were primary to the practices of science and that they should take precedence over something they began to couch as "theory." But because there was no agreement on a complete behaviorist program, there were numerous versions of about how to describe and explain behavior. The most obvious of these positions were those of Clark Hull and his colleagues (classical conditioning) versus B. F. Skinner and his colleagues (operant conditioning). Although Skinner once wrote a paper entitled "Are theories of learning necessary," theoretical disputes among the various schools of behaviorism dominated this period of American psychology's development in the mid twentieth century. However, as George Santayana once noted, the empiricist "thinks he believes only what he sees, but he is much better at believing than seeing."

With the demise of behaviorism and the rise of cognitive science, theory became respectable again if only because cognitive science was a domain occupied by, among others, computer scientists, psychologists, philosophers and linguists. The core concepts in cognitivism – representations, encoding and retrieval, schema,

and so on – are not behaviorally transparent and require considerable theoretical scaffolding to make sense or to become "visible (Margolis, 1984)." In addition, the resurgence of personality theories, social psychological theories and developmental theories in mid-century provided not only legitimacy to the idea of a psychological theory, but created opportunities for psychologists to specialize in being a "theorist." For a period lasting roughly 30–40 years, theoretical psychology programs existed in Europe and North America, often in combination with an emphasis on the history of psychology. Many of these are now gone as both theory and history have come to be seen as luxuries in the neoliberal climate that is slowly changing the nature of the university in the early twenty-first century.

Critical Debates

There is no single, agreed upon account of what theory is or what it ought to do in psychology. For the mainstream, theory remains what one does before setting up research studies or what one does after collecting data. However, the influence of critical theory in the 1960s had a profound impact on the development of theory in psychology (Teo, 2005; Tolman, 1994). The advent of cultural studies and literary studies later enhanced the role of theory in the academy. There is some argument however that debates associated with what came to be called "postmodernism" were destructive to the potential influence of theory, particularly in North America where postmodernism became a synonym for rampant relativism.

Critical Theory as a specific category of "theory" or philosophy originates with the so-called "Frankfurt School" which developed in the 1930s under the guidance of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm, among others. It included the brilliant cutural critic Walter Benjamin who died attempting to cross the French-Spanish border in 1940. The rise of Nazism in Germany scattered the Frankfurt School with many moving to the New School for Social Research in New York, at least until the end of World War II. Critical theory was

noted not only for its neo-Marxist critique but also for its willingness to adopt Freudian and neo-Freudian elements into its critique of society. As such its psychological relevance was obvious to some activist psychologists in the 1960s who realized that psychology was incapable of addressing real social problems such as war, poverty, racism, sexism, and so on. Psychology's theoretical frameworks were sadly lacking in their ability to develop overarching critical views of the social world, the military-industrial complex, and the colonial and proxy-wars that came to dominate the Cold War era. However, critical theory in its various forms did in fact develop social theory with an emancipatory intent, it was not merely a descriptive category, and it was deeply influenced by new developments in Marxist thought.

Social psychologists in particular experienced a period of "crisis" in the 1960s and 1970s after critiques of social psychological experimentation by such authors as Edward Sampson and Kenneth Gergen. More broadly based critiques of psychology introduced variants of critical theory into psychology as well as social theory more generally. The revival of Vygotsky's work and the introduction of activity theory in Scandinavia brought more broad-based work into psychology. Psychoanalysis provided another foundation for critical theory (broadly conceived), which was further extended by radical versions of Lacanian theory, particularly after the widespread introduction to English speaking readers of the Slovene philosopher, Slavoj Žižek. Finally, official programs of cultural studies introduced in universities in the 1980s and 1990s brought broad-based theoretical work into the academy that, while largely without influence in psychology, added a certain academic legitimacy to the work of critical theorists. The period of the 1990s was also characterized as the era of "postmodernism" in literary studies which spilled over into neighboring disciplines.

International Relevance

Mainstream psychology still relies heavily on a traditional conception of theory that is most clearly illustrated in its most representative journals, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* and *Psychological Review*. Here the conception of theory is limited to the elucidation of phenomena already clearly established in research traditions or the extension of an explanation of some phenomenon that is otherwise not yet clear in the research. In this sense, theory has a role not much different from what it might portend to play in neighboring fields such as biology. Such a conception of theory has migrated around the world as psychology has begun to spread throughout developing nations and the majority world. This is the deliberate conception of psychology as a "science" traditionally conceived wherein theory is limited to the explication of interesting data gathered by established methods.

The majority world however remains largely underrepresented in theoretical (as well as research) endeavors in psychology as the US in particular, and English-speaking and European countries in general, continue to dominate the discipline. But because theory requires few resources and is not limited in the same manner as more expensive research practices tend to be, it has found some foothold in other regions of the world. Societies such as the International Society for Theoretical Psychology suggest that theory continues to be a robust activity. In addition, even within American and European psychology departments that are not entirely committed to the mainstream there continue to be pockets of scholars who advance both critical theory and what might be called work in the philosophy of psychology.

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Practice Relevance

The relationship between theory and practice (or praxis, on some accounts) is one frought with controversy. Theory precedes practice on a standard view of psychological science wherein one's practices are informed by theoretical formulations that have been advanced by research. Most work in theoretical and critical psychology is deeply suspicious of such a formulation since practice is rarely transparent and driven not only

by personal interests but also by motivations of which the actor may not be fully cognizant. Both critical theory and contemporary psychoanalytic formulations take seriously the lack of clear boundaries between theory and practice wherein the two are continuously reformulated in cycles of reflection and action. Contemporary anthropologists and sociologists have also been interested in this question, particularly as it is demonstrated in the structures of action. Pierre Bourdieu for example has introduced the notion of *habitus* as a "structuring structure" of the body. By this he means that the body is locus of habits, skills and dispositions that organize practices. In this way, Bourdieu notes that practice can be quite independent of theory and carries within it the traditions of a society.

Future Directions

Traditional theory – as characterized by the accompaniment of theoretical claims to data – will undoubtedly continue to play a role in psychology (Bem & Looren de Jong, 2006; Robinson, 2007; Turner, 2013). This standard form of scientific practice is now deeply embedded in the methodological training that all psychology undergraduates receive. Critical and more general theoretical studies have also become securely embedded in psychology, that is, have their own journals, conferences and societies. This is due in part to the fractionation of psychology on the one hand and the reluctant acceptance of other intellectual traditions that continue to exert a benign pressure on psychology (e.g., philosophy, history, sociology) on the other hand. However, their influence is largely confined to the geographical and academic margins of the mainstream of the discipline. One is more likely to find a psychologist who is engaged in theoretical work outside the major centers of psychological research and outside the better-known universities. Whether this will continue depends in part on the state of the discipline as a whole, as well the evolution of the university itself which is likely to be restructured in major ways in the twenty-first century.

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Theory and Praxis

Ines Langemeyer
Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Institute of Education, Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany

Introduction

With regard to the transition from school to work, it is a widespread belief that theory and practice

ultimately represent opposites. Quite often, their relationship is experienced as rupture, disturbance, or conflict. Within the dominant paradigm of positivism, this perception often blends into other tensions such as scientific versus experiential knowledge, reason versus emotion, culture versus nature, and so on. Critical psychology tackles the "naturalness" and the societal purpose of opposing theory and practice by reflecting the sociohistorical background of these antagonisms: above all, the division of intellectual and physical labor and the domination of the former over the latter in capitalist relations. In what follows, it is important to distinguish three levels of the theory-practice-relation: First, the experiential relation that exists between a specific theory (a theory of X) and a concrete practice (a practice of Y); second, the philosophical relation between theory in general and practice in general; and third, the societal relation of the subjects of theoretical practice (such as academic science) and the subjects of practical practice (such as work).

Definition

The term *theory* is derived from the Greek *theoria* (θεωρία), which originally signifies contemplation and speculation in opposition to action in its moral as well as utilitarian sense. Thus, also the ancient meaning of "practice" or Greek *praxis* (πράξις = "action," "act," "execution," "completion") is conceptually opposed to "theory" although, in the ancient Greek society, the activities of theorizing and acting were philosophically closely connected to each other and did not yet correspond to an opposition between abstract science and concrete life (cf. EP, 1999, pp. 1310, 1622).

In the Dark Ages, a pre-modern conception imbued theory with the almightiness of god, the omniscience of god's eye (EP, 1999, p. 1621), and separated completely the *vita contemplativa* from the *vita activa* (p. 1622). The modern and still contemporarily assumed definition relates theory to scientific knowledge, truth, and objectivity, that is, to general or universally valid knowledge.

Keywords

Theory-practice-relation; scientific and practical knowledge; knowing; experience; thinking and acting

Traditional Debates

The Philosophical Theory-Practice Relation of Positivism

Within the paradigm of positivism, the dualist conception of theory and practice is not only prevalent; theory is also widely regarded as superior to practice. Through the rise of natural sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the notion of theory was strongly interpreted in the light of philosophical empiricism: Theory was identified with objective knowledge that mirrors the world and that exists independently from the knowing subjects in the form of highly systematized and formalized knowledge. The success of engineering also fostered the estimation of science as an immediate societal power-to-act. To ensure the expansion of this knowledge creation, science had to be grounded in vast empirical investigation, especially practical testing. However, empirical sciences have also stressed the unity of knowing and transforming (*Einheit von Erkennen und Verändern*, cf. Heisenberg uncertainty principle) and thus have shown the way to a dialectical relationship between theory and practice.

The positivist notion of science sets the premise for many psychologists to proceed similarly in psychological theory, which implied that the first-person-perspective had to be either rendered into a third-person perspective (achieved by the "conditioning discourse" of experiments and assessment techniques, cf. Holzkamp, 1985/1991, Chap. 4) or excluded already from the beginning from the range of legitimate objects of study (cf., e.g., the black-boxing of human consciousness in behaviorism, Holzkamp, 1985/1991). Psychological issues such as cognition, emotion, memory, and action and their biological substratum (like neuronal connections and structures in the brain) are thus subjected to theorizing

apart from the thinking, feeling, and acting subjects. Through this abstraction, these processes and even more their biological substratum became isolated and, as if by magic, self-reliant elements. By reducing psychological issues of action, thinking, and feeling to biological processes, neuroscientific approaches, although addressing only a biological framework, paradoxically ascribe to these processes the quality of historical powers.

The Critique of "Technical Rationality"

In 1949, Gilbert Ryle identified the problems of the "intellectualist legend," which consists in the categorical mistake that all intelligent behavior could be put down to intelligent operations of the mind (Ryle, 1949). Likewise, Donald Schön (1983, p. 30) questioned the "dominant view of professional knowledge as the application of scientific theory and technique to the instrumental problems of practice." This view would belong to the model of "technical rationality," a "positivist epistemology of practice," undergirded by the success of engineering and medicine that reliably adjusted means to ends (pp. 31, 34). Schön (pp. 49–52) agrees with Ryle that there is a difference between "knowing-how" and "knowing-that" and with Michael Polanyi (1966, p. 4) that "[w]e can know more than we can tell," that is, that a "tacit dimension" incommensurable to rationalization always remains.

A New Societal Theory-Practice-Relation

It is not a coincidence that the "positivist epistemology of practice" corresponds with the kind of rationalization that started with the industrialization of Western societies. The strategy of tearing apart intellectual and manual work in order to establish hierarchical relationships and a societal gradient between those who work "with their brain" and those who work "with their hands" fits with the economic interest to increase productivity through technological progress. The scientific formalization and standardization of work knowledge served to replace more and more human work procedures by technological solutions.

However, since the late 1980s, researchers in the field of the sociology of work, science and technology studies, and vocational education simultaneously discovered the importance of practical or experiential knowledge and experience-based learning, especially for mastering high-tech environments at work such as automation plants, computer systems, aviation, and the like. Attention is drawn to a mode of action incomprehensible by "technical rationality" by introducing concepts like "situated action" (Suchman), "situated cognition" (Resnick et al.), and "work process knowledge" (Fischer, Boreham). Interest has grown with regard to the hidden or "tacit dimension" (Polanyi) of work knowledge and the corresponding competences such as "soft skills." Thus, at the end of the 1980s, a subject-oriented turn in social sciences can be noticed. This sheds new light on the societal as well as the experiential theory-practice relation by enhancing the significance of the subjective practical dimension.

With the beginning of the twenty-first century, this academic interest did not vanish. However, recommendations such as Martin Fischer's thesis (2002) to reconceptualize knowledge and ability, theoretical and practical knowledge, in a dialectical relation have not been further developed on a subject-scientific basis. A tendency prevails to identify theory with explicit and practice with implicit knowledge.

Critical Debates

A Critique of the Philosophical Theory-Practice-Relation

Bengt Molander (2009) disillusions the "tacit dimension" by arguing that "the tacit" is not only part of practical skills, such as biking, but also of every act of thinking itself and, consequently, in every activity of learning and knowledge creation. The crucial insight is not the recognition of the tacit but that "knowledge as used by human beings does not come divided into 'practical' or 'theoretical'." (p. 55) The meaning of concepts like "knowing" or "knowledge in use" is misunderstood in the conclusion that the subjects of knowing are immediately entering

with the "tacit dimension," the sphere of something *completely* tacit.

The problem lies in the positivist framework that "applied knowledge" appears "as a separate element"; it is due to *this* cultural background that also competence, qualification, and skill are conceived in an objectified and reified way where "the worker is really reduced to a 'means of transportation'" (p. 61). What is hidden in this paradigm is not some kind of knowledge, but in fact the "knowing worker" (p. 61). This underlines the importance of the subject-scientific turn as it is introduced by critical psychology with respect to the discussion on theoretical and practical knowledge.

The Critique of the "Form of the Object"

Marxist debates of theory and practice are based on Karl Marx's and Friedrich Engels' intervention against philosophical idealism and materialism. Most cogently, this is found in Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a *practical* question" (MECW, Vol. 5, p. 13). Social movements and activists sometimes read this thesis in a programmatic way to reject scientific engagement in favor of political action. However, Marx's intervention is not directed against theory as such but against theorizing reality merely in the "form of the *object*" (first thesis on Feuerbach, 1845). Instead, the theorizing subject should recognize reality "subjectively" "as sensuous human activity," as "practice" (Feuerbach, 1845). Within Marxist thought, "practice" therefore stands for a shift towards including the first-person-perspective (individually and collectively) into scientific research rather than omitting, suppressing, and making it unrecognizable in theory.

Furthermore, the revolutionary difference of Marxist thought is conceivable in two aspects: first, in the dialectical approach to theory and practice to comprehend the "unity of the process of the real," the dialectical interrelation between the societal basis of living and people's consciousness; second, in its conviction that researchers have to break away from societal relations in which their consciousness is merely opposed to reality and thus "can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real" (Marx and Engels, 1845/1846, p. 44/45).

Against this background, a way of reinventing psychology outside of bourgeois sciences was opened up. This can be exemplified with regard to the Berlin school of critical psychology. When it emerged in the course and in the aftermath of the students' movement of 1968, its theorizing carefully reflected the fundamental critique of students at that time that science must be seen as an element of bourgeois domination. However, it disagreed with the conclusion that psychology had to be abolished for purely being an instrument of capitalist forms of domination. Instead, critical psychologists reasoned that theorizing must be freed from the influence of bourgeois ideologies and science's reproductive function for capitalist relations.

It argued that a new psychology could not emerge unless all its theoretical concepts were developed through the fundamental critique of bourgeois ideologies and bourgeois scientific approaches. The enhancement of practice was therefore seen not only as a problem of a certain theory-practice-relation but ultimately of a theory-theory-relation, because there is no action without theory. Because an undialectical notion of theory and practice prevailed, critical psychology insisted that the development of emancipatory forms of theorizing depends on the particular practice of doing science: Methods were sought that do not subjugate the subjects of practice to the "form of the object" (Marx) but render them into co-researchers and transformers of their societal world-self-relations.

Towards a Subject-Scientific Turn

It was already the merit of the cultural-historical approach of Soviet psychology (Vygotsky, Leont'ev, Luria among others) to incorporate Marxist insights into psychology by theorizing psychic functions such as thinking, memorizing, feeling, and speaking not only from an individual but simultaneously from a cultural historical

point of view. Human cognition is no longer seen as merely a biological substratum or as a product of evolution but essentially as a product of socio-cultural development to which the development of the forces of production such as technology as well as language and symbolic action are paramount (Vygotsky, 2004). These interventions prepared the ground to conceive the concrete subjects of practice no longer as opposed to reality (the "society," the "environment," etc.) nor as naturally private individuals, but as human beings who collectively and creatively transform their living conditions. Thus, fundamental aspects for a subject-scientific turn of psychological and practice research away from the "form of the object" are achieved.

Kurt Lewin, with whom Vygotsky shares many insights (cf. Chaiklin, 2011; Langemeyer, 2011), develops a practice-based form of theorizing termed "action research" (Lewin, 1997b). He vouches "for close cooperation between theoretical and applied psychology" so that "the theorist does not look toward applied problems with highbrow aversion or with a fear of social problems," and that "the applied psychologist realizes that there is nothing so practical as a good theory" (1997a, p. 288). Although the Berlin school of critical psychology still criticizes Lewin's approach as "a variant of the general bourgeois psychological tendency to make subjectivity over into an object" (Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1978/1991, p. 129), it underlines his methodological advancements.

Vygotsky's colleague Alexej N. Leont'ev moves the concept of "activity" on both, its psychic and its societal level, into the center of cultural-historical psychology – which explains the more cited designation of this school as "activity theory." The key of his theory lies in his concept of "object-related activity," which is not tautology but represents an approach to explain – among others – the emergence of consciousness and subjectivity. Leont'ev argues that the epistemic subject cannot – by her biological features – mirror reality so that the relationship between subject and object is rejected as an immediate one (cf. "axiom of immediacy," 1972). To bridge the gap, he assumes the reproduction of an object (therefore the addition "object-related") through the subject's activity. This activity would reproduce the object through a "sensory image," which explains the "objective content of activity" (1978, Chaps. 2 and 3). "Thus, the object of activity is twofold: first, in its independent existence as subordinating to itself and transforming the activity of the subject; second, as an image of the object, as a product of its property of psychological reflection that is realized as an activity of the subject and cannot exist otherwise" (1978, Chap. 3).

In relation to the conceptualization of "objectivity," Janette Friedrich (1993, p. 51) criticizes that Leont'ev interprets the intellectual side of the object-related activity, thinking, as "functional objectness." This objectness would be the result of a representation without representing anything and would therefore mean something ideal: an epistemological content derived from a pure form-activity that should guarantee objectivity. Thereby, Leont'ev would ultimately cut the reference of the objectification of thinking to a real human subject, and thus would fall back into a traditional pattern of idealist thought: another immediacy between subject and object (Friedrich, 1993).

Developing Knowledge of the Societal-Subjective Coherences and Contradictions

The Berlin school of critical psychology incorporates many insights from Leont'ev, especially in relation to the concept of "object-related meaning" (*gegenständliche Bedeutung*, Holzkamp, 1983, p. 231). Holzkamp argues that humans have built into the world more and more objectifications of their needs and their intentions so that people's living conditions are saturated with object-related meaning that represents manifold action possibilities. The relationship between subjects and their objective conditions would therefore not be *determined* or *conditioned* by the latter but *mediated through* the subject's vital interests and her action premises with regard to a given range of societal action possibilities as perceived by the subject. Reasons (grounds) for action would capture a certain articulation between the subject's vital interests (motives), premises, and action possibilities. This is the main argument

against the paradigm of the "conditioning discourse," which still prevails in psychology.

The "discourse of reason," by contrast, shall fully recognize the standpoint of the subject, the first-person-perspective. Most importantly, this subject-scientific turn opens up the possibility of conceiving human practice on an experiential and thus societal level as the origin of all theory. A theory may be "subjective" in the sense that it closely relates to someone's everyday-life experience. On the one hand, it can therefore be marked by a lack of coherence or by ideological practices, while, on the other, it can be a source of critique (cf. Markard, 2009, p. 85). By confronting different theories (such as practical and scientific theories) with each other and by analyzing their ideological bias, humans can develop critically more cogent, coherent, and powerful forms of thinking and theorizing.

However, instead of overestimating the power of scientific theories, Holzkamp suggests that an important resource of critical thinking would lie in the practitioners' questioning of their own knowledge-in-practice. The rudimentary "knowledge of the societal-subjective coherences and contradictions" (Holzkamp, 2012, p. 99) should be the starting point for developing more profound bodies of knowledge. Yet, this questioning cannot take place if practitioners simply subordinate their thinking to scientific theories. In so doing, they would often eliminate contradictions; they would likely psychologize or naturalize certain phenomena rather than questioning and really comprehending them (cf. Fahl and Morus, 1999).

Future Directions

Dialectical Thinking

Critical psychologists (whether as scientists or as practitioners) face the challenge of meeting the demand of involving and empowering "practitioners" while being inspired by a mainly scientific enterprise, that is, an intervention into the body of scientific institutions, scientific discourses, and research practices. Given the fact that subjects in everyday life may even contradict

the aim of fostering social justice, participation, and emancipation, a "transformative activist stance" (Stetsenko, 2008, p. 474) becomes paramount. This stance takes concerns and needs of people seriously, but simultaneously is critical of the partiality and the societal estrangement of the standpoint of the subject. It is through this dialectical thinking that critical psychologists can strive "in the most challenging entanglements, [...] to generate – each time anew – critical perspectives on [...] societal practices in which we participate, and on our own social-individual basis to act and to reflect on the problems and conflicts to be resolved" (Langemeyer and Roth, 2006, p. 40).

A Historically New Theory-Practice Relation

Another challenge for critical psychology results from the transformation of the division of intellectual and manual labor through a new mode of production. With regard to this, the new nature of work activities, as well as conflicts entangled with them, also need to be analyzed. Inasmuch as critical psychology conceptualizes "technology as materialized action" and not just as means to an end (Schraube, 2009, p. 297), this approach manages to seize the changes of the societal and experiential theory-practice relation at work.

Due to the new materiality of technologies (i.e. the microelectronic development of digital information and communication technologies, artificial intelligence, etc.), work activities are no longer comprehensible by Marx's formula that man "can work only as Nature does, that is by changing the form of matter (MECW 35, Chap. 1, Sect. 2). This dimension certainly does not disappear. However, a new dimension consists in the demand to workers to increasingly ensure their attentiveness to fully or partially automated work processes, to manifold symbolic representations of it as well as possible risks and security problems that are hardly comprehensible as mere technical ones. Thus, work activities have become increasingly theoretical and self-reflexive: workers are challenged to shape themselves as knowing subjects, as intellectuals of the work process; this includes challenges to

experiment with their socio-technological environments, to conduct – though often in a rudimentary manner – some sort of researching activities that may even lead to changes in the social relations of work. Thus, the subjects of work are no longer reducible to a mere reproductive function – as it was the core enterprise of Taylorism. As far as power relations do not impair this, they increasingly take on a strategic role and thus are challenged to become developers of their own work in its entire societal form. Ines Langemeyer (2012) investigates this as a new "scientification of work" around which conflicts of learning vs. labor (producing), of vocational identity (the readiness of being an intellectual or not), and of responsibilities and possibilities of control arise.

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Therapeutic Culture

Ole Jacob Madsen
Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Blindern, Oslo, Norway

Introduction

"Therapeutic culture" is a collective term for the continuous sociological interest and documentation of the wider sociopolitical implications of psychology. Since work within this field of knowledge often is conducted by sociologists, historians, political philosophers concerned with the public sphere, etc., professional psychologists have up until the present often been unaware of these important findings, somewhat surprisingly this neglect is also evident in parts of critical psychology.

Definition

As therapeutic culture is a collective term, there are no clear definitions around in the strictest scientific sense. The essence of the notion points to the presence of a psychological mindset, a therapeutic way of thinking and speaking that is apparent outside the traditional spaces of psychology, like the therapist office, the clinic, and the academic departments. Thus, therapeutic culture both involves a certain psychological outlook on the world and is to be found in society exterior to psychology's traditional and expected separate localization. The sociological idea of a therapeutic culture is not to be confused with the clinical perception of therapeutic culture which is sometimes used to describe the relational atmosphere between the patient and the therapist.

Keywords

Therapeutic culture; therapeutic ethos; triumph of the therapeutic; consumer culture; neoliberalism; globalization; communitarian critique; return of religion

History

Therapeutic culture first came into the public perception when psychoanalysis in the 1950s emerged from the American therapist offices and started to influence the wider societal sphere. The original work that most often is recognized for starting the sociological and historical interest in psychology's cultural influence is Philip Rieff's (1966/1987) seminal book *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*: *Uses of Faith After Freud*. Rieff was originally an acknowledged Freud scholar and was for instance asked by Collier-Macmillan to oversee and write the introduction to the American edition of *The Collected Papers of* Sigmund Freud in the early sixties. In his doctoral thesis *Freud – The Mind of the Moralist* (1959/1979), Rieff was among the first writers who took a serious interest in Freud primarily as a moral philosopher and unknowingly responsible for a whole new Weltanschauung in modern society. Rieff's subsequent authorship deals with the long-term consequences of Freud's ideas on Western culture. *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* opens with lines from W. B. Yeats' famous poem "The Seconding Coming" which includes the often quoted passage: "The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of passionate

intensity" (Rieff, 1966/1987, p. 1). In Rieff's view the emerging therapeutic culture fails in the most vital task of all cultures, namely, to situate the self outside of itself: "Culture is another name for a design of motives directing the self outward, those communal purposes in which alone the self can be realized and satisfied" (Rieff, 1966/1987, p. 4). In contrast, the enthusiastic "psychologizers" of his time seek to pit "human nature against social order" through their individualistic conceptions of the self. It should be clear by now that Rieff basically anticipates that the therapeutic culture and its principal idea of emancipation through psychology is inevitably disaster prone.

The next wave of writers on the therapeutic culture like historian T. J. Jackson Lears and sociologist Christopher Lasch would expand Rieff's original analysis and more frequently talk of a *therapeutic ethos* which came to replace the Protestant ethos for the new needs in the modern capitalist economy of America in the twentieth century. Lears (1983, p. 4) traces the evolving consumer culture in the United States to important religious transformations in the first decade of the twentieth century: "I shall argue that the crucial moral change was the beginning of a shift from a Protestant ethos of salvation through self-denial toward a therapeutic ethos stressing self-realization in this world – an ethos characterized by an almost obsessive concern with psychic and psychical health defined in sweeping terms." Of the two Lears was perhaps the most sober in his analysis, maintaining that early psychological pioneers and advertisement agents like John B. Watson and Bruce Barton did not really understand the scope of the therapeutic culture and the new taken-for-granted reality they helped to create. While Lasch forcefully claimed that the therapeutic impact on society had helped to momentarily postpone the outer revolution and replace it with an inner revolution. The young self-obsessed Americans of the 1970s now preferred to seek the truth within themselves rather than seeking political changes. His influential work *The Culture of Narcissism* warns against the depoliticizing risks psychological impact radiates in contemporary society:

"Having displaced religion as the organizing framework of American culture, the therapeutic outlook threatens to displace politics as well, the last refuge of ideology" (Lasch, 1979/1991, p. 13).

Traditional Debates

Refreshingly in a time of differentiation, studies in the therapeutic culture have often revolved around sweeping and difficult troubling questions such as the following: "What is the real impact of psychology on Western culture?," "Is psychology in its widest consequences liberating or repressing?," and "Does the therapeutic culture unknowingly serve late modern capitalism?" The angle of incidence toward the therapeutic culture has traditionally followed two different paths. The first one is inspired by German sociologist Max Weber's (1905/2001) original analysis of the alliance between the economic sphere and the religious sphere, most famously expressed in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. For instance, historian and psychotherapist Philip Cushman (1990, 1995) talks about "the empty self," a self in need of constant gratification through consumption. This ideal of the American citizen partially produced by the self-psychology and humanistic psychology in the 1950s is perfectly suited to fit the needs of the American economy in the postwar era. While sociologist James Nolan Jr. (1998) has investigated the therapeutic ethos as the primary source of state legitimation in present-day America, as an efficient replacement of protestant religion and civic republicanism emptied of their previous authority over the public mind. For instance, if the federal government wants to prevent illiteracy across the USA, they could in previous times lean on the necessity of learning the Bible to withstand temptations from the Devil. Nowadays authorities can be certain that American parents fear of low self-esteem among pupils who do not master the art of reading, and writing will serve the same purpose.

The second main theoretical direction is inspired by the late writings of French

philosopher Michel Foucault (2007) and his interest for "the conduct of conduct" (*governmentality*) in neoliberal government, in particular what Foucault names the psy sciences which becomes a trusted expertise for the state in order to govern people through their own autonomous choices. British sociologist Nikolas Rose (1996, 1999) has written several influential works on the social history of psychology in Great Britain in the twentieth century. Rose is less reliant on the tradition that follows from Rieff into contemporary analysis of consumer culture, and although his convincing analysis of the intersection between psychological techniques like individualization and self-realization and neoliberal government undoubtedly will provoke many professional psychologists, the methodological heritage from Foucault's analysis of power as something bottom-up means that psychological culture remains an indispensable part for the late modern exercise of freedom and autonomy. Nevertheless, Rose's works have seemingly become something of a standard reference over the years and has also been picked up by critical psychologists like Ian Parker (1999) who includes investigations of psychological culture as a designated part of critical psychology.

Critical Debates

Of course, the sociological analyses of psychology's place in the wider sociopolitical context are themselves not beyond politics nor beyond psychology. Lasch has for instance been criticized for misappropriating both the Marxian legacy and the Freudian legacy and recently for relying on a psychoanalytic world view as a metapsychological framework in his critique of the therapeutic culture (De Vos, 2010).

In the past decade, Israel-based cultural sociologists Eva Illouz's (2008) interest in the therapeutic culture has helped to move the field forward from what she calls the unfortunate communitarian habit of an "epistemology of suspicion." Illouz maintains that both the Weberian- and Foucaultian-inspired approaches toward the therapeutic culture are equally guilty

of applying what she calls "bulldozer concepts" like "ideology," "biopower," or "surveillance" that end up flattening out the deep complexities of the social object of interest. Illouz calls her own approach to the therapeutic culture for "pragmatic" since it implies that ideas and meaning like the therapeutic cannot become dominant through institutionalization alone but only when they help people "do things" such as coping and resolving practical questions. Thus, the studies of therapeutic culture up until now have failed in acknowledging the role of individual agents and basic human needs. A similar complaint has been raised by Australian sociologist Katie Wright (2008) who maintains that the pessimistic assessments of the therapeutic turn neglect how psychological knowledge has given the self an optional language to articulate and experience suffering previously confided to the private sphere.

International Relevance

The scholarly interest for the therapeutic culture first originated in America as Freud's impact on contemporary culture in the middle of the twentieth century was something historically unique. There is still an overweight of books and articles available on the therapeutic culture that discusses American internal affairs, but already Rieff in a new preface for the 1987 edition of *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* acknowledged that the rest of the Western world now seemed to follow along. Two decades on, Illouz (2003) calls the therapeutic culture for globalized as, for instance, the therapeutic narrative of Oprah Winfrey is distributed internationally to 149 countries around the world. The therapeutic ethos can be interpreted as what Italian social theoretician Alberto Melucci (1996) calls universal codes, powerful narratives distributed through world media that serves as key interpretations around the world for how people understand their lives. Documentation and writings on the therapeutic culture is now available from a range of regions and countries including North America, Western Europe, Scandinavia, South Africa, Israel, Australia, and China.

Future Directions

There are three distinct trends in the studies of the therapeutic culture over the recent years: (1) *Consolidation*: The concept seems to lately have been taken up again and gained more support after a period of stagnation judging by the increasing numbers of academic papers and books containing the therapeutic ethos or culture in their title. Perhaps this is a response to the increased psychological presence in other Western and non-Western countries whose development has followed the pattern pioneer writers like Rieff (1966/1987) originally observed in America. (2) *Balanced view*: There is also a tendency that the theorizing over the therapeutic culture is less explicitly critical toward the increasing influence of psychology in the public spheres. Scholars of contemporary culture like Eva Illouz and Katie Wright maintain that the therapeutic culture is a testimony to increased public recognition of forms of human meaning making and suffering previously kept private, in particular women's experiences. (3) *Recognition of religion*: The early theorizing of the triumph of the therapeutic was instinctively influenced by the secularization thesis of its day that forecasted the abolishment of religion. Therefore, several scholars (see, for instance, Loss, 2002; McGee, 2005) have rightfully criticized scholars of the therapeutic culture for overlooking the role (or return) of religion in contemporary society, and a more balanced understanding of the therapeutic as one among many religious existing impulses is a likely development in the future.

Future directions in the study of the therapeutic culture is set to be more nuanced, more empirically founded, and more focused on specific areas and regions of culture compared to its past tendency toward critical overarching theorizing over the future faith of Western culture. Elaine Swan sums up these prospects nicely when she writes that: "As more empirical work is undertaken on different subcultures in therapeutic cultures, then we can understand where there is common ground and where there are fundamental differences" (Swan, 2010, p. 223). It remains to be seen whether critical psychologists also will engage in this task or if the tracing of psychology in its widest sense is left to other professions.

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Time, Overview

Michalis Kontopodis
Department of Research and Theory in Education, VU University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Introduction

Time has been a central concern in psychology, especially within the following domains: psychology of time perception, psychology of memory, narrative psychology, organizational psychology, psychology of experience, and developmental psychology. The spectrum is broad and includes heterogeneous bodies of knowledge: neuropsychological, psychophysical, or cognitive theories and methodologies that aim to explain how humans perceive time, qualitative inquiries about autobiographical time, social psychological studies of time in institutions and organizations, as well as temporal models of human development. There is also significant philosophical, sociological, anthropological, and inter- and transdisciplinary scholarship on time that does not follow the methodologies that are usually employed within the discipline of psychology nowadays but addresses psychological issues (a classic example is Henri Bergson's (1896/1991) philosophy of memory, and a more recent example is Niklas Luhmann's (1987) theory of the temporality of meaning systems). Although the scholarship on time is extensive, a scarcity of intensive discussions and debate

between the different disciplines, fields, approaches, and positions is noticed.

Problems of Definition

Given the above-described heterogeneity of the approaches to the study of time, one can find very different conceptions and definitions of "time" as well as a range of employed terms such as perception of time, estimation of time, apperception of time, temporal discrimination, notion of time/of duration, sense of time, and Zeiterleben (temporal experience). Some scholars argue that there should be a unique or unified definition of time, but this argument usually implies an objectivist epistemology, i.e., the idea that the time is "out there" and can be defined objectively (cf. Parker, Harris, & Steineck, 2010). Relational epistemologies suggest instead that our understandings of temporal phenomena depend on theoretical presumptions as well as on the practicalities and technologies involved in studying time. There is no single time "out there," but many different times (in plural) are fabricated or enacted by means of narratives, archives, devices, experimental settings, and other relational arrangements (Kontopodis, 2012; Latour, 2005).

Keywords

Quantitative vs. qualitative time; specialization; epistemological concerns

Traditional Debates

Time has been a central concern in religion and philosophy since the ancient times. The beginning of modern science was marked by heated debates among the various scientists who studied time and temporal phenomena in fields as diverse as evolution theory, physics, or psychology. Since the 1960s one can however notice a growing specialization that prevented scholars who worked within different theoretical,

methodological, and epistemological frames from debating and reflecting on the foundations of their approaches. As a result, for example, psychophysicists presuppose that there is an internal clock or central timekeeper that is responsible for the perception of time (Grondin, 2001). Cognitive psychologists presuppose on the contrary that time is perceived on the basis of external stimuli and external parameters of nontemporal nature (Droit-Volet, 2000; Piaget, 1946/1970). Although attempts have been undertaken to discuss and combine these different ways of understanding time (Vanneste, Perbal, & Pouthas, 1999), there has been little discussion on the epistemological foundations of those positions and their underlying quantitative understanding of time.

Critical Debates

Brent Slife (1993) argues that most psychological approaches to the study of time are based on the assumption of the linearity of time, which is taken for self-evidence, although there are many findings and explanations that are incompatible with linear time in several psychological specialties. Alternative i.e. qualitative conceptions of time can be found in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy (time as process; cf. Green, 2002), in the developmental psychological theory of Lev S. Vygotsky ("developmental crises," Vygotsky, 1932–1934/1998; see also Kontopodis, 2012), in relational approaches to remembering and forgetting (Middleton & Brown, 2005), as well as in narrative psychology (Ricoeur, 1984/1985/1886, Brockmeier, 2000). Furthermore, Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of the chronotope (1930/1981) has been quite influential within cultural psychology as a way of synthesizing space and time. There is however a clear lack of debate among the different fields and approaches, which reflects the broader fragmentation of psychology, social sciences, and academic research nowadays.

Although a few of the above mentioned qualitatively oriented studies imply broader critical aspirations, psychological research on time has not raised political issues to the extent that this has happened in other disciplines. In educational science, for example, early critical pedagogical approaches criticized the future orientation of educational activities (Korczak, 1929/1971; Schleiermacher & Weniger, 1826/1957), and later critical pedagogical approaches questioned the way time is organized in education in the context of the capitalist economy (e.g., similarities between the production of capital and the learning process; cf. Mollenhauer, 1981; Oelkers, 1980). The German school of ecology of time has also much criticized the ways in which the school and other institutions are currently organized for disrupting biologic rhythms, individual tempos, and family life (Held & Geissler, 1993; Reheis, 2005). Furthermore, French cultural theorists Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer (2008) discuss the effects of speed and technology on humanity in their seminal book "Pure War". In her various books, British sociologist Barbara Adam has also critically reflected on time, social theory, the industrial way of life, and environmental hazards (1990, 1995, 1998). Unfortunately, these critical debates have very little been echoed in the psychological study of time.

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Online Resources

German Society for Time Politics/Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zeitpolitik. www.zeitpolitik.de/

International Society for the Study of Time. www.studyoftime.org/

KronoScope. http://www.studyoftime.org/KS/

Time & Society. http://tas.sagepub.com/

Tools, Overview

Luca Tateo
Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

Introduction

Understanding tools is a central issue for critical psychology, because they are not only shaped by but also shape human activity and mediate the complex relationship between human subject, others, and the world. The question of tools is indeed strictly related to contemporary debates about technology. To what extent are human beings controlled or masters of their own technology? What is the role of technology in reducing or increasing social inequalities? Going back to eighteenth century, when Giambattista Vico introduced the fundamental distinction between natural history and human history, produced by human activity, several authors identified the nature of mankind as the ability to construct and use tools in order to create its own world. This question became a psychological issue as soon as it became clear that the use of tools was strictly related to the symbolic and social nature of human being. More than a century after Vico, Carlo Cattaneo posed again the issue of the relationship between psychology, tools, and social organization, arguing that the creation of tools is the way "associated minds" can widen the natural perceptive and acting potentialities of mankind, allowing the discovery of new parts of reality that challenge the mind to create new tools in return, triggering the virtuous circle of human development. Marx took up the theme, defining a materialist anthropology of the toolmaking animal. The core of Marx's anthropology, and similarly in Vico and Cattaneo, is the idea of productive human activity, socially and historically organized, as the ground for the development of psychological and social processes. That is, the way humans collectively pursue different forms of life sustaining, building, and using tools represents the starting point for understanding

how both social and psychological life develop. In order to satisfy their needs, people collectively develop forms of activity and tools to carry out them. The use of these tools shape people psyche and social reality in return. In the course of human development, tools represent the possibility to widen the experience of the world, to touch the untouchable, as, for instance, handling the fire or observing the microscopic.

Definition

A tool is any artifact created in the course of human activity "for the purpose of successful production and reproduction of the means of existence" (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 200). A tool can be either a material artifact (utensil, music instrument, etc.) or a symbolic one (language, calculation, music notation, etc.). It is modified in the course of its use, shaped by human activity, and able to shape the activity in return. The production and use of tools are attached to a set of skills and knowledge that can be transmitted, elaborated, and preserved within a group. A tool is also part of a chain of technology, in which tools can serve for either acting directly or making other tools (Bergson, 2005). The symbolic process of communication of skills and knowledge in production, elaboration, and use of tools "becomes a characteristic human mode of activity" (Wartofsky, 1973, p. 201). The whole of tools and communication constitutes culture. Language is commonly understood as the most powerful and flexible tool developed by human beings, and from the merging of language and material, tools allowed humans to remediate their relationship with material world and social relationships, increasing the quality of both culture and mental functions.

Keywords

Tool; activity; sign; symbol; homo faber; philosophical anthropology; cultural-historical school; higher mental functions; mediation; production; technology

Traditional Debates

A number of scholars attempted to build a philosophical anthropology grounded on the idea of human nature as characterized by the making and use of tools. Bergson (2005) used the term *homo faber* to characterize human intelligence by the ability to create tools, to make tools, and to constantly develop them. The doctrine of *homo faber* elaborated by Bergson and further developed by Dewey was initially focused on the sign-making ability as the typical feature of human nature. Cassirer underlined the ability to use symbolic forms as constitutive of human nature, thus the ability to create a world of meaning in contrast with the mere animal ability to manage signals, that are not conventional and immutably part of the world of being. This was a strong attack to the mainstream comparative approach of physiological psychology of behaviorism that actually compared human and animal psychology on the basis of shared basic mechanisms. Scheler (1973) used the term homo faber that refers to humans as controlling the environment. Heidegger (1962) further elaborates the concept of *Umwelt* as the network of tool-things, in German *Werkzeuge*, surrounding us as an expansion of the human body, through which we encounter ourselves as well as others. Scheler also criticized the psychological doctrine of mankind as uniquely animal but also the idea of a nature uniquely symbolic. Scheler's philosophical anthropology attempts to take altogether into account the biological, psychological, ideological, social, and spiritual development.

Critical Debates

The most relevant and systematic contribution to the understanding of the relationship between tools and psychological processes came from the cultural-historical school of Luria, Vygotsky, and Leontiev. Drawing on Marx's anthropology, Leontiev identifies the unit of analysis of psychology in the "the activity of concrete individuals, which takes place either in a collective . . . or in a situation in which the subject deals directly

with the surrounding world of objects" ([1981](#), p. 47). Activity and tools constitute the core of cultural-historical conceptualization of higher psychological processes. Material and cultural tools that mediate the relationship with the experience become psychological tools enabling humans to manage their own mental functions. Vygotsky still represents the most powerful synthesis of semiotic- and activity-focused analysis of the role of tool with respect to higher psychological functions. Indeed, Vygotsky focused on the cultural-historical context in which tools develop, going beyond Dewey's idea of tools as solutions to the need for adaptation. Tools play a function towards the external word and "serve as the conductor of human influence on the object of activity" (Vygotsky, [1978](#), p. 55). The most powerful kinds of tools are signs. They play a cognitive function towards the internal psyche, serving as a regulator both of the mental processes and of the response to the object of activity. The fundamental insight of Vygotsky and colleagues that human development is made possible through the twofold function of tools' use and circulation – mediation and regulation to the psyche and to the world – set up in specific historical forms of cognitive and social organization, led to further reflections about the tools' mediation process. The philosopher Evald Ilyenkov ([1977](#)) elaborated a theory of how the ideal form of a tool exists beyond its material existence as societal knowledge. Critical psychology is also committed with Vygotsky's critical topic that tools are both objects and means of scientific method. The use of tools – apparatus, statistics, etc. – in psychology triggers the discussion about the epistemological and methodological status of psychological concepts (Schraube & Osterkamp, [2013](#)). Psychology of education has shown the fallacy of teaching/learning short circuit and the relevant role of tools in the relationship with knowledge and learning. Linguistic anthropology has underlined the role of tools as integral part of the human activity systems. It is now up to critical psychology to further develop the reflection upon the role of tools in the construction of scientific concepts in psychological science. The agenda should include the study of how experimental apparatus and statistical tools shape the development of concepts and are shaped in return by them. It is worth to reread a number of scholars that have started to reflect also outside critical psychology, such as Vico, Cattaneo, experimental phenomenology, and contemporary idiographic approaches.

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Online Resources

Marxists Internet Archive

Pragmatism Cyberarchive

Internet Archive Search on Vico

Torture

T

Dan Aalbers
Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

Introduction

Psychologists played a critical role in the construction, implementation, promotion and legitimation of the U.S.' torture program.

Definition

Torture is defined by the Convention Against Torture (CAT) as: "Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person, information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."

In a series of memos, the Bush administration interpreted this definition in a manner that all but guaranteed that psychologists would be involved with each and every torture session that the U.S. carried out. Bush administration lawyer John Yoo opined that the word "intentionally" should be interpreted as "specific intent." For example, if one robbed a bank in the hopes of being arrested and – as a ward of the state – gaining access to state-funded health care, one would say that the robber *generally intended* to rob a bank but *specifically intended* to access state-funded health care. In similar vein if an interrogator inflicts severe pain or suffering on a prisoner but does not *specifically intend* to inflict pain or suffering then the treatment inflicted upon the person does not qualify as torture. Thus, under the Bush Administration's reinterpretation of the CAT's definition, torture is largely defined by the mental state of the interrogator; this definition creates a need for experts capable of evaluating the mental states of interrogators and the interrogated (Yoo, 2003).

An interrogator could demonstrate that he or she was not in a state of mind to torture by consulting with a psychologist before an interrogation, by following an interrogation plan written by a psychologist or by having a psychologist observe the interrogation. Interrogators who were also psychologists would demonstrate that they did not *specifically intend* to torture by reviewing the literature before an interrogation. By the logic of Bush administration's lawyers an interrogator who intended to inflict severe pain or suffering would not have consulted with an expert in psychological states to insure that the interrogation methods would not result in severe pain or suffering, would not have an expert in psychological distress on hand to ameliorate any damage unintentionally inflicted upon the prisoner, would not have reviewed the psychological research before undertaking an interrogation. In this understanding, psychologists serve as safety officers who guarantee that interrogators never drift into a mindset that would result in torture and their mere presence in an interrogation center served to legitimize the acts carried out by interrogators (Yoo, 2003).

These legal memos also gave psychologists an important role in evaluating prisoners for signs of psychological torture. Focusing upon the adjective "severe" in the formulation "severe pain or suffering," Bush administration lawyers opined that severe could only interpreted as the most extreme forms of treatment. In the case of physical pain, only pain rising to the level of "organ failure or death" qualifies as torture, in the case of psychological suffering, only treatment that results in *prolonged mental harm* qualifies as torture. Prolonged mental harm, in turn, is defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM). Bush administration lawyer John Yoo mentions two DSM diagnoses which could possibly qualify as *prolonged mental harm* and therefore torture: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and (untreated) Depression (Yoo, 2003). Thus, clinical psychologists and psychiatrists were the best possible consultants to an interrogation because their involvement legitimized the proceedings in ways that no other profession could do.

History

Some of the tortures used by, promoted by and legitimized by psychologists such as stress

positions and water tortures have a long history, dating back at least as long as the inquisition but the development of a complete system of no-touch torture is recent. The power of a complete system of no touch torture was displayed strikingly during the Moscow treason trials when many of the figures who help to bring the Soviet Union into being confessed to panoply of implausible crimes. Many observers suspected torture but no outward signs of torture could be detected. Psychologist Irving Jansis suspected that the Soviets were using electroshock and drugs in combination with hypnotic techniques developed by Luria and his colleagues to implant false memories in the mind of the accused (Jansis, 1949; McCoy, 2006). The CIA was concerned that the soviets had discovered "mental warfare" technology.

The CIA's concerns would reach a fever pitch when U.S. airmen confessed to using biological weapons against Korea. The U.S. feared that the soldiers had been "brainwashed" into making false confessions and that this technology could be used to create "Manchurian Candidates" – ideal sleeper agents. The CIA wanted needed to understand, to posses, and to protect itself against brainwashing technology and, in an effort to reverse engineer the "communist" system, the U.S. would fund research in hypnosis, electroshock, sensory deprivation and drug induced states. In the end, it would be found that the that "communist" confessions were extracted using nothing more than a combination of psychological shock, forced standing, isolation, sleep deprivation, constant light and a Spartan but nutritious diet. Indeed, these experiments did little more than establish that "mind control" was not produced by drugs or hypnosis and served only to confirm the results of the CIAs theoretical analyses.

Of these analyses, three merit special attention: one written by psychiatrists Hinkle and Wolf, one written by sociologist Albert Biderman and one by a team of psychologists and psychiatrists: Farber, Harlow and West.

Hinkle and Wolf

The Hinkle and Wolf report is a document striking for its level of detail, its insight and its moral clarity. Hinkle and Wolf note, in vivid detail, the very real effects of no-touch torture taking great pains to describe the terrible effects of seemingly innocuous techniques: "After 18-24 h of continuous standing, there is an accumulation of fluid in the tissues of the legs. This dependent "edema" is produced by fluid from the blood vessels. The ankles and feet of the prisoner swell to twice their normal circumference. The edema may rise up the legs as high as the middle of the thighs. The skin becomes tense and intensely painful. Large blisters develop which break and exude watery serum. The accumulation of the body fluid in the legs produces an impairment of the circulation. The heart rate increases and fainting may occur . . . Ultimately they usually develop a delirious state, characterized by disorientation, fear, delusions, and visual hallucinations." (Hinkle & Wolff, 1956).

These authors also note the total control that the jailors have over the lives of the jailed and how this combination of total control and social isolation puts prisoners into an animal-like state of complete dependence. Within 4–6 weeks a prisoners stop caring about personal hygiene, they follow orders meekly and they feel desperate for human conversation. At this point the prisoner welcomes the visits of the interrogator who often treats the prisoner as a human being and trusted friend.

While these authors were, at the time of this writing, opponents of torture they do draw two conclusions that will aid in the development of an American torture program: one, that no touch torture has no permanent effects of the mind of the tortured and two, that the U.S. can develop a program to innoculate prisoners from the effects of interrogation.

Albert Biderman

Biderman thought that all of "brainwashing" could be lumped under the larger heading of "compliance." Psychological torture was nothing more than a set of mundane techniques designed to elicit compliance from prisoners. He collected these techniques in influential chart entitled "Communist Coercive Methods For Eliciting Individual Compliance" which put

for the follow categories: "isolation, monopolization of perception, induced debilitation, threats, occasional indulgences, demonstrating 'omnipotence' and 'omniscience', degradation, and enforcing trivial demands." Reinforcing the views of most people who have studied this issue, Biderman notes that any resort to physical violence dooms the enterprise; psychological torture is the best way to produce a confession (Biderman, 1956).

Farber, Harlow and West

Farber, Harlow, and West (1957) reach a conclusion similar to Biderman's. For these authors, confessions are nothing other than a form of "cooperative behavior" that can be explained using the principles of instrumental conditioning. Communist techniques could be lumped into three categories: debility, dependency and dread (DDD). Debility referred to weakening of the individual through exhaustion, Dependency to the captor's control of basic necessities and of social approval and Dread to induced fear. "Communist" captors created an environment in which DDD could only be alleviated by acting in ways that pleased the captors and the alleviation of DDD, in turn, served to reinforce cooperative behavior.

Kubark

The influence of these analyses and years of sensory deprivation research would be reflected in the CIA Kubark interrogation manual (McCoy, 2006). Kubark is document heavily indebted to psychological research and theory – it speaks of how to induce "debility" and how to induce or take advantage of regression. It discusses sensory deprivation research and notes that the more the interrogation environment reflects the conditions in SD studies the more debility the victim will experience. And it speaks of invoking fear, noting that the fear of pain is a more effective way of educing information than is the actual infliction of pain and it notes the importance of working in an environment which is entirely controlled by the interrogator. In brief, all the aspects of what Kaye (2009) has called the DDD paradigm are present.

All of the aspects of the "comintern" interrogation system are present in KUBARK – enhancing the shock of capture, isolation, dependency, dread, debility, disorienting light, sleep manipulation and self inflicted pain. Indeed, the two differences between the Soviet system and the U.S. one are: one, the CIA de-emphasizes the role of self inflicted pain in favor of SD induced debility and two, the CIA adopted methods it only imagined the "communists" possessed such as hypnosis and psychoactive drugs.

SERE

SERE (Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape) is a program putatively predicated on the idea that exposing soldiers to torture will innoculate them from the effects of torture. In this program military personnel are exposed to range of tortures including stripping, waterboarding, sonic bombardment, stress positions, slapping, sleep disruptions and isolation for a short time under protected conditions overseen by psychologists (Committee on Armed Services, 2008). While the origins of SERE remain unclear, it is known that the program started sometime during the Korean war and that Biderman's analysis influenced its development. It is equally clear that it the major source from which the U.S.' contemporary torture program drew inspiration.

The Return of the Repressed

Sometime in December of 2001, the Pentagon's decided to reverse engineer the SERE tactics. It began to review the analyses of "communist" interrogation techniques and the psychological experiments on sensory deprivation; nearly everything reviewed was written in the 50s and 60s. Dovetailing with the U.S.' redefinition of torture was the opinion issued by a SERE psychologist that SERE techniques have no permanent ill effects on those exposed to them (Committee on Armed Services, 2008).

In 2003, two senior SERE instructors initiated a training program at the Guantanamo Bay naval base that focused on Biderman's principles and which included his chart of coercion. Students were taught a variety of techniques including how to throw someone against a wall, the use of

rocks to intensify the effect of forced standing, and the use of hooding to induce sensory deprivation (Committee on Armed Services, 2008).

Around the same that the Pentagon was working to reverse engineer the soviet techniques from SERE, the CIA was working on a parallel track. In April of 2002 it hired James Mitchel and Bruce Jessen, two former SERE psychologists with a special interest in learned helplessness, as consultants. A month later the CIA invited former APA president Martin Seligman to address the SERE school in Diego on the issue of learned helplessness – Mitchel and Jessen are present in the audience and spoke with him afterwards. Soon after, learned helplessness became a major element in the interrogations carried out at Guantanamo and the black sites. As interrogator Steve Kleinmann says of Mitchell:

> Learned helplessness was his whole paradigm . . . It starts with isolation. Then they eliminate the prisoner's ability to forecast the future – when their next meal is – when they can go to the bathroom. It creates dread and debility. It was the KGB model. (Mayer, 2008, p. 164)

The induction of learned helplessness would seem an odd choice for an interrogation tactic since it produces a state that interferes with memory – but rationale behind this choice comes clear if one understands that "learned helplessness" is simply a translation of "debility." Psychology has a commodity form and, if it is to sell itself successfully, it must constantly update its language so as to seem new, fresh and up to date. The DDD paradigm remains but the word "debility," with its roots in the theories of Thorndike, is beyond its sell by date and needs to put into the new bottle of contemporary conditioning theory.

Conditioning Compliance

A 2004 memo illustrates the influence of the learning paradigm on the CIA's language. It notes that after capturing a detainee, bringing him to a black site, and having his mental state evaluated by a psychologist, he is subject to a "conditioning" regime in which the subject is reduced to a "baseline" state in which "he learns to perceive and value his personal welfare, comfort, and immediate needs more than the information he is protecting." (Background paper Author Unknown, 2004, p. 4).

Likewise, detainees at Guantanamo were first debilitated through isolation and then made dependent upon their interrogators: "The purpose of the Behavior Management Plan is to enhance and exploit the disorientation and disorganization felt by a newly arrived detainee in the interrogation process. It concentrates on isolating the detainee and fostering dependence of the detainee on his interrogator." (Guantanamo SOP, p. 4.3).

Detainees who complied with the often trivial demands of their jailors received reinforcers such as squares of toilet paper or small bars of soap. In truth, the "conditioning" techniques used at Guantanamo and the Black Sites differ little from what might have been used in Korea but the language is now part of the psy-complex and thus these techniques can been seen as something other than torture.

Traditional Debates

The traditional debates would better be called pseudo-debates. Apologists for the U.S.' enhanced interrogation program argue that "enhanced interrogation" is not torture. In most cases, such as President Bush's repeated claims that the U.S. does not torture, this simply means that the interrogators acted in accord with the U.S.' interpretation of the CAT's definition of torture – an interpretation that makes it all but impossible to torture someone if a psychologist is involved with the interrogation. Others defend the interrogation program on *primae facia* grounds. These apologists argue that techniques such as sleep deprivation or forced standing do not look like torture and therefore are not. This defense quickly dissolves upon inspection – first, it should be noted that it is a rhetorical move to examine these techniques in isolation. Sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation, sensory bombardment, isolation, stress positions and the like are parts of a total system of breaking a person down; second, it should be noted that the U.S.

regarded these techniques as a tortures when they were "communist" methods of interrogation. Indeed, if one replaces the word "Communist" with "American," Hinkle and Wolf's comments could serve as powerful critique of contemporary U.S. policy:

> The Communists do not look upon these assaults as "torture." Undoubtedly, they use the methods which they do in order to conform, in a typical legalistic manner, to overt Communist principles, which demand that 'no force or torture be used in extracting information from prisoners.' But all of them produce great discomfort, and lead to serious disturbances of many bodily processes; there is no reason to differentiate them from any other form of torture. (1956, p. 12)

Critical Debates

While space does not allow for a detailed account of the many torture debates that took place within the American Psychological Association (APA), I will attempt to provide a brief outline of some key debates. I write as a participant in these debates and my comments are based on my experiences as an activist; while many of these details have never made their way into journal articles, allies and skeptics can find a trove of supporting evidence by following the links in the "Online Resources" section.

In 2005 the APA secretly convened a task force that would form the association's interrogation policy. This task force, known as the Presidential Task Force on National Security (PENS), was overwhelmingly dominated by military and intelligence psychologists; six of the nine voting members were on the payroll of the military and intelligence establishments and five of the nine were directly associated with the Bush administration's detention and interrogation policies. PENS report concluded that psychologists are needed to keep interrogations "safe, legal, ethical, and effective." This phrase would become a touchstone for APA spokesmen and would be echoed U.S. interrogation policy. Indeed the U.S. would require that all psychologists who "consulted" to interrogations be familiar with the PENS report. While it is not clear if

military psychologists were writing intelligence policy under the aegis of the APA or if the intelligence community simply imported existing policy into the APA but it is clear that in 2006, the policies of the "world's largest professional association of psychologists" and the world's largest military were one and the same (BSCT SOP, 2006).

Resistance

Most APA members received the news about the depth of their profession's complicity in the Bush torture program and APA's position simultaneously. The juxtaposition these two revelations – that psychologists were involved with torture and that the APA convened a secret task force which concluded that it is ethical for psychologists to be involved in interrogations, inspired resistance.

One of the first acts of resistance was an effort which came to known as the "the moratorium." The text of the moratorium often changed often but the core remained – the moratorium would temporarily remove psychologists involved with interrogations from sites where human rights abuses had taken place. While the movers of the moratorium were highly skilled activists, the cards were stacked against them and the persuasive power of the activists was overwhelmed by the institutional power of the military and intelligence interests.

After the stinging defeat of the moratorium, anti-torture activists turned to an outsider strategy, taking their critique directly to the membership. I joined with Brad Olson and Ruth Fallenbaum to write a policy known as "the referendum." When this issue was taken out of the backrooms and put before the membership, the referendum passed by a margin of 59-41 %. This policy bans psychologists from working in settings that operate outside of or in violation of international law. The ban only applies to psychologists who are working for the jailers; our intention was to remove military and intelligence psychologists from places like the black sites and replace them with psychologists working for human rights organizations (see www. ethicalapa.com for the full text).

Counter-Resistance

Opposition to the referendum came from three main sources: those who believed that psychologists stopped torture at places like Guantanamo, those who opposed basing APA policy in international law, and those who objected to the notion of replacing military clinicians with clinicians from human rights organizations.

Perhaps the most prominent of those who believe that psychologists improved conditions at Guantanamo is Larry James whose book "Fixing Hell" argues that he ended torture by stopping individual acts of torture initiated by interrogators. In his account, James (2008) claims that he encouraged interrogators to stop acts such as dressing male detainees in panties and wigs and taught interrogators to extract information using rewards like McDonalds fish sandwiches and photos of swimsuit models. The behavior modification program instituted during James' tenure at Guantanamo, however, is much less benign than his book portrays. The plan instituted under James' leadership requires detainees to earn "comfort items" such as soap and toothpaste; only the most obedient detainees were afforded such luxuries as a fast food sandwich (cf. Guantanamo SOP, 2004). The weight of evidence indicates that James rationalized a system of torture.

A number of APA members opposed the referendum because it sought to replace military clinicians with clinical psychologists who were beholden to the detainees themselves. Some erroneously believed that there was a firewall or a "bright line" between the work of the interrogators and the work of the clinicians. This opposition was largely based either on an ignorance of or a misunderstanding of the Bush administration's legal rationale for torture. To reiterate, the very presence of a clinician on site guaranteed that the interrogator did not specifically intend to cause harm. Also, we, the authors of the referendum, expected that the military clinicians were hiding and/or ignoring evidence of torture – a hypothesis that was later confirmed (Iacopino & Xenakis, 2011). Thus, while a DSM diagnosis could, theoretically, provide evidence of torture, this never happened.

The most effective opponents of the referendum were a small group of self described peace psychologists who opposed this effort on multiple grounds including: the referendum's basis in international law, the "clarity" of the language of the referendum, and the notion that the referendum could somehow interfere with the work of peace psychologists working in countries with bad human rights records. While this position only represented a tiny minority of the membership, this small group would later come to have a large impact inside the APA.

After the passage of the referendum, these same psychologists joined with military and psychologists to lobby the association to "clarify" the referendum before taking any meaningful action. The opponents of the referendum claimed that they could not understand the referendum and could *only* come to understand it if the authors of the referendum co-authored an interpretative document with those who were "concerned" about the referendum. Even this compromise document was too much for the APA and the association has refused to take any meaningful action to remove psychologists from sites like Guantanamo.

In sum, powerful interests transformed the referendum from a first step towards a humane policy into a symbolic victory that has done little to nothing to improve the lives of torture victims or to weaken the APA's allegiance to the U.S.' military and intelligence establishments.

International Relevance

This entry has focused on the U.S. torture program because of the recency of revelations and because the U.S. program is unique to the degree to which it involved psychologists. The U.S. is certainly neither the first nor the only western industrialized nation to institute a psychological torture program. For example, in 1972, the U.K. was found to have used techniques likely derived from the Soviet conveyor system on Irish prisoners (c.f. Ireland v. The United Kingdom, (1977) a ruling which reduced the 1972 findings of torture to a lesser charge but did not dispute the facts).

Practice Relevance

A great many U.S. citizens believe that President Obama ended the U.S. torture program when he instructed interrogators to only use the methods outlined in the Army Field Manual (AFM) but the U.S.' torture program continues but, as Kaye (2009) notes, the AFM contains loopholes which allow for sensory deprivation based torture. Also, the Obama administration has continued the practices of indefinite detention and of rendition – the latter a practice that led to the torture of Canadian citizen Maher Arar (Commission of Inquiry, 2006).

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Online Resources

http://whenhealersharm.org/
www.focusreframed.com/media/APATownHallFull.pdf
www.ethicalapa.com/referendumtext.html
www.apa.org/ethics/advisory-group-final.pdf
http://valtinsblog.blogspot.com/
http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org/blog/

Traits

Michael Mascolo
Department of Psychology, Merrimack College, North Andover, MA, USA

Introduction

Psychologists invoke the concept of *trait* to refer to stable, consistent, and coherent patterns of thinking, feeling, and action within individual persons. Personality theorists often invoke the concept of *trait* to account for differences

between individuals. For trait theorists, traits operate as the universal building blocks of personality.

Definitions

There are two basic ways to define the concept of trait. The first identifies traits in terms of systems, entities, or processes that exist *within* individuals. Allport (1937) defined a *trait* as "a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system (peculiar to the individual), with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and expressive behavior" (p. 295). The second approach defines *traits* not as the *inner causes* of stable patterns of behavior, but in terms of the behavior patterns themselves. For example, McRae and Costa (1997) define trait as "relatively enduring styles of thinking, feeling and acting" (p. 509).

Keywords

Trait; trait theory; individual differences; personality; Five-Factor Model; the "Big Five"; temperament; dispositions

Traditional Debates

The Number and Organization of Traits
Within personality theory, a central question concerns the nature, number, and organization of personality traits. *Personality structure* refers to the pattern of covariation that exists among personality traits. Researchers have proposed a variety of different trait structures. For example, Cattell (1956) proposed 16 bipolar personality dimensions, whereas Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) identified three (*introversion*/extraversion, *emotional stability* versus *instability*, and *psychoticism* versus *high impulse control*). Current consensus favors the Five-Factor Model of personality ("The Big Five") which organizes personality into five orthogonal factors:

introversion-extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience (McCrae & Costa, 1997).

The dominant method for identifying the trait structure involves using a statistical technique called factor analysis. In a typical study, participants use Likert scales to rate the extent to which a series of behavioral descriptions or trait terms describe their own or someone else's behavior. Correlation coefficients are calculated between each pair of rating dimensions. Factor analysis reduces the resulting pattern of intercorrelations to a small number of presumably underlying *factors*. Researchers examine the cluster of trait terms associated with each factor to identify its meaning. For example, descriptors such as "I feel other's emotions" or "I care about others" could be seen to reflect an underlying trait of "empathy."

How Stable Is Human Behavior?
Research using questionnaires (self-report and observer observation) indicates both stability and variability over time and place in the patterns of behavior identified by the Five-Factor Model. With minor variations, cross-cultural research has largely replicated the Five-Factor Model in a variety of different cultures (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Nonetheless, in his classic analysis of trait approaches to personality, Mischel (1973) argued that trait theorists overestimate the degree of consistency and coherence in human behavior. Mischel's critique spawned decades of research intended to identify the conditions under which "person" and "situational" variables predict behavior. This work suggests that "person" variables act as better predictors when repeated and aggregated assessments of behavior are made in familiar situations; situational variables are better predictors when brief assessments of fewer actions occur in novel or highly constrained contexts (Strelau, 2001).

The Nature and Nurture of Personality
Trait theorists often draw on twin studies to estimate the heritability (and environmentality) of the so-called traits. Within a specific population, heritability is a statistic that identifies the proportion of variance between people in a "trait" that

can be attributed to genetic differences between people. Drawing on twin studies, typical heritability coefficients fall in the moderate range of .40–.60 for assessments of most personality traits (Johnson, Turkheimer, Gottesman, & Bouchard, 2009).

Critical Debates

The Ontological Status of "Traits"

The most consistent critique of the notion of trait concerns its status as an *explanatory* or *descriptive* concept. If the term *trait* simply refers to *stable patterns of behavior*, then trait terms function as mere vehicles of *description*. However, personality theorists (Allport, 1937) often identify "traits" as processes within the person that explain the production of behavior. Such assertions, however, require theorists to identify the nature of the "inner processes" that are assumed to give rise to outward behavior. However, theorists tend to infer the existence of such "inner causes" from the behavior patterns themselves. An inner trait of "conscientiousness" is inferred from the observation of stable patterns of "conscientious" behavior. The circularity of this reasoning calls into question the status of the assumed inner process.

Is the concept of trait useful to frame *descriptions* of behavior? The notion of "trait" has its clearest application when speaking about physical characteristics, such as the weight of a rock or the length of a rod. While the height of a tree is relatively fixed, human behavior is not. When theorists speak of traits, human actions are understood as if they were static "characteristics" of things. In this way, the concept of *psychological trait* operates as a *metaphorical extension* of the concept of *physical trait*. Actions, however, are not things. Because the trait metaphor privileges stasis of variability, it fails to function as a framework for describing the dynamics of human action.

Language, Culture, and the Meaning of Trait Terms

A related set of issues concerns the use of everyday trait terms in psychological research. To complete self-report questionnaires, participants must (a) draw upon their lay understandings of everyday psychological language and (b) apply those meanings to make judgments about their own experiences. Use of self-reports thus presumes that lay judgments provide veridical reflections of extant traits. However, this assumption discounts the *mediated* nature of human judgment. Everyday language operates as a vehicle for representing cultural meanings. Thus, self-reports are mediated by cultural meanings represented in language. Such judgments cannot be said to "parse nature at its joints."

This issue is particularly salient in cross-cultural research. A common method for the cross-cultural comparison of trait structures involves translating trait-based questionnaires from one language to another and then retranslating target phrases back to the original language. While this approach assures precision in translation, it establishes the original language as the criterion to which the translation must accommodate. This runs the risk of simply failing to represent indigenous meanings that may have no clear referent in the language of the original questionnaire. While research suggests that the Five-Factor Structure is applicable to a wide variety of the world's cultures, it also reveals culturally indigenous dimensions that do readily fit into the Five-Factor Model (Cheung et al., 2001).

### The Dynamic Coupling of Person and Context

Traits are understood to be properties of individuals. However, research suggests that context has a direct effect on the production of behavior (Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Mascolo & Fischer, 2010). The seemingly simple act of running differs depending upon whether a person is running on a flat surface, a hill, the beach, or a rubberized track. Similarly, children who exhibit a tendency toward behavioral inhibition (shyness) behave differently as a function of context (e.g., home versus school) (Dyson, Klein, Olino, Dougherty, & Durbin, 2011). Such work suggests that even seemingly stable patterns of action reflect the dynamic coupling of persons and contexts and are not static properties of individuals (Shweder, 2007).

Heritability, Norms of Reaction, and the Epigenetic Origins of Action

Trait theory invites the stance that traits are part of a person's essence, nature, or genetic endowment. Trait theorists have drawn upon twin studies in an attempt to assess the independent contributions of genes and environment as determinants of psychological stabilities. However, research in developmental biology and psychology shows that genes and environments are *inseparable* as causal processes in development. Behavior patterns often assumed to be genetically determined have consistently been shown to rely upon experience for their developmental emergence (Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, 2006).

If genes and environment are inseparable as causal processes, then what do estimates of heritability and environmentality mean? Heritability studies ask, "What portion of the *variation between people* can be explained in terms of genetic *differences* between people?" Heritability coefficients are about accounting for *variability within specific populations*; they are simply *silent* about the processes by which genes and environments coact to create patterns of individual behavior. For example, the heritability for the "number of limbs that people have" is likely to be low; *differences* between people in the number of limbs occur primarily because of *differences* in their environments (e.g., accidents). However, no one would deny that genes play a central role in the development of arms and legs. Conversely, the heritability of "how often people catch colds" is likely to be high – largely a function of differences in genetically influenced immune systems. However, no one would doubt the importance of the environmental exposure to rhinovirus in causing colds.

The concept of *norm of reaction* provides an alternative to the concept of *heritability* in understanding the dynamic interplay between genes and environment in the production of structures of human action. Although the concept of *norm of reaction* is frequently invoked in the biological sciences, it has only rarely been used in psychology. The norm of reaction refers to the empirically derived distribution of phenotypes that arise as a function of differences in environment *for*

Traits, Fig. 1 Hypothetical norms of reaction curves for "Shyness" across four contexts

a particular genotype. Figure 1 shows a set of hypothetical norm of reaction curves representing the distribution of "shyness" over a series of environments for two persons (genotypes). As is well understood, individuals commonly described as "shy" display considerable variation in "shyness" across contexts. A particular student who becomes anxious and refuses to speak in class may show similar levels of inhibited behavior when interacting at a party. However, she may exhibit less inhibition when interacting with friends at the same party and still less when interacting at home with friends and family. Similarly, while a student who might be described as "extroverted" may show less behavioral inhibition across contexts than the "shy" student, the level and form of inhibition by the "extroverted" student nonetheless varies across context. Norms of reaction provide precise representations of how persons (and their genotypes) and contexts interact in the production of behavior. (It is important to note that the norm or reaction curves illustrated in Fig. 1 are simplified and do not represent *developmental* sources of variation in behavioral inhibition that occur over long periods of time.) Research demonstrates both stability and variability in behavioral dispositions like "shyness" over the course of development (Schwartz, Wright, Shin, Kagan, & Rauch, 2003).

Traditional analyses of personality dispositions assess differences between individuals in aggregate measures (including self-report) of target behavior abstracted across contexts. Most assessments of personality processes, however, simply fail to assess the dynamic coupling between person and context in the production of action and experience. Findings that individuals differ in their propensity to engage any particular style of behavior are not the same as saying that particular styles of behavior are stable across contexts. Norms of reaction show that human activity shows both striking order and dynamic variability within and between persons.

Differentiating Biases from Behavior

One can avoid many of these conceptual problems by replacing the concept of *trait* with the concept of *disposition* or *bias*. A disposition is not a preformed inner something that is simply expressed in a given context. A disposition does not refer anything fixed within the organism. Although dispositions *bias* behavior, behavioral stability and variation are emergent products of dynamic couplings that occur *between* person and context.

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Transculturalism

Lars Allolio-Näcke
Center for Anthropology of Religion(s),
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität
Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Bavaria,
Germany

Introduction

Transculturalism (orig. *transculturatión*) is a concept of cultural encounter and its consequences for society, political, and economical structures as well as cultural identities. Coined by Fernando Ortiz in 1940 for phenomena within the society of Cuba and as a proper substitute for acculturation, it reappears prominently with the cultural turn in 1990s and is mostly associated with the philosopher Wolfgang Welsch who published an article with the term *transculturalism* in its title in 1998.

Definition

Transculturalism highlights the very complex transmutations of culture that can be phased in acculturation, deculturation, and neoculturation. Acculturation focuses on the transition of one culture into another culture and the acquisition of features of this new culture; deculturation is the parallel process that ends in a loss or uprooting of home culture; transculturation highlights the creation of new cultural phenomena.

Keywords

Transculturalism; transculturatión; cultural identity; Cuba; Fernando Ortiz; Wolfgang Welsch

History and Traditional Debates

The Cuban anthropologist and lawyer Fernando Ortiz coined the term *transculturation* in his

book *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar* (1940). Instead the book is more poetic than scientific, Ortiz uses the allegories of "Mr. Tobacco and Mrs. Sugar" to retell the history of the Cuban people in regard of its ethnic mix as well as its social structure, politics, and international contacts. Tobacco and sugar are allegories for the African slaves and the Spain conquerors and their cultures. "While tobacco is variously linked to the native (as an indigenous plant), to the European (as cultivated by white small holders), to the uniquely Cuban (as a transcultural product); it is related to the satanic, to the sacred, and to the magical. Although in its finished form it is an icon of Cuba's identity, it symbolizes foreign capital's control as well" (Coronil, 1947, p. XXI). That means both cultures are very different right from the beginning – tobacco is brown, male, occult, sacred, characterized by wildness, and tends to revolution; sugar is white, female, quite, originates in civilization that gave it the taste of divine ambrosia – they just mixed a little (today's inhabitants are 65 % white, 10 % black, and 25 % are mulatto or mestizo). Like the production of sugar influenced the production of tobacco, the blacks took over European traditions (acculturation). *Vice versa* Europeans took over black traditions because the sugar is mulatto in its heart that changes its look from brown to white during the refinement. *En passant* Ortiz undermines the stereotypes of both cultures and describes the one with features of the other – both are so linked in a way that they cannot be separated anymore. Both cultures also lost some features that they brought in when Cuba was colonized (deculturation). Out of this liaison between the whites and the blacks, the Cuban mix appeared: mulatto or mestizo (neoculturation).

Although the famous anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski wrote the introduction to the first English translation and used the concept twice by himself, the concept was not received into scientific contexts outside the Spanish-speaking community. There it was mostly used to describe processes of linguistic hybridization (Hildebrandt, 2005, p. 347f.). Only in that narrow sense Mary Louise Pratt (1992), who worked on colonial travel reports, took over transculturation into the North American context. Since then it is mostly used as an analytic category in literature.

It was the philosopher Wolfgang Welsch who (re)introduced (he writes that he has not known that the term was first used by someone else before) transculturalism into the sociological and psychological discussion about interculturality and multiculturality. He profiles the concept of transculturalism in debate with the North American cultural anthropology that still uses the *Kugeltheorem* of Herder (see entry Völkerpsychologie) to describe different cultures. According to Welsch, this idea does not fit anymore in a globalized world that has become more complex and has vertical and horizontal differentiations and interpenetrations of cultures and societies. His vanishing point is transculturalism that indicates on interconnectedness of cultures, the character of hybridity of each culture, and the dissolution of dichotomies of "self" and "other." Last but not least, this development has consequences to the people that live in that societies and cultures: they are imprinted by transculturalism. Welsch's idea coincides with Ortiz's idea in the fact that processes of acculturation do not end in a homogeneous or uniform culture, but rather cultures lose old features and produce new ones in that process.

That process is also apparent on the individual level. According to Welsch, we all are in a historical view transcultural. For instance, travelling to countries in the South changed the attitude of Germans to hot summer days; various exotic restaurants changed taste in that sense that the former exotic dish is experienced naturally; pop music has a lot of influence on young people, but there are no role models anymore that can be labeled as national. The global youngster is the same in East and West and North and South (Welsch, 2005, p. 327). This has consequences for the theoretical debate in sociology and psychology. According to Welsch, cultural identity in a transcultural sense can no longer be described in categories of region or nation or taken for them. The difference between cultural and regional/national identities becomes more and more important and is to be modeled in very different ways;

we do not have one identity, but we all have multiple identities. The cultural formation is not identical with the passport anymore. For instance, it has become senseless to identify someone that owns an Iranian or German passport as *being* Iranian or German. Sometimes someone appears to be a global citizen, sometimes a European; in other situations someone appears to be a nationalist or local patriot (ibid., p. 359).

Critical Debates

One major point is the question if people are able to cope with the multiplicity of identities or if they need a basis as a necessary starting point and anchor. In that context the question arose: how to understand the relation between the global and the local in the Welschian sense? Is there really the possibility to distinguish exactly between cultural and regional/national identities? Both authors had been criticized in the sense that their concepts seem utopic or futuristic and not real: Ortiz's concept culminates in the wish that the Cuban subcultures become part of a synthesis of a stable culture or nation that is a result not of the differences within Cuba, but a result of joint distance to the outside (Hildebrandt, 2005, p. 351). That leads to the question if the concept of transculturation can be separated from the special development in Cuba. Welsch is intellectually ambitious and overburdens the capacities of the individual as well as the theoretical discourse. He believes that the increasing circulation of his concept promotes the development of an education towards a more peaceful global society (Welsch, 2010, p. 14), because teaching pupils that the foreign is a natural part of their own identity effects more acceptance of the other (Welsch, 1998, p. 56). But intercultural education is not that simple (Auernheimer, 2003).

Despite the critique adding deculturation and neoculturation to the acculturation concept was and still is a major contribution to the debate of cultural encounter and its consequences. Hopefully this idea will be received in psychology in the future to consider it in the context of cultural and personal identity.

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Transdisciplinarity

Paul Stenner
Department of Psychology,
The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

Introduction

Transdisciplinarity (TR) is part of a theoretical and practical effort to address the limitations of disciplines. In debates about the nature and

organization of knowledge, it is typically contrasted with *disciplinarity* (Pohl & Hirsch Hadorn, 2007). Disciplines are cultural formations that function as agencies for the production, dissemination, and application of *specialist* knowledge. Disciplines like psychology, biology, sociology, and art history supply those who are trained in them (their *disciples*) with *disciplined* practices, socially recognized forms of authority (capable, e.g., of annexing resources), distinct forms of professional identity, and so forth. This frees up resources for specialization, but specialization comes at the price of institutionalized *limitations* with respect to authorized questions, methods, and other practices. No discipline is a static island. As products of ongoing human activity, disciplines are incompletions in process, each having some relation to what is outside of the limits formed by their borders. These borders include relations to other disciplines (*epistemological borders*), to undisciplined knowledge (*lay/expert borders*), to the real-world environment of practical issues and problems (*pure/applied borders*), and to the matrix of the broader society that variously supports or challenges its activity (*science/society borders*). TR is associated with efforts to transcend these borders.

Between the hypothetical extremes of disciplinarity and TR, further distinctions are typically made between multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity (cf. Nicolescu, 2002). Following this tradition, Stenner and Taylor (2008) define *multidisciplinarity* as approaching a problem in a coordinated fashion from various discipline-based vantage points, reserving the term *interdisciplinarity* for collaborations involving the transfer of concepts and/or methods from one discipline to another. In multidisciplinarity, each discipline concentrates upon its own proper domain of abstraction, and the aim is to enrich research by *combining* the fruits of such disciplinary knowledge in order to better approach a real-world problem. An example would be a team of experts who divide their labor into the sociological, psychological, and biological aspects of drug addiction. Interdisciplinarity, by contrast, involves transactions at the borders between disciplines (such as the transfer of methods) and hence involves *change*, including the emergence of new disciplines. The budding of cognitive neuroscience when new medical brain-imaging methods were incorporated into psychology provides an example here. Multidisciplinarity would thus be closer to the ideal of disciplinarity, while interdisciplinarity is closer to that of transdisciplinarity (see Moran, 2002).

With *TR*, the transformation involved in interdisciplinarity is taken further. The Latin prefix "trans" means to move *across*, *beyond*, or *through*. TR therefore suggests a combination of (a) horizontal movements *across* disciplines, (b) vertical movements *beyond* disciplines, and (c) diagonal movements *through* a discipline. Critical psychology, for example, is TR in these three related senses. Being critical of any tendency to abstract psychological processes (such as feelings, personality characteristics, or modes of cognition) from their concrete social, historical, and political circumstances, critical psychologists typically make the "horizontal" move of engaging with disciplines like sociology, politics, anthropology, and history. Horizontal movement across multiple disciplines, however, rarely entails the mere assembling of knowledge from different specialisms. Rather, it provokes critical reflection on the relationships between, and on the limits of, these disciplines. This typically entails a corresponding vertical movement *beyond* specialist knowledge and towards a bigger picture integration of different knowledge types. This vertical dimension of a TR sensibility pertains to the long-standing philosophical to-and-fro between reductionism (stemming from a specialist concern with the concrete details of a limited disciplinary domain) and holism (concerned with general concepts which serve to express the interconnection of these domains). Thirdly, opening to these horizontal and vertical movements feeds back into the critical stance towards the received discipline of psychology. This leads critical psychologists to cut diagonally *through* the discipline, *transforming* its knowledge and practices by meticulously revising its content and methods

rather than simply remaining within its accepted borders.

This summary of three related modes of TR transformation focuses predominantly on *epistemological borders* concerning relations to other specialist disciplines. But debates about TR also involve practical and ethical dimensions that cut across other borders, especially *lay/expert* and *pure/applied borders*. Klein et al. (2001), for instance, emphasize the pure/applied border when they assert that the core idea of TR should be that specialists from different disciplines work jointly with *practitioners* to solve real-world problems. For Gibbons et al. (1994), TR is associated with a new mode of knowledge production (*mode 2 knowledge*) expressing a change in the nature of the science/society relationship (with closer alliances between industry, technology, and science). Mode 2 knowledge contrasts with the supposedly pure and disinterested laboratory research of *mode 1 knowledge*. It moves towards knowledge practices that are inherently problem-oriented, but it is also about building a socially robust knowledge by incorporating into the research process the views and interests of all people with a stake in defining and solving the problem at issue. Here, there are evident similarities with what Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) call *postnormal science*.

The relationship between pure/applied and expert/lay boundaries is particularly acute in the case of psychology, since applications typically involve interventions into the conduct *of* lay people. Lay people are evidently stakeholders in this process, whether they be defined as deviant with respect to accepted norms (e.g., in need of attitude or behavior change) or as norm setters. Here, the word "discipline" takes on a meaning associated with the work of Michel Foucault, for whom the disciplines are historically bound up with the history of technologies of governance and domination. It connotes regimes of power relations such as military discipline and the disciplining of schoolchildren, criminals, and others judged to deviate from social norms. Critical psychologists have long drawn upon Foucault to expose the concrete historical ways in which the discipline of psychology has operated as part of

a power/knowledge complex (Rose, 1985). With respect to these practical dimensions, critical psychology would be TR to the extent that it takes a stand on issues of normativity and against oppression, working *with* lay participants rather than *on* them and articulating its own normative agenda (Stainton Rogers, Stenner, Gleeson, & Stainton Rogers, 1995). In transgressing lay/expert borders in this way, TR shades into participatory action research.

Obviously, the names given to these conceptual distinctions are ultimately arbitrary. Other terms which overlap with TR include cross-disciplinarity and postdisciplinarity, the former emphasizing postmodern genre blurring (Gülerce, 2009) and the latter the capacity to move between the other modes of disciplinarity (Jessop & Sum, 2003). In sum, TR is a response to the limits of specialization: we are coming to know more and more about less and less, while the pressing problems that we face locally and globally do not do us the favor of posing themselves in ways compatible with disciplinary arrangements (Mittelstrass, 1993). This response has affected all disciplines, but given their relatively long-term engagement with the kinds of border transgressions associated with *TR*, critical psychologists have made notable contributions to its development (Maiers, 2001).

Definition

Transdisciplinarity is a concept that has been used in efforts to describe integrative activity, reflection, and practice that addresses, crosses, and goes through and beyond the limits of established disciplinary borders, in order to address complex problems that escape conventional definition and intervention.

Keywords

Disciplinarity; Interdisciplinarity; Multidisciplinarity; Borders; Boundaries; Metaphysics; General structuralism; General systems theory

History

Although the term had occasionally been used before this date, 1994 was a watershed year for TR. In that year, Basarab Nicolescu's Charter of Transdisciplinarity was announced at the First World Congress of Transdisciplinarity in Portugal (see Nicolescu, 2002); Michael Gibbons, Helga Nowotny, and their group published *The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies*; and the Beryl Curt Collective published *Textuality and Tectonics: Troubling Social and Psychological Science*, a work of critical psychology designed to explore "the possibilities for new forms of transdisciplinary analytic craft and illustrate… their use in practice" (dust jacket comment). Each group appears to have independently invented a concept of TR. Gibbons et al., for instance, use the word from the preface onwards with no reference to any prior tradition of use. With respect to Curt's usage, Brown (1995, 57) notes the absence of a glossary entry for TR but identifies it as a concept "made to order." Nicolescu begins his *Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity* (published 8 years after the 1994 World Congress) by praising the "pristine charm" of a term that has "not yet been corrupted by time" (Nicolescu, 2002, 1), although he does note its prior use in the 1970s by Jean Piaget, Edgar Morin, and Erich Jantsch.

Each of the three versions mentioned above has its distinct emphasis. Gibbons et al. (1994) offer an empirical description of actual developments, with emphasis placed on the social utility of a transformed relationship between science and society in which problem-oriented knowledge is generated in its domain of application rather than first arrived at in the pure space of the laboratory. Nicolescu's account, by contrast, is considerably more idealistic, intellectual, and programmatic. Drawing inspiration from quantum theory, chaos theory, and complexity theory, TR is about grasping multiple levels of reality, thanks to a "logic of the included middle" capable of grasping the emergence of complex plurality. Curt's account draws its inspiration from poststructuralist social theory. It emphasizes the disciplinary power of expert knowledge in an effort to revalue ordinary experience as part of a broader critical and egalitarian project of social transformation. Each version foregrounds transformation, but the first is an *empirical* description under the pragmatic sign of the *economy* (and mainly concerns the pure/applied borders), the second a *rational* proposal under the sign of future *truth* (mainly concerning the epistemological borders), and the third an *ethical* suggestion under the sign of a *politics of knowledge* (mainly concerning the lay/expert borders).

Traditional Debates

Many of the traditional debates broached under the heading of TR would previously have been dealt with by philosophy as *metaphysics* (Stenner, 2009). Whitehead (1929, 86), for instance, saw metaphysics not as "a mere juxtaposition of various sciences." Instead, it "generalizes beyond any special science, and thus provides the interpretative system which expresses their interconnection." Metaphysics, however, might be considered to have died along with Whitehead around the middle of the twentieth century. The batons of generality, integration, and synthesis were then passed from philosophy to science and were notably taken up by the proponents of *general systems theory* and *general structuralism*. Of those people credited with first using the word "transdisciplinarity" in the early 1970s, it is thus no accident that Piaget (Piaget et al., 1972) was centrally associated with general structuralism and Jantsch (1972) with general systems theory. The second wave of interest (i.e., that just crudely dated at 1994) corresponds in turn with what Curt (1994, 4) called the "climate of problematization" associated with *post*-structuralism (largely in the social sciences and humanities) and with complexity oriented critiques of systems theory (largely in the natural sciences) and hence with a postmodern loss of faith in a generalized scientific cosmology.

Critical Debates

Unsurprisingly, critical debates tend to be structured around the value attributed to disciplinarity. Those who value the clarity, focus, and security provided by disciplines may perceive transdisciplinarity to be at best a muddle and at worst a threat, while those who associate disciplines with an anticreative repression of possibilities will think differently. The situation is complex. Change and transformation are not always for the best, and what for some commentators is an effort to make ivory tower research more relevant to ordinary people is for others a neoliberal challenge to the autonomy of science, pushing researchers to be accountable to stakeholders in business and government. Strathern (2004) takes on something of this stance when she discusses challenges to disciplinarity as part of a broader context in which science is being made subservient to the industrial requirements and market demands of a thoroughly monetized knowledge economy. Building on Strathern's work, but also based on an empirical study of various different cases of inter- and TR collaboration, Barry, Born, and Weszkalnys (2008) identify three interconnected "logics" at play. The first is the logic of accountability just touched upon (a logic which can resonate with corporate quality control), and the second is a logic of innovation: "a spectrum of arguments about how scientific research can be expected to contribute to industrial innovation and economic growth" (Barry et al., 24). Together, these logics indeed point to the ways in which a neoliberal alliance of business and government has sought to appropriate and maximize the economic value of scientific knowledge. This process is evident in the increasing demand that research must demonstrate its economic impact and build measures of impact into its self-justification (cf. the UK Government's Research Excellence Framework). In this context, defending disciplinarity against TR can take on the connotation of defending truth itself from corporate take-over. However, Barry et al. resist the temptation of reducing TR to such external political and economic directives alone, asserting the relevance of a third logic that they call "ontological," since it concerns genuine changes in ways of conceiving reality.

Another contentious issue concerns the extent to which disciplines are in fact self-contained and homogenous units and, correspondingly, whether TR in practice actually is open, fluid, and heterogeneous. Galison (1996), for instance, draws attention to the heterogeneous and often conflicted nature of disciplines in general. More specifically, Danziger (1990) maps the conflicting multiplicities at play in the discipline of psychology, and Good (2000) does the same for the subdiscipline of social psychology. TR, by contrast, can sometimes appear as a monotonous set of promised transformations eternally repeated but never actually delivered. Building on Curt's (1994) tradition of critical psychology, Brown (1995, 59) offers the alternative of viewing disciplinarity and TR, not as separate empirical realities or distinct developmental stages but as "moments or conditions that any discipline may approximate." Discipline and TR would then not be separate identities but distinguishable tendencies in a unified mixture. Disciplinarity is always moving beyond itself, but two ideal-typical possibilities can be abstracted: (1) a highly bounded state of *disciplinarity* in which all of the relevant elements of knowledge are thoroughly compartmentalized and fixed in a well-defined space capable of being clearly and rapidly surveyed by specialists and (2) an unbounded *transdisciplinarity* in which such elements and structures are in a flux of becoming that escapes disciplinary knowledge (Motzkau, 2009). TR would then be the transformation of what is established by disciplinarity, and vice versa. These two scenarios map onto two distinguishable modes of advancement. The first proceeds in a "quantitative" sense, by gathering ever more details into an already established pattern. The second proceeds "qualitatively" through the transformation of an established pattern and the creation of a new pattern (Stenner, 2012). TR would therefore be concerned with the dynamism of forces at work in such transformations (Brown & Stenner, 2009) or with "the dynamic of change/becoming/event itself. . . at the exact moment at which something happens. . . the moment in which one thing becomes another thing" (Motzkau, 2011). In this scenario (which these authors call

a transdisciplinary *psychosocial approach*), disciplinarity and TR would be abstractions to which no empirical reality exactly conforms, but which exist in a relation of mutual presupposition, as settled "structure" and liminal "anti-structure."

International Relevance

It is notable that much TR activity is authorized by prominent international organizations. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, for instance, has hosted and sponsored a number of conferences and publications (see UNESCO, 1998), and perhaps the earliest use of TR discovered was connected with the Union for International Associations, Brussels (Judge & Clark, 2002). The 1972 use of the TR word by both Jantsch and Piaget was part of an OECD document (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). To give a final example, Patricia Rosenfield – a leading advocate of TR in the health field – was responsible for the Social and Economic Research Steering Committee of the World Health Organization (Kessel & Rosenfield, 2008). In the context of this growing international activity, it is easy to lose sight of some of the TR specificities proper to psychology and to *critical* psychology in particular. There is a subjective dimension to all of these problems, and that dimension is not reducible to the individual-centered psychologism of conventional psychology (Nicolescu, 2002). The key future direction for critical psychology in the context of TR concerns an articulation of that experiential dimension. Following the German tradition of critical psychology, that articulation should give due attention to the social and material context of experience, while reducing it to neither (Maiers, 2001). That context includes the growing "transnationalization" of knowledge practices (Gülerce, 2009).

Practice Relevance

As a metatheoretical problem, TR does not align straightforwardly with practical relevance, but as indicated in the introduction, it is very much about rethinking the relation between theory and practice and working out how scientists can work jointly with practitioners and lay people on real-world problems (Klein et al., 2001). Nissen's (2012) participatory approach with young people's drug taking in Copenhagen is exemplary here, seeking collective, normative, and participatory definitions of problems and solutions in the context of a critical psychology in dialogue with social sciences and philosophy. Also noteworthy is Motzkau's (2011) approach to researching practice as process which adopts TR thinking and methods to collaboratively draw participants' (here, judges, psychologists, and social workers) attention to paradoxes and voids that block practice and escape standard disciplinary attention.

Future Directions

It is easy to predict that issues associated with TR will become more acute and internationally relevant in the coming years. Calls for TR will become more extensive as scientific practice continues to globalize and as global problems associated with human rights (such as health, inequality, and violence), with energy needs (such as depleting oil resources), and with the nonhuman environment (e.g., global warming) continue to intensify. Such pressing real-world problems evidently demand scientific activity which grasps the complexity of problems; moves beyond, across, and through disciplinary boundaries; engages scientific knowledge with the manifold politics of practice; grapples with diverse life-world and scientific perceptions of problems; links speculative and concrete types of knowledge; and orients all this towards the promotion of the common good (Pohl & Hirsch Hadorn, 2007).

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Online Resources

A page from a network for transdisciplinary research. http://www.transdisciplinarity.ch/e/Transdisciplinarity/

A page containing Nicolescu's charter of transdisciplinarity. http://basarab.nicolescu.perso.sfr.fr/ciret/english/charten.htm

A page from a holistic education network with a focus on transdisciplinarity. http://www.hent.org/transdisciplinary.htm

Transformation, Overview

Chante De Loach and Shena Young
Department of Clinical Psychology, The Chicago
School of Professional Psychology, Chicago,
IL, USA

Introduction

Popular definitions of transformation include "a change or alteration, especially a radical one" or "change in condition, nature, or character" (dictionary.com). Certainly, these definitions attempt to sum up a remarkable and profound experience that is intangible, subjective, and difficult to articulate. Understandings of transformation, germane to the field of psychology, are equally variable qualifying the topic as being especially relevant for critical psychology. Often, transformation is described as a form of healing susceptible to facilitation by a helping professional amongst the field of psychology. However, opinions about how transformation is achieved, necessary conditions, and roles of helping professionals vary. Thus, this entry will offer an abbreviated exploration of these ideas in parallel with traditional and critical debates.

Definition

For the purposes of the present discussion, transformation will be defined as a continuous and fluid healing process characterized by a subjectively defined change in character or condition, to metamorph based upon one's individual needs, circumstances, contexts, and worldview.

Keywords

Transform; change; transcendence; resilience

Traditional Debates

Transformation is often referenced in dialogues on topics of transcendence, spirituality, and resilience. Existing literature on transformation can be found in the form of self-help books and guides to spiritual development. In academe, transformation may be discussed as radical change in regard to personal growth, in relation to forgiveness, hardship, and as a goal of therapy. Further, transformation is often widely seen as an extension of eastern philosophical and spiritual traditions.

A quick search of literature with a keyword of transformation elicits resources on mindfulness and meditation, transcendental meditation, paths to enlightenment, and "East meets West" approaches to psychotherapy. Buddhist conceptualizations of transformation abound; some Buddhist teachings of transformation note the confrontation of death and internal attachment to the material as being a prerequisite for transformation to ensue (Abe, 1987). In recent decades, the academic and clinical sectors of psychology have made stakes for meditation as a viable tool in therapy which has had immeasurable influence on present schools of thought. Meditation facilitates opportunities to become aware of thoughts, feelings, bodily sensations, and ultimately a deeper level of being. These dynamics combined offer the necessary preconditions and may serve as a vehicle to transformation where individuals can operate from their deepest inner senses of truth.

In short, within mainstream psychology, transformation is often deemed synonymous with change, often as a result of an effective course of psychotherapy. Yet, postmodern spiritual, humanistic-existential, and more Eastern-influenced approaches to therapy have broadened this understanding to be far more encompassing, particularly being inclusive of spiritual processes of transcendence and change.

Critical Debates

While transformation has been considered a fruit of therapeutic work, opinions of necessary conditions differ amongst schools of thought represented in the field of psychology. For instance, acceptance and commitment ideologies

emphasize the importance of acknowledging and accepting truth as a prerequisite to transformation. Relational theories view transformation and healing as occurring through increased awareness and adjustments to one's relational patterns. Existential schools of thought are concerned with transformation as it is confined by one's own set of limitations and possibilities as human beings. Systems theories render meticulous attention to context and external conditions, particularly as such contexts may hamper one's capacity to transcend beyond said conditions. Despite the varying epistemologies represented in these schools of thought, a few things are evident. Transformation is complex, often uncomfortable, and generally requires some degree of internal and social consciousness as a precondition to change. There is little agreement about issues of power, privilege, social capital, and differing levels of ability and social constraints to change or transformation. Moreover, criticisms emerge when differences in the clinician's role in transformative work is brought to light. Some areas for critical thought within a therapeutic relationship involve the evaluation of the clinician's role as facilitators, participators, or bystanders in the client's transformative journey. Another critical area for reflection pertains to the ways in which clinicians themselves understand transformation as an event that occurs, a decisive moment, or a process of agentic exercise. In addition to introspection on the clinician's behalf, helping professionals assume the task of exploring how clients understand the pursuit of transformation.

Another criticism, eloquently offered by Shakti Gawain (2010) in her book, *The Path of Transformation*, pertains to struggles that arise from the fact that many new age philosophies and leaders draw from wisdom of ancient spiritual traditions without fully adapting them to the modern world and our present stage of evolution. Gawain's perspective highlights the danger of pursuing a path that ultimately will not meet their needs or consider systemic conditions. In regard to the field of psychology she asserts, "Many traditional forms of psychotherapy, while providing a certain amount of health and guidance, exclude the spiritual or transpersonal dimension of human life, and so leave out a significant part of the healing paradigm" and that "changing our lives and changing the world cannot be accomplished either by focusing exclusively on external solutions or by following a traditional transcendent, spiritual path in which the reality and importance of the physical world are minimized or denied" (p. xvi–xvii). Thus, critical psychologists are tasked with reevaluating approaches to healing and transformation that isolate or prioritize one aspect of being over another. Such a path to transformation calls for integration of spiritual and human aspects of ourselves, learning to live as whole beings, and healing on all levels–physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual (p. 9). Further, Gawain points out that many professionals who are able to help people up to a certain point are unable to guide them through deeper levels of emotional healing, partly because professionals have neglected to commit to their own healing work. This kind of action calls forth owning one's center of power and responsibility for self which inevitably creates space to take any particular kind of external action through clinical work, political avenues, or social justice.

There appears to be disproportionate attention granted to individual processes of personal transformation while little consideration is granted to social transformation. Yet, social transformation is of particular importance to critical, community, and liberation psychologists. Social transformation refers to second order or systemic change with the task of transforming a social system including the culturally embedded power dynamics that foster oppression and the inequitable distribution of resources (Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2010). Thus, social transformation seeks to create the conditions necessary for personal transformation to occur. These emancipatory tasks, however, are not unlike the Buddhist teachings of awakenings and non-duality/interconnectedness: our spiritual awakenings and, indeed, liberation are mutually connected. It is noted that the basis of Buddhist social engagement is within the parallel process of spiritual engagement and employing one's compassion and spiritual sensibilities socially (Loy, 2010).

Thus, there appears to be a dialectic relationship between the calls for a more socially and politically engaged Buddhism in which it is hoped that through personal transformation and spiritual awakening individuals create a more just world community.

Critical theories are concerned with human emancipation or what Horkheimer states as the goal of liberating "human beings from the circumstances that enslave them" (Horkheimer, 1982; p. 244). Critical theories aim to create and transform personal and social conditions that disallow human growth and freedoms. To this end, personal and social transformation must necessarily be interdisciplinary and becomes an imperative of any critical theory and theorist, particularly critical psychology.

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Transgender, Overview

Antar Martínez-Guzmán[1] and
Katherine Johnson[2]
[1]Department of Psychology, University of Colima, Colima, Mexico
[2]School of Applied Social Sciences, University of Brighton, Brighton, UK

Introduction

The term transgender has a relatively recent history. It was introduced in the 1970s as a means to distinguish between those who engaged in medical techniques for changing gender appearance (e.g., transsexuals) and those who experienced a distinction between their sexed body and gendered sense of self, but did not intend to pursue hormonal or surgical intervention. Since then its use has become widely accepted to refer to an array of people who might cluster under a "transgender umbrella," including those who have undertaken medical interventions. The term transgender is often preferred because it is self-generated rather than clinically applied and in this sense can be thought of as a term of empowerment rather than disempowerment. Despite the growing popularity and visibility of the term, the meaning of "transgender" is still hotly debated and its uses are diverse. In this sense, the term remains in flux and indeed some argue that this is what gives "transgender" its richness in meaning and political potency. In the last decade, transgender identities have gained visibility both in political and social spaces and in popular culture and media. Thus, transgender identities have become a major topic of attention in sexuality and gender issues particularly in the fields of gender embodiment, identity formation, and the impact of discriminatory experiences.

Definition

Transgender is an adjective used to refer to individuals or practices that diverge from the conventional cultural norms regarding sex/gender. This variation commonly relates to self-identification with a form of gender (woman, man, neither, or both) that does not match the sex assigned at birth (i.e., the identification by others as male or female based on physical and genetic characteristics). Thus, the notion of transgender often includes some degree of ambiguity with respect to conventional and stable gender categories.

Furthermore, "transgender" is often described as an inclusive "umbrella term" (Ekins & King, 1999) intended to capture multiple forms of gender crossing and mixing significant to people's self-definition and can be stretched further to include partners, family, and professionals

working in the field. The transgender umbrella normally includes transsexuals, drag queens, transvestites, drag kings, intersexed persons, and other people whose gender expressions disrupt conventional assumptions of gender order and who identify as such (Elliot, 2010). Therefore, the term transgender – in contrast to transsexual – does not necessarily designate a permanent and definitive body or identity change, even though some who identify in this way do make a permanent gender crossing. Thus, "transgender" can integrate permanent or temporary body modifications, partial or complete transitions, more or less frequent cross-dressing practices, and other dynamic and ambiguous expressions. Transgender people may have or may not have had medical sexual reassignment surgery and may be or may not be interested in completing such a procedure. In other words, not all transgender people are necessarily transsexual.

Transgender is also sometimes used to describe an "in-between" or ambiguous gender position. In this sense, a transgender individual may identify with a particular point in a gender continuum defined by conventional parameters. The term "genderqueer" also refers to the mixing of qualities traditionally associated with "male" and "female" and is frequently linked with transgenderism, although the focus on gender performativity as found in accounts of queer theory is particularly pertinent here. Finally, transgender is sometimes used to define a position outside of the gender conventional parameters (e.g., third gender) or to identify with several points of gender continuum simultaneously (e.g., bigender). Although "transgender" has been associated with the concept queer, it does not imply any specific sexual orientation. Transgender people have more or less the same variety of sexual orientations as cisgender people (cisgender is understood as the opposite of transgender; a person who identifies with the gender/sex they were assigned at birth). Transgender people may be identified as heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or other, regardless of their gender identification. It is important to acknowledge that while some people may fit under this definition of transgender, they may not identify as such. Therefore, self-identification is considered an important aspect of transgender identity.

Keywords

Transsexual; trans; genderqueer; transphobia; cisgender

History

The term "transgenderist" was first coined by pioneer gender researcher and transgenderist, Virginia Prince (1976). It was introduced to denote people who lived in a gender that does not correspond with the sex that was assigned to them at birth (biological sex), but were not seeking reassignment surgery or as it was known at the time, a "sex change." Prince's aim was to draw a distinction from "transsexualism," which was entangled with the medical discourses that had conceptualized it as a form of gender dysphoria with a treatment pathway that included sex reassignment. Since then, the term transgender has grown in popularity and is now widely used in different social spaces, taking root especially in the fields of activism and gender studies. Its emergence as a key concept in academia is often attributed to the influence of early queer theory, particularly the work of Judith Butler, which includes an analysis of the documentary *Paris is Burning* and developed the concept of gender performativity. A decade of subsequent work that debated the fluidity of gender and the drag of the body on gender set the scene for emergence of Transgender Studies as its own interdisciplinary area of study. As pointed out by Stephen Whittle, "Trans identities were one of the most written about subjects of the late twentieth century" (2006, p. xi), and by the late 1990s, transgender (and more latterly "trans") had been adopted as general terms covering a growing range of nonnormative identities, from "androgynous" to "genderqueer transboi" (Couch et al., 2007), including those who may have previously identified as transsexual women and men.

Traditional Debates

In Psychology, debates about transgender identities have traditionally considered how transitional practices relate to health discourses and institutional power, specifically whether "trans" should be understood through the perspective of mental disorder and the impact of clinical and health care on transgender lives. The transgender community has been active in demanding depathologization of people transitioning between sexes/genders. In this debate the question of whether gender identity disorder as a psychological diagnosis increases or restricts autonomy for transpeople is examined, with parallels drawn to early gay liberation activists who successfully eliminated homosexuality as a psychological disorder. Concerns about who owns the transbody, who gains access to treatments, the role of health insurance coverage for impoverished transpeople, and, conversely, the problematization of individuals' internal gender conflicts, rather than societal gender norms, are analyzed (e.g., Butler, 2004). Recently, transgender activist groups have been calling for the full depathologizing of "gender dysphoria" and for the open availability of medical reassignment procedures as a right for the enhancement of transpeople's health.

Critical Debates

Critical debates around transgender experiences and identities refer to a wide variety of topics including the relationship with LGB and feminist communities, identity borderlines, the queer agenda, and transsexuality (particularly regarding the medicalization of transitioning and health care for transpeople) and discussions about transsexual and transgender subjectivities, where issues of reproduction/transformation of the normative gender order are crucial.

Relation to LGB and Feminist Communities

Despite the distinction between sexual orientation and gender identity, throughout history the gay, lesbian, and bisexual subculture was often a key site where transgender people were socially accepted in the gender role they felt they belonged to. Thus, the transgender community has had a close and complex relationship with the LGB communities. For instance, in her discussion about transgender identities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Stryker (2008, p. 34) notes that "distinctions between what we now call 'transgender' and 'gay' or 'lesbian' were not always as meaningful as they have since become." Nevertheless, the relationship has not always been easy. For instance, debates about the gender status of transgender women and whether they should be allowed in lesbian and feminist spaces have been fiercely contested (see Raymond, 1980; Stone, 1991). Coalition politics have been mooted by some (e.g., Johnson, 2007a), but there are concerns about the adequacy of LGB and feminist political struggles in relation to the specific demands of the transgender community related to an agenda for social recognition and integration. Although there are many transgender people who understand their experiences in these terms, there are also transgender expressions and individuals who do not make sense of their gender experience, or their political struggles, within the confines of the LGBT framework.

Borderline Identities: Demarcating Distinctions?

Debates around transgender diversity also triggered what became known as identity "border wars" (Halberstam, 1998; Halberstam & Hale, 1998). Drawing on the critical relationships between different forms of masculinity such as "butch" and female-to-male transgender, these authors drew attention to specific gender forms with their own cultural history that cannot be subsumed into more general gender categories. These discussiones revolved around for the exploration and expansion of taxonomies related to nonnormative gender expressions and for more complex recognition of gender variance, rejecting the idea that dilemmas such as "right body/wrong body" are exclusive to transgender subjects. Many subjects – not only transgender/transsexual subjects – do not identify completely

with their bodies or their assigned gender, and it was argued that this widespread gender variance (in masculinities and femininities) should be recognized. In a broad sense, this argument sought to displace the problem of gender variance located in transpeople, by applying it to the wide gender spectrum including normative identities (Johnson, 2011).

Transgender as a Queer Trope

An important part of the field of transgender studies has taken shape over the past decade in a close kinship with queer theory (Bornstein, 1994; Feinberg, 1996; Stryker, 2006). In this dialogue, the notion of transgender has been associated with postmodern conceptions of subjectivity and queer conceptions of gender and sexuality that deconstruct binaries such as man/woman. For some authors, this necessarily entails the disruption and eventual abandonment of categories such as "woman," "man," and "transsexual." Jay Prosser states "queer studies *has made the transgendered subject*, the subject who crosses gender boundaries, a *key queer trope*" (p. 5, emphasis added). Although he acknowledged in 1998 that "transgender would not be of the moment if not for the queer moment" (p. 6), he argued that queer theory had problematically elevated the transgendered subject above and beyond the transsexual subject.

Within this conception "transgender" is understood as referring to a political positioning that draws from postmodern notions of fluidity (for both bodies and genders), while transsexuality is understood in more modernist terms, as a (psychiatrically defined) state of being that assumes the preexistence of two sexes between which one may transition. In this sense, the common alignment of transsexual people to the "other sex" is construed as complicit with the normative gender order and therefore as contrary to the gender-transgressive ethic of transgender politics. Some (e.g., Namaste, 2000) have vociferously lamented the way Judith Butler's work on gender performativity seemingly contributed to the hierarchical division between the newly celebrated "transgenderist" and the relegated "transsexual." Others (e.g., Rubin, 2003),

including non-transfeminists (e.g., Elliot & Roen, 1998; Johnson, 2007b), have highlighted that discourse alone is insufficient for accounting for the way transsubjectivities are lived and have turned to phenomenological and psychoanalytic accounts to better theorize transembodiment.

Transgender-Embodied Subjectivity

The "making of transgender subjectivity" entailed a "coming out" in terms of reclaiming transsexual subjectivity and bodies from the psychomedical sphere and mobilizing politically. However, the call to "come out" wedded with the queer/postmodern view of transgender as transgressing gender regulations and revealing the artificiality of gender identities was rejected by some for obliterating transsexual individuals' subjective experiences of gender realness (Prosser, 1998). Critics argued that the theoretical emphasis on multiplicity and fluidity celebrated within postmodern and queer perspectives of transgenderism ignored the bodily experiences and living conditions of transsexual people (e.g., Namaste, 2000, 2009). In this context the transsexual/transgender binary is often portrayed as an antagonist and hierarchical relation, yet it is important to note that these are schematic positions that are often not mutually exclusive in everyday life. What both the transgender and the transsexual positions share is a desire for more societal acceptance and legal rights for transpeople. In recent years, to avoid invoking a hierarchical distinction, we find the increased usage of the term "trans" to describe shared experiences across a range of sociopolitical contexts.

A greater demand for understanding transpeople in terms of their daily negotiations with particular contexts and their struggle for social recognition has emerged. Given social expectations for the conventionally stable, biologically rooted nature of gender, this negotiation often leads to open transphobia and the precariousness of translives. Thus, Connell (2012) argues that the major issues for transwomen's lives are not well represented by discourse centered on problematizing identity. These issues include the nature of transition, the laboring transsexual body, workplace relations, poverty,

and the functioning of state organizations including police, health policy, family services, education, and child care. This argument calls for recognizing the specificity of transgender experiences at the level of social and embodied practice and the continuing connection with material problems that are linked to gender oppression.

International Relevance

Transgender historians have registered diverse cross-gender practices across different cultural contexts and periods (e.g., kathoey, muxes), but these are usually situated in minority cultures or groups and cannot always be understood through the framework of modern gender categories and studies. Anthropological accounts (e.g., Herdt, 1996) have also documented diverse gender experiences to counteract the normative assumptions about binary gender distinctions in Euro-American contexts, with well-known references made to the hijras of India and "two-spirited" people within Native American tribes. There is also plenty of research evidencing gender diversity in contemporary urban contexts, for example, experiences of transgender youth in Thailand (Costa & Matzner, 2007) and transgenderism in Latin America (Lancaster, 1998). The challenge of widespread transphobia is recognized annually in the International Transgender Day of Remembrance on 20 November where meetings are held from the Philippines to Scotland to mourn those who have died from hate crimes.

Practice Relevance

Transgender experiences can be considered as gender expressions which challenge various aspects of the psychomedical construction of "gender identity." Influential transgender authors such as Kate Bornstein, Leslie Feinberg, and Riki Anne Wilchins have given voice to alternative views of the transgender experience where the conventional objectifying psychological approach is questioned. In this sense, transgender

issues pose to psychology important interrogations regarding the conceptualization of gender identity, the normal/abnormal distinction in gender behavior, the understanding of nonnormative subjectivities, and the place of psychological knowledge in the regulation of gender. For instance, transgender activists and authors have argued against medical and clinical psychological protocols for gender surveillance, regulation, and diagnosis such as the real-life experience test and the "evaluation" of femininity and masculinity through psychological instruments such as MMPI scales. Critiques to these kinds of protocols point out that these practices reinforce conformity to gender role stereotypes and in many cases bind transpeople to narrow gender criteria in order to obtain recognition and citizenship (e.g., change name and sex/gender status in official identification documents). This calls for the construction of different psychological practices. These need to deemphasize gender-normalizing procedures by developing psychosocial tools that are useful for understanding the complexity and diversity of gender identifications and strategies for coping with discrimination and exclusion while challenging the perpetuation of gender stereotypes and the pathologization of nonnormative gender expression.

Future Directions

Future lines of research and practice for critical psychologists include the discontinuation of transsexuality and transgender as identities associated with mental disorder as currently stated in the DSM-IV-TR and the ICD-10. For instance, a main point of discussion and target of recent global activist action has been the upcoming edition of the DSM-V to be published in 2013. The issue remains whether and in what terms transgender and transsexual experiences might be included in the manual and how this will impact on medical and mental health practices towards transpeople. Any reframing or modification of the Gender Identity Disorder category will influence a new set of "standards of care" for the

health of transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming people, and future research on the implication of these are important. Improvements in these areas are welcomed if they transform and expand health-care practices for transgender communities, taking into account their specificities and their inherent diversity. Another line of work is the fight against transphobia (discrimination against transgender people based on their gender identity) in its different forms and levels and the relationship between transgender and cisgenderism in the broader context of gender politics. Related to this, particularly in an international context, are questions about citizenship, autonomy, and social recognition for transgender rights (Currah, Juang, & Minter, 2006).

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Online Resources

International Transgender Day of Remembrance http://www.transgenderdor.org [Accessed 20 November 2012]

Transgression

Ole Jacob Madsen
Department of Psychology, University of Oslo,
Blindern, Oslo, Norway

Introduction

Transgression as the act of violating norms, laws, budgets, etc. is from a common societal point of view, including psychology, traditionally esteemed as an unwanted, destructive act of behavior. Yet, within the early French sociology of religion, the philosophical critique of modernity and art transgression often holds a revolutionary potential as it possibly can alter the status quo, at least for a period of time.

Definition

Transgression defined either in the legal, social, psychological, religious, or geological sense of the word refers in general to the process of an overstepping of a boundary. Etymologically transgression stems from the Latin verb *transgredi* which is composed by *trans* that means "through" or "the other side" and *gredi* which means "to go" (Barnhart, 1988).

Beyond this basic definition there exist significant differences among disciplines in terms of how transgression is used. An authorative definition is hard to find. Often when transgression is applied in emancipatory and revolutionary postmodern academic work, it takes the form of an empty buzzword, which perhaps was why physicist Alan Sokal (1996) threw it in the title of his famous hoax article in *Social Text*.

Keywords

Transgression; violation; history of man; antimodernists; archaic cultures; festival; sexual revolution

Traditional Debates

In psychology the most common types of transgression is involved either with interpersonal or social norms. The interpersonal type of transgression is *relational transgression* which occurs when a partner violates an implicit or explicit relational rule like infidelity (Cupach & Spitzberg, 1994). The societal type of transgression is *social transgression* that happens whenever an individual steps out of and/or breaks social rules (for instance, refusal to wear clothes in public spaces) (see, for instance, Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Malle & Moses, 2001 for applications in psychological research). Transgression as a phenomenon in itself is not regularly thematized in mainstream psychology, but tends to apply only in context with research towards different interpersonal or social patterns.

Critical Debates

The situation is quite similar in critical psychology, where transgression has seldom been a topic of particular interest, although many critical psychologists view their work as potentially transgressive in terms of searching for and opening up new subject positions. In critical pedagogy transgression is seemingly slightly more incorporated – in describing the desired outcome for the role of the poor, marginalized, or disenfranchised (see, for instance, Biesta, 1998; Denzin, 2003).

A speculative, but rather intriguing, hypothesis about psychology's nonexisting interest for transgression as a phenomenon in itself is perhaps that transgression holds the threat, however unlikely, to abolish psychology as the science of man altogether. The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1966) famously ends his work *The Order of Things* with a passage where Foucault compares modern man with drawings in the sand that the waves eventually will wash away. Foucault's radical perspective is that our ideas of human beings today, including the whole enterprise of the science of psychology, are a temporary form of understanding which

originated in the sixteenth century and therefore will eventually dissolve into something wholly other, unknown form. Previous to this, Foucault (1963) in his essay "A Preface to Transgression" expressed his hope that transgression held the revolutionary potential for bringing mankind forward into new ways of organizing life around a more radical existence.

German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1983) labelled Foucault, together with French philosophers Georges Batailles and Jacques Derrida, *antimodernists* (and "young conservatives") as they all shared the intent of taking the step out of modernity's foundation on knowledge and reason. Readers unfamiliar with the history of philosophy may have a hard time grasping what the antimodernist strategy really was about, but their growing dissatisfaction with modernity goes back to German philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel concept of transgression, *Aufhebung*, in which nothing is lost, but incorporated in the new throughout the history of mankind. Hence, the whole modern Enlightenment idea of progress and growth is possible to related to Hegel's dialectics, and, for instance, Batailles (1967) opposed the idea of an accumulation of excess of energy and monetary values in the interwar period as he foresaw an uncontrollable eruption in a new world war. The antimodernists looked instead to different organizations of time and took inspiration from archaic cultures depicted by the French Collège de Sociologie school of sociology of religion in the 1930s, in which the social reality was reinstated a new every year.

What makes transgression difficult and intricate is that transgression as a radical movement or a sudden rupture requires stable borders or structures to overstep or break. Therefore a revolution cannot simply be permanent. In geology this is illustrated in the natural cyclic relation between earth and water. In archaic cultures this was also the ideal of cosmos as living entity (Eliade, 1959) and the organization of the social around a stable gathering of excessive food, natural resource, and energy during the whole year before it was excelled during the short, excessive period of the festival (Caillois, 1959). And then the whole cycle would start over.

A number of cultural critics, for instance, Danes Fredrik Stjernfelt and Søren Ulrik Thomsen (2005), have made the astute point that in late modern Western culture art and cultural movements are in the habit of reproducing themselves by making transgression the rule rather than the exception. This leaves the true outcome of, for instance, constant transgressions after the sexual revolution in doubt, as if the originally radical transgression have themselves unwillingly been turned into conservative verifications of the status quo. For instance, asexuality among young people in today's pornographic culture contains seemingly more provoking potential than sexual openness and experimentation. Previously mentioned Batailles (1986) grasped the intimate relationship between transgression and rules as well as he maintained that sexuality was never as strong as under the rule of Christianity. At the beginning of the twenty-firstcentury, there is perhaps a tangible collective feeling of disappoint and sense of living after the revolution took place in liberal democracies in the Western world, reflected in contemporary art exhibits which pose questions like "Whatever Happened to Sex in Scandinavia?" (see Kuzman & Lafuente, 2011 for documentation). Grand questions like this are at the very heart of critical psychology, where the ambition to find new ways of being human has not abandoned (see, for instance, Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1998). So in the widest sense, transgression should after all be the key to any critical psychology wanting to deal with subjectivity.

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Transnational Migration Theory

Debora Upegui-Hernandez
Psychology Department, University of Puerto Rico – Rio Piedras, San Juan, Puerto Rico

Introduction

Given the prominent role and heated debates about immigration that continue to make headlines in newspapers around the world, it would be hard to deny that migration continues to be an issue of great social and political concern. Migration literatures have proliferated in an attempt to understand the processes and outcomes of these movements of people becoming more interdisciplinary now than ever with contributions from sociologists, demographers, economists, anthropologists, legal scholars, postcolonialists, and epidemiologists (Bhatia & Ram, 2001a; Suárez-Orozco, 2002). Yet psychologists have not played as big a role as one would expect (Berry, 2001; Deaux, 2000; Mahalingam, 2006) in understanding the social and psychological effects of the phenomenon of human migration. Transnational perspectives have been advanced mostly by anthropologists, sociologists, and some political scientists. They build on work about "diasporic communities" which are considered groups of people displaced or exiled from their countries of origin without the possibility of return but who maintained psychological, social, economic, and political ties with a common past and future that may or may not involve a nation-state or home country (Clifford, 1994). This entry introduces critical psychologists to a transnational perspective for understanding how human migration and changes in the dynamics of incorporation of (im)migrants and their children create and transform individual and collective identities, subjectivities, longings, everyday practices, and relationships.

The concepts of "nation" and "nation-states" are usually intertwined in our minds and in social and psychological research. In this time and age, it is hard to talk about nations without talking about nation-states. But this is not a coincidence. When one considers the concept of "nations," one almost immediately thinks of the governments and nation-states associated with them which reifies how successful nation-state building projects have been in rendering those ideas as "taken for granted" and unquestionable. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller argued that the methodological nationalism of social sciences "assume[s] that countries are the natural units for comparative studies, equate[s] society with nation-state, and conflate[s] national interests with the purposes of social sciences" (2003, p. 578). Recent research on theories of transnationalism deconstructs

these concepts within social sciences and migration research and highlights their social and political construction. The concept of transnational social fields extends what psychology and sociology have theorized as social fields and elaborates on how globalization and transnational border crossings constitute new transnational spaces where social relationships and lives are simultaneously affected by multiple geographical, economic, social, and political realities.

Definitions

Transnational theory has often been criticized as having a lack of clarity in defining its scope of study and what it is and is not. As a relatively emerging area of study, transnationalism and its proponents have worked to achieve a conceptual clarity as the field develops. Transnational migration is then defined as "a process of movement and settlement across international borders in which individuals maintain or build multiple networks of connection to their country of origin while at the same time settling in a new country" (Fouron & Glick-Schiller, 2001, p. 60). One of the most important implications of this definition is the understanding that immigrants and their families continue to have relationships with their home countries despite the fact that they migrated to another country. Most traditional psychological research about the experiences of immigrants (i.e., Berry, 1997, 2001; Deaux, 2000; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; see also Deaux, 2006 and Suarez-Orozco, 2002 for a review and critique of psychological research about immigrants) has denied or ignored this fact of life as immigrants and has centered solely on how they fair in the new contexts. Although it has received less attention and it less often used as a term, the proponents of transnational migration called "transmigrants" as those individuals who live their lives simultaneously crossing national borders, be it physically, socially, or politically. In other words, those individuals who maintain a dual reference point of sociopolitical membership by travelling to visit relatives in their home country, keeping up to date with home country news, participating politically and economically in their home country by sending remittances, or investing capital at the same time that they incorporate themselves in their host country's society.

The concept of transnational social fields was introduced by Linda Basch, Nina Glick-Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc in 1994 as a way to conceptualize "the domain created by the social relationships of persons who visit back and forth in their country of origin and persons who remain connected even if they themselves do not move" (as cited by Fouron & Glick-Schiller, 2001, p. 61). Their conception of transnational social fields is based on the concept of a social field as "an unbounded terrain of interlocking egocentric networks" (Glick-Schiller & Fouron, 1999, p. 344) that cross nation-state boundaries. By concentrating on the concept of social fields, they pushed beyond the scope of social networks which usually refers to social relationships among specific persons with whom one has contact within one's immediate geographical space and within national borders. Transnational social fields encompass social spaces created by the existence of transnational social networks and affect migrants beyond specific social networks they may have in the country in which they have settled. Transnational social fields as a construct extends what psychology and sociology have theorized as social fields and elaborates on how globalization and transnational border crossings constitute new transnational spaces where social relationships and lives are simultaneously affected by multiple geographical, economic, social, and political realities. Sharing a social and psychological space with family members and friends no longer requires geographical proximity or face-to-face interaction, which has traditionally been the focus of social networks, social support, and identity theorists (Vertovec, 2009). It also provides the basis for the formation of transnational social groups and diasporas by facilitating the perception of common characteristics among migrants who maintain transnational ties and relationships.

Keywords

Transnationalism; transnational identity; diasporas; transnational social fields; social networks

History

Different disciplines in the social and behavioral sciences have approached the question of how immigrants are incorporated into the contexts where they chose to settle upon migration differently. A transnational perspective of migration emerged as a way to rescue methodologically and analytically important aspects of immigrants' lives that had not been given attention by migration scholars who ascribed to a view of society guided by what Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2003) termed "methodological nationalism." Although the dilemmas encountered by immigrants since the late nineteenth century are still alive, the perspectives under which they are understood and examined have changed. Our understanding of the social context within which American migration occurs has gone from "assimilation" (Alba & Nee, 1999) during the early part of the twentieth century, through definitions of "acculturation," (Berry, 1997) "melting pot," "pluralism," "segmented assimilation," (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), and "salad bowl" (Fernandez, 2000), among others (see Deaux, 2006 for a detailed discussion). These views rested on fixed definitions of "home" and "host" countries that serve as points of departure or arrival for the development of identity among (im)migrants and the maintenance of separate social spheres (Deaux, 2006; Suárez-Orozco, 2002).

Theories of assimilation have been advanced largely by sociologists and date to the beginning of the twentieth century when the largest wave of immigration, mostly of European origins, entered the United States (Suárez-Orozco, 2002). The assumption then was that immigrants would eventually assimilate into American culture, leaving behind their old country views and attachments. Assimilation was understood as "a process of change that is directional- indeed

unilinear-nonreversible, and continuous" (Suárez-Orozco, 2002, p. 24). Suaréz-Orozco (2002) outlined three main assumptions in the dominant discourse about the assimilation of immigrants: the "clean break," the "homogeneity," and the "progress" assumptions. The first meant that immigrants were expected or understood to be moving from their home country to a host country without hopes or thoughts of returning. The second assumed that immigrants would, over generations, become part of mainstream American society. Finally, assimilation theory expected that later generations would do better than their immigrant parents and experience upward social mobility.

Recent waves of immigrants have made evident the inadequacy of traditional assumptions behind assimilation theories (Kasinitz, Waters, Mollenkopf, & Anil, 2002; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Waldinger, 2004) and shown them to be problematic. First, more recent immigrants continue to arrive mainly from Asia (over 25 %) and Latin America (50 %) which makes it harder to assume that their children will be incorporated as "white ethnics" in the same way as third- and fourth-generation Irish and Italians (Suárez-Orozco, 2002). Second, immigrants "of color" are experiencing continued discrimination and racism which undermines the possibilities for later generations to be more successful than their immigrant parents (Farley & Alba, 2002). Third, more recent immigrants are maintaining social, economic, and political ties with their countries of origin with greater intensity and ease (Eckstein & Barberia, 2002; Hirsch, 2000). Proponents of assimilation (i.e., Alba & Nee, 1999) and segmented assimilation (i.e., Portes & Rumbaut, 2001) theories have responded to critics by refining their models. However these refined models still center on the study of experiences of (im)migrants as if they were bounded by or restricted to their lives in their host countries.

On the other hand, the acculturation perspective has received more attention within psychology (Berry, 1997; Bhatia & Ram, 2001a; Colic-Peisker & Walker, 2003; LaFromboise et al., 1993). Berry (1997) used

the concept of acculturation to describe the process whereby a cultural group experiences changes as it comes into contact with another cultural group. Berry's model of psychological acculturation suggested four paths or outcomes for immigrants: integration, assimilation, separation/segregation, or marginalization. Inherent in his theorizing was the assumption that integration was the best possible outcome where "there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking to participate as an integral part of the larger social network." (Berry, 1997, p. 9) Those who find themselves in other cells of the 2×2 matrix would experience psychological stress to varying degrees. The emphasis is placed on psychological stress as a result of the process of acculturation and the understanding that, despite individual differences and diverse contexts. Berry and his colleagues assumed a universalist perspective on acculturation (Berry & Sam, 1997 as cited by Bhatia & Ram, 2001b).

Cross-cultural psychologists have used this perspective to understand what psychological changes occur in the process of immigration. In other words, they focus on how the individual adapts to a different society and culture as they migrate from one country to another. LaFromboise et al. (1993) argued that, to a great extent, the acculturation approach maintained assumptions similar to those held by the assimilation approach with regard to adopting the mainstream culture, the existence of a hierarchy among the different groups coming into contact, and understanding the process as a unidirectional one. However, acculturation differs from assimilation in so far as it allows for understanding that adapting to a new culture and context does not require that the immigrant group stop identifying with its culture and its country of origin.

Transnational perspectives have been advanced mostly by anthropologists, sociologists, and some political scientists. They build on work about "diasporic communities." As Clifford puts it "[t]he centering of diasporas around an axis of origin and return overrides the specific local interactions (identifications and "dis-identifications," both constructive and

defensive) necessary for the maintenance of diasporic social forms. The empowering paradox of a diaspora is that dwelling *here* assumes a solidarity and connection *there*. But *there* is not necessarily a single place or an exclusivist nation" (1994, p. 322 emphasis added). These diasporic communities were usually dispersed among a number of different locales, i.e., the African diaspora, which includes people of African descent in the United States, the Caribbean, Central and South America, or the Jewish diaspora and their histories are intimately tied to histories of colonialism and postcolonialism, of power, oppression, and economic dependence. According to Safran, what defines a diaspora is "a history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host (bad host?) country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity importantly defined by this relationship" (1991, as cited by Clifford, 1994, p. 305) which has its origins in Black British Cultural Studies through the theorizing of Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, and James Clifford and gained currency in postcolonial theory.

More recently, diasporas have come to be understood as one type of transnational community defined as:

> . . . rooted in particular, bounded sending- and receiving-country locales. Because they emerged from the social networks that precipitate migration, members tend to know one another personally or have family members or acquaintances in common during the early phases of community formation. They form organizations that express their identity as a transnational group. They exhibit some level of self-consciousness about belonging to a community spanning borders. . .Transnational communities include both migrants and non-migrants, though the nature of non-migrant participation varies considerably. (Levitt, 2000, p. 461)

Levitt acknowledges that using the term "community" does not imply that all members have a sense of affinity or solidarity with one another.

Diasporic and transnational perspectives acknowledge that immigrants participate both in their homelands/home countries while they incorporate into their host countries. The concept

of "transnational social fields" allows us to bring together into a single field of analysis immigrants' life experiences from different times (past, present, and future) and different locations (home country, host country, homeland, country of residence). Although, Basch and colleagues (1994) developed the concept of transnational social fields as an elaboration of Bourdieu's sociological concept of social fields, "social fields" as a concept has its origins in psychological field theory. Ironically, once social fields as a concept migrated to sociological theory, its origins in psychological theory were forgotten. According to several accounts (Bargal, 2006; Lewin, 1997 (1948, 1951); Martin, 2003), Kurt Lewin introduced the concept of psychological and social space/field to the repertoire of social psychologists in his book Field Theory in Social Science (1951). Lewin's theorizing was influenced by Gestalt theory and primarily developed the implications of field theory for understanding the psychological field/space of an individual. In the late 1960s, field theory reappeared in sociology in Pierre Bourdieu's work. According to Swartz (1997 as cited by Martin, 2003), Bourdieu credited Lewin's field theory for having a major role in his sociological theorizing of social spaces and field theory. Although Bourdieu (2008) did not hold in high regard the psychologists of his time, his theorizing of social fields, *habitus*, and the different domains that define social spaces (such as economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital) have much in common with social psychological concepts and epistemologies.

A more qualitative and narrative inquiry line of cross-cultural psychology has taken a different approach to the study of multiple identities among immigrants using a postcolonial studies perspective and focusing on transmigration, border-crossing, and diasporic identities (Bhatia, 2002; Bhatia & Ram, 2001a, b; Hart & Lindegger, 2002; Tappan, 2005). Bathia (2002) considered the consequences that postcolonial relations and relations of economic dependence between "first" and "third" world have on migration patterns and the subsequent formation of what he calls *diasporic identities* within

transnational migration. In many ways, this line of narrative dialogical analysis of immigrant's experiences acknowledges the existence and role of transnational social spheres among immigrant communities. In order to carry out their analysis, Bhatia and Ram (2001a, b) conceived immigration as a dialogical process "that involves a constant moving back and forth between incompatible cultural positions" (Bhatia, 2002, p. 57). Their postcolonial critique of assimilation and acculturation strategies revolves around the belief that "acculturation is not a matter of individual strategy . . . Rather, the formation of immigrant identities in diasporic communities involves a constant process of negotiation, intervention and mediation that is shaped by issues of race, gender, sexuality and power" (Bhatia, 2002, p. 59).

Early research on transnationalism and transnational migration dealt with the need to undermine assimilation, acculturation, and incorporation theories' inadequacy to study the phenomenon of living across borders in an increasingly globalized society (Levitt & Glick-Schiller, 2004). First, they needed to open up a space for their theories of transnationalism to be considered seriously, as offering a different and important contribution to immigration theory. Then, they found the need to support their claims with empirical research and to convince scholars that this was a worthwhile approach for mainstream migration theorists to consider (Levitt, DeWind, & Vertovec, 2003). Although transnationalism is not in itself a new phenomenon, its use as an analytical lens in migration theory dates from the 1990s. As a theoretical perspective, it continues to evolve and refine its conceptual and methodological premises as evidenced in the publication of special issues in 1999 by Ethnic and Racial Studies and in 2003 by International Migration Review (see Levitt et al., 2003; see Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt, 1999; Vertovec, 2009 for an extended review of criticism and debates in the field).

Although women increasingly comprise a large proportion of migrants within and across national borders (Ghosh, 2009; Massey, Fischer, & Capoferro, 2006), migration research and

policy has largely focused on male migrants or has lacked a gender perspective. Within the frame of transnationalism, work that takes gender seriously as an important part of migration processes has begun to surface (i.e., Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2003). Hondagneu-Sotelo argues that the relationship between gender and migration research has evolved in three stages. A first stage focused on remedying the exclusion of women in research. For example, pioneering research by Saskia Sassen (1984) explored how the relationship between changes in national and international labor markets affected women's migration from rural areas to urban cities and how this internal migration related to an increase in women's international migration. A second stage was marked by efforts to move beyond a Women and Migration focus to a Gender and Migration framework (e.g., Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; and Kibria, 1993), which examines gender as a social construct and how it operates as set of dynamics and processes that reinforce gender inequalities. For example, Grasmuck and Pessar's (1991) book represented an effort to understand how Dominican migration extended beyond one single generation and created the conditions for circular migration. In the process, they analyzed the role of women in these circuits of migration. A third stage embraces gender itself as a constitutive element of migration and highlights the role of transnational connections in the experience of gendered migration (e.g., Gold, 2003; Goldring, 2003; Jones-Correa, 1998). For example, Sarah Mahler (2001) explores Central American migration, more specifically Salvadorian, and portrays the precarious situation in which wives of male immigrant Salvadorian workers found themselves upon their husbands' emigration. Despite this research, the fact remains that studies about the intersection of immigration and gender are relatively scarce and continue to be done mostly by women (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2003; Pessar & Mahler, 2001). Yet, psychologists remain absent from the discussion of international migration and its gendered character, with very few exceptions (e.g., Espin, 2006; Mahalingam, Balan, & Haritatos, 2008).

Traditional Debates

From its appearance as a methodological and conceptual tool in the early 1990s, transnational migration has raised concerns about specific issues which have been debated by scholars reaching agreement over some and not others. Although a transnational perspective is understood to be a novel methodological and conceptual lens to approach the study of migrants' experiences, scholars now agree that as an experience is it not new. Migrants have lived and maintain transnational ties early on in history by writing letters, participating in national liberation movements from abroad, and as expatriates long before the term began to be used in the social sciences. However transnational practices have increased in quantity, diversity, and extent with the advent of new technologies in communication and transportation. A transnational lens differs from the concept of "Global" by localizing migrants' experiences in the reality of living among specific nation-states as they crossed their borders, however their claims still make reference to localized states and not a global post-national reality where boundaries do not exist. Boundaries and frontiers are still very real and a part of their experience of crossing them. Most transnational scholars recognize that migrants may, as a result of their experience of crossing boundaries, develop multiple identities, have multiple points of reference, experience bifocal lives, and feel attached to more than one nation-state or territory. While early on some scholars felt divided over whether bifocality and transnational experiences that involve sustained involvement with the home country were mutually exclusive of experiences of assimilation or integration in the host country, contemporary research has shown that participation and integration in host countries and maintenance of transnational connections with the home country can co-occur without negatively affecting each other. One does not negate the other. Moreover one may facilitate the other. Another area of debate arises from the question of who is considered to be a transnational or transmigrant because even those who maintain transnational connections

may or may not use the language of transnationalism to describe their experiences of living in between worlds.

Early transnational migration research was critiqued for the lack of consideration of the role of gender dynamics. It was criticized, much like migration research in general, for focusing on the experience of male migrants as though they were the only ones who migrated. Feminist scholars have made great contributions that highlight not only the existence and extent of female migration but also how important a role they have in today's migration circuits and transnational connections by supporting family and children through their migrant labor. They are also uncovering the diverse ways in which their experience as migrant women is altering gender dynamics in host and home countries as well. Scholars are also divided about how permanent transnational ties were and whether they would continue through time into future generations which brought about a methodological change to focus on second-generation immigrants (or children of immigrants). Scholars were divided in their opinions about whether the children would continue to maintain an attachment to their parents' home country or not. Although there is no definite answer, recent studies have demonstrated that many children of immigrants do maintain transnational connections even though they may not be as strong or often as their parents. Future studies can help identify motives and consequences of maintaining such ties. Another area of contention that remains is how important are transnational connections and whether extent and type of connection are an important variable to consider when assessing its importance as an explanation variable that merits further research.

Critical Debates

The ethnicity of immigrants usually involves a different categorization within their home countries. Therefore we should reconsider whether the concept of "ethnicity" needs to be reevaluated and understood in the context of transnational social fields that involve more than

one nation-state as their point of reference. Certainly, it points to the inadequacy of ethnic labels that double as national identity labels. The fact that immigrants identify with ethnic labels such as Dominican, Puerto Rican, Mexican, Peruvian, and Irish does not mean that immigrants understand them to be ethnic identity labels. Overemphasized categorization of (im)migrants using ethno-boundaries or national labels can render invisible the reality of those who do not identify with them and instead might gather around issues like labor, religion, and social struggles (e.g., immigrants who do not identify with a national origin label but might instead feel compelled to act to denounce labor or immigration law issues with others who are immigrant workers from their same national origin or not). Time and space are important variables to highlight when looking at transnational migration, especially because the circumstances under which migration occurs and the transnational connections that are made possible are intimately tied to the political, social, and economic circumstances dictated by the time and space in which they occur. There has recently been some work that explores how race dynamics and beliefs are affected and/or constructed through transnational migration (Upegui-Hernandez, 2010).

Transnational theories have been criticized for overemphasizing the process as liberating, positive, grassroots, and based on individual's agency. Researchers have begun to warn against some of the possible negative aspects of transnationalism such as the reification of elite social classes and political systems across borders (Smith, 2003) and how in some cases, like Haiti, transnational nation-states discourses use hegemonic nationalistic discourses to "channel energy and resources away from struggles for social and economic justice" (Glick-Schiller & Fouron, 1999, p. 358). Despite the potential for countering and transgressing boundaries and exercising agency through their movements across national boundaries, structures and social hierarchies find ways to reinstate themselves in the midst of transnational connections. The constitution of social power and privilege has not been investigated as much within transnational circuits. It is important

to remember that for every push from below, one can expect to see a push from above. Just as migrants have questioned and challenged national borders and rules, so have sending and receiving governments worked at redefining and reestablishing control of physical, ideological, and imaginary borders. As governments appropriate and find ways to benefit from the remittances and sociopolitical influence that their emigrants may hold in host countries, there is a lot of potential for their exploitation and abuse, especially by sending countries who are not necessarily working to extend political and social protections to emigrants but are definitely finding ways to benefit from the product of their labor.

International and Practical Relevance

Transnational migration and using a transnational perspective is extremely relevant at the international level since migration is inherently an international phenomenon that involves crossing social, economic, and political boundaries, established and validated by international laws and treaties. Using a transnational lens to view and study migration helps us understand that any rules and policies that aim at regularizing or managing migration should not be made unilaterally and should recognize the universal right to free movement upheld by the United Nations. Policies imposed by individual countries and attempts to close frontiers have not been successful at eliminating transnational ties and involvement. Transnational studies have evidenced how actors and individuals involved in migration find ways to circumvent the effect of restricting policies aimed at reinstating the rigidity of nation-state borders. At the same time, many emigrant-sending countries and small national economies increasingly depend on fostering remittances and the maintenance of transnational ties among its emigrants in order to subsidize their national economies. The enactment of dual citizenship, laws allowing emigrants to run for representation of migrants within their sending countries' political institutions, and government encouragement of formal economic investments of its emigrant in their home territories are a few examples of the relevance of transnational migration to the arena of international affairs.

There are several aspects of transnational migration that have practical relevance for the work of critical psychologists and should be explored. The definition of transnational migration and transnational social fields begins by questioning our long time held assumptions about our definitions and conceptualizations of society within psychological research and practice. Transnational migration unveils to critical psychologists the realities of transnational connections (social, physical, economic, or ideological) which have mainly being ignored in our understanding and treatment of (im)migrants' psychological realities. Restrictive migration and deportation policies have psychological consequences for the well-being of migrants and their children (Dreby, 2012). Social networks represent well-documented sources of support, happiness, and resiliency within psychological research, yet negating access to such transnational social networks to immigrants and their families is equivalent to denying them access to psychological well-being and causing emotional and psychological harm (Upegui-Hernandez, 2010). In addition, (im)migrants who live transnational lives have access to multiple ways of seeing, being, and understanding the world which can be seen as an opportunity to question taken-for-granted ways of doing, being, and seeing the world within specific nation-states and can help highlight possibilities for questioning social injustice and envisioning new ways to deconstruct power and privilege (Upegui-Hernandez, 2010).

Future Direction

Despite the enormous potential for understanding and focusing on human interaction and interpersonal relationships inherent in the uses of transnational social fields as a concept, many of these researchers have focused instead on the kinds of activities that transmigrants carry out such

as remittances, trips to home country, phone and e-mail communication, transnational business practices, and social/human capital (Guarnizo, Sanchez, & Roach, 1999; Portes, 2003). Researchers have studied the outcomes of these behaviors on assimilation, acculturation, and/or incorporation, their effects on ethnic identity, and patterns of integration into the host country (Portes, 1999). Others have focused on the impact of transnational activities in the political and economic development of sending countries (Guarnizo & Díaz, 1999; Smith, 2003). Although Smith (2003) makes an important discussion of how the political state through political decisions has contributed to changing the social representation of transmigrants, citizenship, and migration in general, he also elaborates on how these changing social representations contribute to (re) shape peoples' identities and lives. A few others have begun to question how transnational ties redefine our understanding of sociological constructs such as motherhood, parenting, citizenship, and loyalty (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 1997; Mahler, 2001).

While research on transnational ties is important for understanding the process of migration and transmigration, the psychological importance of transnational ties for immigrants and nonimmigrants remains neglected. In addition, there has been little room for discussing variation by nation, language, color, gender, class, or sexuality among immigrants' experiences. In a recent article, Vertovec (2004 also 2009) notes social science literature on transnational mainly focused on understanding the social organization, specific political and economic practices, and institutions of transnationalism, while questions about motivations, meanings, attitudes, feelings and people's agency in these transnational processes remained largely absent. Beyond that, transnational "dispositions and practices have substantial impact on individual and family life course and strategies, individuals' sense of self and collective belonging, the ordering of personal and group memories, patterns of consumption, collective sociocultural practices, approaches to childrearing and other modes of cultural reproduction." (Vertovec, 2004, p. 977).

From a psychological point of view, the concept of immigrants' "bifocal" orientation to life is perhaps the most interesting. Vertovec uses the term "bifocality" to refer to findings that describe how immigrants maintain a "dual frame of reference" where they "constantly compare their situation in their 'home' society to their situation in the 'host' society abroad" (2004, p. 974 paraphrasing Guarnizo, 1997). This feeling of simultaneously being *here* and *there*, of *double belonging*, is described by Golbert (2001) as a "double consciousness" that develops in maintaining and participating in transnational social fields and having a transnational conception of self. Many researchers have repeatedly mentioned the existence of such "bifocality"/ "double consciousness" among immigrants. Bicultural competence was used to describe the ability of individuals to be aware of and draw from diverse cultural norms (LaFromboise et al., 1993). In an effort to understand bicultural individuals' experiences, (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Hong, Benet-Martinez, Chiu, & Morris, 2003) have more recently advocated for adopting a *dynamic constructivist approach* to the study of culture and social cognition, which they used to construct a theory of *cultural frame switching* in response to social and cognitive heuristic cues among bicultural individuals. More specifically cultural frame switching involves using different cultural interpretative frames to respond to diverse contexts and situations, which include changes in the meanings attached to each cultural frame (Pouliasi & Verkuyten, 2007).

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Online Resources

Transnational Communities Programme. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/

The Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/

Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/

Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/

Transnational Studies Initiative. http://www.peggylevitt.org/the-transnational-studies-initiative.php

Transpersonal Psychology, Overview

Harris Friedman[1] and Glenn Hartelius[2]
[1]Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
[2]Sofia University, Palo Alto, CA, USA

Introduction

Transpersonal psychology (TP) consists of a variety of psychological approaches, research and applied, that look at the individual human as being more than an isolated entity separate from the many contexts in which humans are embedded, including entertaining a spiritual perspective and its profound implications. Insofar as TP overtly challenges many mainstream psychological assumptions and conclusions, it resides among the critical psychologies.

Definition

There have been many attempts to create a definition of TP, but this remains elusive due to TP being such a large container for so many meanings. One recent approach explored numerous previous definitions, summarizing them into three basic themes (Hartelius, Caplan, & Rardin, 2007). The first theme focuses on understanding humans as going beyond ordinary notions of the ego and separateness by recognizing that humans are complex beings who are interconnected with all aspects of the cosmos and have spiritual and transcendent capacities that may not be just limited to ordinary materialistic assumptions. The second theme focuses on understanding integrative and holistic approaches to psychology by providing the largest possible frameworks to view humans, emphasizing inclusivity, diversity, and spirituality. The third theme focuses on understanding psychological transformations, which apply the TP perspective to both individual and systems growth. Together, all three themes mutually reinforce the others as essential parts of TP.

Keywords

Consciousness; meditation; mysticism; spirituality; transpersonal

History

TP emerged in the United States during the 1960s out of three social movements: psychedelic experimentation, social unrest (e.g., for increased civil rights and against the Vietnam war), and growing multicultural awareness (e.g., from Eastern and indigenous spiritual and mystical traditions). In its early development, TP primarily focused on studying altered (i.e., non-ordinary) consciousness states, stemming from the excitement generated around psychedelic use and spiritual practices that began to be popular at that time. These promoted experiences of various extraordinary states, but the notion of seeing these as altered assumed a consensual human experience (i.e., "normal"), which could then become altered (i.e., "abnormal"). Gradually the term altered evolved into one of seeing various states of consciousness, including those that might be normative in various non-Western cultures, as "alternate" rather than simply altered from some presumably normal baseline, as no baseline consciousness state can be privileged as absolutely superior.

TP also considered the transcending of the usual sense of self, at least as experienced in the

modern West as an individual apart from its context. Instead, humans are seen as radically interconnected, such as through an expanded self-concept that goes beyond the sense of being an isolated individual into an interconnectedness with not only other people and the environment but all aspects of the world (e.g., Friedman, 1983; Walsh & Vaughan, 1993). This includes the possibility of identifying with all of existence in space and time or even that which might go beyond existence as ordinarily conceived, such as through transcending limits of space and time. These notions spurred the discontent of some humanistic psychologists, who critically challenged the restrictions of a human-centered psychology that largely ignored humanity's relationship to the cosmos, particularly regarding topics related to higher consciousness and unitive experiences.

Although TP had earlier roots, the *Journal of Transpersonal Psychology* marked its debut as a separate discipline. The journal's first issue included a lead article written by Abraham Maslow (1969), one of the key figures in developing humanistic psychology, who later had become dissatisfied with humanistic psychology's predominant human focus, and he led the refocusing toward a more inclusive and diverse psychology centered on exceptional experiences thought to reflect human potential and interconnectedness with the cosmos, which became TP. Along with Maslow, other notable founders were Stanislav Grof (1985), Stanley Krippner (1972), and Charles Tart (1975). The Institute of Transpersonal Psychology (initially the California Institute of Transpersonal Psychology, now Sofia University) was created in 1975, granting doctoral and other degrees for educating TP practitioners and researchers. Other US schools offering opportunities for doctoral-level study of TP include Saybrook University and the California Institute of Integral Studies, while some schools provide master's degrees in TP (e.g., Naropa University and West Georgia University), and many schools include courses and even allow doctoral specialization in TP. TP continues to progress toward understanding and facilitating the achievement of individual higher consciousness and spirituality, as well as social and cultural transformation that can support and sustain these changes.

Traditional Debates

Many areas emphasized by TP have been ignored, or even denigrated as unworthy of study, by mainstream psychology. The most basic of these is the study of consciousness, which has now become legitimate in its own right but, in the 1960s, was essentially taboo for psychologists to study. TP is also noteworthy for challenging many Western assumptions about psychology, especially claims that tout Westerners as superior to other people and that psychological findings obtained in the West are culturally universal. Consequently, it anticipated much of the multicultural movement gaining traction later within psychology. TP has also led the way to developing several transpersonal disciplines that are nonpsychological, including transpersonal anthropology and sociology, which recognize that the transpersonal perspective is broader than merely psychological.

The growth of TP also promoted insights regarding limitations of traditional scientific approaches, helping forge a paradigm shift in psychology. This shift parallels the end of the so-called cultural wars in which qualitative approaches are gradually being seen as just as valid as quantitative approaches within psychology, but what TP offers to psychological methods is even more radical. TP challenges the hegemony of rigid beliefs about what is proper science by asserting the validity of alternate methodologies (and their underlying epistemologies and even ontologies) via state-specific approaches in which data may be accessed in alternate states of consciousness (Tart, 1975). Using such alternate methods is not inferior for research and practice, but may even be more valid than mainstream psychological methods when applied to studying humans across vastly differing cultures and as related to exceptional experiences within Western cultures. In fact, conventional scientific methods may not be very effective in such settings.

Consequently, TP has pioneered various human science approaches, which differ from conventional methods used when psychology is seen as only a natural science, as opposed to being viewed through the lens of alternate assumptions about knowing and reality (Braud & Anderson, 1999). As an example, meditators within various spiritual traditions have for millennia explored higher consciousness using cumulatively consensual and shared internal observations. If these are understood as valid experiential data, they might be considered within some form of empirical science, but a science that deals with what is conventionally inner rather than outer data (e.g., Hartelius, 2007). TP considers such alternate methods for studying complex and subtle phenomena, such as from deep meditative experiences, to be more appropriate than attempts to apply conventional scientific approaches to their study. For example, experimental methods using short-term interventions with a fabricated meditation protocol or survey methods with superficial multiple-choice questions are thought to fall far short of appreciating the complexity of such phenomena.

Critical Debates

Currently TP faces many challenges. Among these is differentiating itself from the psychology of religion, which now focuses on spirituality openly but primarily in ways typically derivative from Western monotheistic (e.g., Judeo-Christian) assumptions. The psychology of religion also tends to be more focused on demographics and other external variables related to spirituality. In contrast, TP takes from all traditions, not just the Western monotheistic, and values experiential approaches, not just those that are more external. Additionally, insights from TP offer alternate understandings to prevailing Western materialistic assumptions, such as those gleaned from near-death experiences, which suggest that consciousness might be independent of brain functioning. These even provide an alignment between TP and some aspects of parapsychology, although the connections between these two disciplines are not fully developed.

Finally, the role of individual development is a key area of current debate within TP. Some TP theorists (e.g., Wilber, 2000) have postulated that all transpersonal development occurs through set universal stages, including post-conventional ones involving higher insights that are transrational, as opposed to others (e.g., Ferrer, 2002) who argue that there can be considerable variance among different paths to higher development. A deeper understanding of cultural variances in worldview is also a growing concern of TP.

International Relevance

The emergence of TP caused a split between transpersonal and humanistic psychologists in the United States, focused on debate as to whether TP should remain connected to or become separate from humanistic psychology. A separation occurred when the Association for Transpersonal Psychology, a primarily US-based organization, spun off from the Association for Humanistic Psychology. However, subsequent efforts to form a separate Division of Transpersonal Psychology within the American Psychological Association were unsuccessful, resulting in TP maintaining its home within the Division of Humanistic Psychology in that organization. In contrast, the British Psychological Society has its own Transpersonal Psychology Section, keeping the two movements more separate there. In addition, there are many active transpersonal associations globally (e.g., European Transpersonal Association), many of which are now cooperating since the 1978 launching of the International Transpersonal Association. This global association excluded the use of the term psychology explicitly to include other transpersonal disciplines, so that it would not be seen as just psychological but encompassing many areas of transpersonal study and application (Friedman, 2002). This broader position toward not focusing exclusively on psychology is also reflected in the *International Journal of Transpersonal Studies*, founded in 1981 (initially known as the *Australian Journal of Transpersonal Psychology*). Other journals and schools focusing on TP, as

well as more broadly transpersonal studies, have now been created all over the world.

Practice Relevance

Increasingly, TP involves clinical applications in psychology, such as in assessment (Friedman & MacDonald, 2002) and psychotherapy (e.g., Grof, Grof, & Kornfield, 2010). These provide a basis for psychologists working not only with psychopathologies but also, at the other end of the spectrum, with optimal human development, including spiritual and transcendental experiences. TP does not ignore psychopathology, but recognizes that both higher consciousness and psychopathology often overlap and can be difficult to differentiate (e.g., religious and spiritual content is common in both psychosis and spiritual emergence; Johnson & Friedman, 2008; Phillips, Lukoff & Stone, 2009). In addition, many psychotherapeutic approaches now finding widespread mainstream expression have their roots stemming from TP, such as the burgeoning interest in mindfulness approaches to psychotherapy, although these are seldom labeled as transpersonal per se. Finally, TP is forging a role in social change and other larger systems applications (e.g., involving peace and environmental sustainability). The transpersonal perspective provides an inclusive and increasingly coherent framework for these and many other applied efforts.

Future Directions

Recently, the primarily US-based Association for Humanistic Psychology and the Association for Transpersonal Psychology have remerged. This suggests that humanistic psychology and TP may increasingly become viewed as complementary rather than separate. From such a stance, to be fully human requires recognizing the transpersonal aspects of one's human nature, while, conversely, being transpersonal requires being grounded in one's humanity. It is also anticipated that TP will become more important with the resurgence of clinical applications of psychedelics (Friedman, 2006) as well as significant advances in neurobiology (Krippner & Friedman, 2010) and virtual technologies for altering consciousness. In addition, the growth of multiculturalism is exposing more people to other, often competing, worldviews, which can spur the development of TP as a way to deal with the challenge of diversity, especially regarding religious and spiritual differences that often fuel discord and conflict. Understanding human interconnectedness with the planet at a deeper level can also impact the growing environmental crises. Antiquated visions of the human as separate and isolated are increasingly strained, while TP provides a large framework to understand and operate adaptively in a more holistic way in the emerging world.

In summary, TP provides a number of salient critiques to mainstream psychology as well as to humanistic psychology and its recent offshoot, positive psychology. First, it was one of the first psychological approaches to actually appreciate, rather than denigrate, non-Western cultures, and its future direction will likely involve furthering multiculturalism. Second, it bolstered the humanistic critique of mainstream methodolotry (Friedman, 2003), in which only certain methods were seen as legitimate scientific approaches to psychology, and its future will likely involve increased legitimacy for research conducted in alternate states and in other nonconventional ways, such as using various emerging forms of technology and neurobiological advances. Third, in contrast to the psychology of religion that predominantly focuses on phenomena similar to those studied by TP but primarily from a distanced academic and non-experiential way, TP will likely foster more experiential applications of transpersonal phenomena, such as in mindfulness. Last, by situating its focus not just on humans but on humans in relationship to the larger cosmos, it opens avenues to studying and intervening in a variety of areas important for human adaptation and even transformation. In these ways and more, TP fits well as an important critical psychology.

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European Transpersonal Association. http://www.eurotas.org

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies. http://www.transpersonalstudies.org

International Transpersonal Association. http://www.transpersonalassociation.org

Transsexualism, Overview

Katherine Johnson
School of Applied Social Sciences,
University of Brighton, Brighton, UK

Introduction

The term "transsexualism" was reportedly first used by D. O. Cauldwell (1949) but popularized by Harry Benjamin MD (1953) in a response to the widely reported media coverage of the story of Christine Jorgensen who had undergone reassignment surgery by a team of surgeons in Denmark. Although Benjamin is often described as the "father of transsexualism," accounts of medical attempts to reconstruct the sex/gendered body can be found earlier with the most frequently cited case being Lili Elbe (Hoyer, 1933). The field of transsexualism has been hotly contested with debates over the legitimacy of transsexualism as a syndrome, its etiological basis, and the appropriateness of medical interventions and reassignment surgery as a form of treatment. Critics have pointed to the sociomedical constructed nature of transsexualism which functions to regulate a binary gender system, with some positioning transsexuals as "medical dupes" (e.g., Hausman, 1995). At stake is whether or not claims to gender

categories should be grounded in essentialist or social constructionist terms. Transsexualism shook the epistemological foundations of gender but also raised significant challenges for those feminists (e.g., Jeffreys, 2003; Raymond, 1980) who rejected transsexualism on political grounds. In more recent years transsexualism has been reconceptualized in light of the emergence of queer theory and transgender politics precipitating a greater focus on the subjective experience of those who come to call themselves "trans." This has resulted in significant improvements in the guidelines for standards of care in the field of transgender health (WPATH, 2011) and the replacement of gender identity disorders (GIDS) with the diagnosis gender dysphoria in DSM 5 (APA, 2013).

Definition

Transsexualism is a term primarily utilized by those working in clinical settings to describe individuals who seek or have received hormonal and/or surgical treatment to enable a change in their gender presentation. Since its emergence in the 1950s, its use has undergone a number of revisions in the clinical literature from a diagnostic category itself to an adjective (WPATH, 2011) that might be used to describe someone who has a persistent feeling of gender dysphoria. As an identity category, from the mid-1990s the term transsexual became increasingly subsumed under the umbrella term "transgender" sitting alongside many other self-naming devices for gender variation or gender nonconformity. Reasons for this shift include the increased politicization of a generation of transsexual subjects who wished to reject the pathologizing connotations associated with the medicalization of transsexualism and promote better understanding of their subjectivity. Latterly, a preference for the term "trans" has emerged avoiding the borderline identity battles between conceptualizations of transsexualism and transgenderism that ensued and the question of whether the transition involves changing sex or changing gender.

Keywords

Transsexual; transgender; gender dysphoria; gender identity disorders (GIDs); gender nonconformity

Traditional Debates

Debates in the field of transsexualism have traditionally been divided between two major approaches (Bolin, 1988). The first is a clinical perspective that encompasses medical, psychiatric, and psychological research where transsexualism is frequently understood as a syndrome that requires medical treatment and a better understanding of its etiological origins. The second perspective is broadly sociocultural asking questions about the relationship transsexualism has to society at large. Within traditional debates, whether focusing on the etiology or analyzing transsexualism in a quest to understand how gender is socially constructed, transsexuals have been theorized in order to understand the broader categories of sex and gender. Less attention has been paid to the lived experiences of those who identify as transsexual or transgendered.

With no etiological grounding and the potential for people to self-define through personal suffering, a number of criticisms were raised about psychiatric practice and the validity of reassignment surgery. A wave of opposition emerged in the late 1960s about the surgical treatment of what some perceived to be a psychological disorder. The attack was led by psychoanalysts in private practice who labeled transsexuals as "border-line psychotics" and charged surgeons with "collaboration with psychosis" (Meerloo, 1967, p. 263). In order to counter these claims, Robert Stoller's advancement of the role of early socialization in the formation of gender identity provided the needed etiological justification for a non-pathological account of cross-gender identification. His claim that "core gender identity" forms early in life and has little propensity to change enabled him to argue that psychoanalysis was pointless for

transsexuals as there is no psychological conflict. Instead, the distress displayed is the result of having a core gender identity discordant with their biological sex (Stoller, 1975).

Others construed transsexualism as a sociomedical construction (e.g., Szasz, 1990) critiquing reassignment surgery as an attempt to uphold a binary gender system rather than exploring the possibility of greater variation in sex/gender experience. In an extensive empirical study, the feminist social psychologists Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna investigated "what transsexualism can illuminate about the day-to-day social construction of gender by all persons" (Kessler & McKenna, 1985, p. 112). Their ethnomethodological analysis of interviews with 15 transsexuals produced 6 beliefs that focused on practices of "passing" that contributed to the "naturalization of gender." They suggested that by rarely referring to themselves as "transsexual" and by claiming to have always been one gender, transsexuals, like all of us, reinforced the "natural" binary gender system. Their research represented a significant shift away from traditional studies of transsexualism that focused on etiology and treatment yet avoided the acerbic critique of radical feminists such as Janice Raymond (1980) who attacked transsexual women as "misguided men" set on infiltrating women's spaces. More recently, Sheila Jeffreys (2003) has argued that gender reassignment surgery is a technique to eradicate homosexuality, a claim that does not stand up when considering the significant number of trans-identified people who identify as lesbian or gay after transition. Those working within radical feminist perspectives sought to challenge patriarchal values and gender oppression as well as create safe spaces for women, some of whom had suffered from violence and discrimination often perpetrated by men. Social constructionist ideas were seen as useful for arguing that the social roles ascribed to women were not based in nature, but many fell back on essentialist gender declarations when it permitted others, who had been born male, to lay claim to the social identity "woman." The charge against trans-identified people by feminists such

as Raymond and Jeffreys diminishes the importance of broader social institutions in maintaining gender inequality and oppression by blaming minorities who have their own struggles to construct what Butler (2004) refers to as a livable life.

Critical Debates

The key problem with traditional debates in the field of transsexualism is that neither dominant perspective sufficiently engaged with the embodied experiences of those who came to self-define as transsexual. For clinicians working in the field, the requirement for those presenting to fit a narrow predefined script to achieve a diagnosis hampered understanding transsexualism and contributed to maintaining stereotypical gender norms of what it means to be male or female. For those gender theorists studying the "figure" of the transsexual for what it can tell us about broader categories of sex and gender, transsexualism became a site of political contestation. In latter years, with the emergence of transgender studies, we have seen more empirical studies that seek to better understand transsexual subjectivity (e.g., Elliot & Roen, 1998; Johnson, 2007; Rubin, 2003). These studies demonstrate the complexities and inconsistencies in narrated accounts of transsexual men and women as they negotiate medical, psychological, and sociocultural discourses and demonstrate the ways in which transsexual subjects also unsettle the medical and heteronormative discourses that attempt to regulate the binary gender system. This observation offers the potential to highlight shared experiences of gender oppression across identity categories as well as the opportunity to interrogate the intersections of sex, gender, and sexuality. A key focus for critical psychologists working in the field (e.g., Roen, 2011) is on the way the inclusion of gender identity disorders in DSM IV (APA, 2000) and their reconceptualization in DSM V (e.g., Zucker, 2010) contribute to gender oppression and subjective modes of experiencing gender variation.

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Online Resources

International Journal of Transgenderism

World Professional Association for Transgender Health: http://www.wpath.org/index.cfm

Trauma

Bodil Pedersen
Department of Psychology and Educational Studies, Roskilde Universitet, Roskilde, Denmark

Introduction

The concept of trauma has been imported by psychology from the medical field, where it signifies a physical injury.

Mainstream and critical concepts of trauma and traumatization have been and are widely discussed in psychology. Yet, as a part of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, 2013), and although other approaches are also in use (Ringel & Brandell, 2012), the concepts are dominantly represented by the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Therefore, PTSD, and the presentation of an alternative approach, will be central to this entry.

Definitions

Depending on the contexts in which it is used and criticized, the concept of trauma is varyingly defined. One example is Freud's psychoanalytical approach, where it, among others, describes psychological aspects of children's discovery of adult sexuality.

In the medical/psychological PTSD diagnosis, all events that threaten one's life or – supposedly – one's integrity are designated as trauma. As a long-term psychophysical reaction to trauma, the diagnosis designates traumatization in ways similar to its original medical use: PTSD is defined as a syndrome, a condition characterized by a specific set of clearly delimited symptoms common to most people. These are described as (1) the traumatic event being reexperienced in the shape of nightmares, flashbacks, and/or overwhelming, uncontrollable thoughts, (2) repeated avoidance of activities and

thoughts connected to the event, and (3) reinforced vigilance not experienced before the event, such as insomnia, lack of concentration, irritability, and generalized anxiety.

Keywords

PTSD; resilience; medicalization; generalization; objectification; subjection; looping effects; colonization

Traditional Debates

The practices using PTSD have been named psychotraumatology. Theoretical and professional discussions focus mainly on which "symptoms" or constellations of symptoms are crucial to the syndrome and on how long they must continue to allow for diagnosis and treatment. Further discussions are concerned with whether trauma may cause dissimilar reactions such as depression or alcoholism, as well as with which so-called secondary factors may contribute to the "syndrome." Also, some participants in the field wish to integrate the diagnosis in more community-oriented approaches.

Currently, with the growing frequency and amount of events and reactions designated as trauma and traumatization, PTSD serves as a catch-all diagnosis for many and very diverse difficulties. This has resulted in a critique for possible overdiagnosis.

Critical Debates

Psychotraumatology and its specialists, conferences, and widespread networks dominate the possible debates. Commercial interests are involved in developing and using tests, as well as in testing and furthering medical research.

The specific diagnosis, as well as the diagnostic approach as such, has been questioned frequently (Bracken, 1998; Caplan & Cosgrove, 2004). PTSD's focus on kinds of events and on measuring symptoms assumed to be universal reduces persons and their suffering to abstract,

static, and quantifiable entities, disregarding culture. Also assuming that events predefined as traumatic are traumatizing is circular thinking.

Some of the critical debates are positivism critical but also anti-psychiatric, feminist, postmodern and postcolonial. Although generally inspired by critical voices, this entry is mainly indebted to the German/European critical theory of subjects as participating in situated but also overarching practices of society (Dreier, 2008). Understanding personal difficulties and psychological concepts as historical and reflecting relations of power, the approach aims at a critique of society and psychology.

Disregarding subjects' first perspectives and their interconnection with praxis, PTSD objectifies persons, their perceptions, feelings and actions as deviations from a nonexisting normality (Pedersen, 2011). Yet, its incorporation in DSM in 1980 resulted from a cooperative effort by psychiatrists and war veterans from the first war in Iraq. Their intention was to facilitate recognition of needs connected to soldiers' war experiences. But currently it has, like other diagnosis, become a prerequisite for obtaining help. Individualizing suffering due to such practices as war, rape, and torture, as has been the case on the West Bank and in Cambodia, diagnostic practices risk stigmatizing whole populations as having a so-called mental disease.

When at all included in the diagnosis, personal/societal aspects of gender, class and ethnicity, are usually understood as secondary to the event designated as a traumatic. Consequently, co-determining aspects of persons' complex conduct of life are reduced to a designated, singular, and main cause. But diverse societal aspects have central meanings for distress and difficulties experienced by diagnosed persons. Excluding such processes and their meanings for suffering and changes in the conduct of life, before, during, and after events designated as traumatic contributes to the symbolic violence inherent in PTSD: At the expense of their personhood, i.e., their subjectivity and agency, persons may merely be identified and identify themselves as helpless victims of predefined events and ensuing "syndromes."

Some practitioners are critical of using the diagnosis. Practice as well as research departing from first person psychosocial perspectives, instead of from objectifying psycho-medical ones, indicates that overwhelming and/or violent experiences diverge greatly in their personal and situated meanings. Most often the diagnosis does not represent the perspectives of primarily affected persons. When it does, it can be due to looping effects: Psychological concepts of trauma and traumatization have become part of folk psychology, and personal assessment of distress draws on PTSD. Concepts of trauma, traumatization, and denial have become normative notions, indicating how one is expected to act, think, and feel. They may contribute to difficulties and distress, for example, when persons worry at the absence of diagnostic symptoms, or even designate this as denial.

Therefore, taking a critical and situated first person perspective point of departure – instead of an objectifying third person diagnostic perspective – may help understand diversity and concrete changes in difficulties and distress.

Hence, concepts of trauma and traumatization profit from being reconceptualized as difficulties in and with ones situated conduct of life. Diverse overwhelming and/or violent events are then understood as serious disruptions, difficulties, and/or constraints in this life. "Symptoms" become visible as aspects of difficult processes of change in and changing the interconnected conceptions of one self, ones conduct of life, and life conditions.

This approach does not use reductive categories like cause, reactions, and symptoms, but rather of actions, thoughts, and feelings related to conditions for conducting lives. Accordingly, distress and suffering, but also changing and overcoming them, are understood as complex aspects of changing relations between person and world. Then, instead of instrumentally directing more or less standardized treatment at objectified persons with apparent universal difficulties, professionals and laypersons may support persons and communities in difficult changes of their situated conduct of lives.

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